Smith v. Superintendent

Filing 8

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 1 PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed by Kevin E Smith. Signed by Judge Joseph S Van Bokkelen on 3/12/2015. (lhc)

United States District Court
Northern District of Indiana
KEVIN E. SMITH,

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Petitioner,
v.
SUPERINTENDENT,
Respondent.

Civil Action No. 3:14-CV-1921 JVB

OPINION AND ORDER
Kevin E. Smith, a pro se prisoner, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254 challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding. (DE 1.) In ISP-14-04-0231, a hearing
officer at the Indiana State Prison (“ISP”), found Smith guilty of Class B offense 2222, setting a fire
without authorization. (DE 5-3 at 1.)
The charges were initiated on April 16, 2014, when Correctional Officer D. Panagiotidis
prepared a conduct report, which stated:
At approx. 5:05 pm on 4/16/14 Offender Smith lit two fires in his cell. Smoke was
filling the entire 100 East range. I Officer Panagiotidis ran to get [a] fire
extinguisher and put them out.
(Id.)
On May 23, 2014, Smith was notified of the charges when he was served with the conduct
report and the notice of disciplinary hearing. (DE 5-2 at 1.) Smith was notified of his rights; he
pleaded not guilty and did not request a lay advocate, or witnesses. (Id.) However, the screening
report states that Smith requested as physical evidence “evidence sheet attached via Smith.” (Id.;
DE 5-3 at 11.)

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A hearing officer conducted the disciplinary hearing on June 6, 2014. (DE 5-3 at 1.) Smith
refused to attend the hearing, but provided two written statements. (DE 5-3 at 1, 2.) The hearing
officer, relying on the conduct report, Smith’s written statements, work logs and witness statements,
found Smith guilty. (DE 5-3.) The hearing officer imposed a 60-day deprivation of earned time
credit. Smith’s appeals were denied and this petition followed. (DE 5-4, 5-5.)
When prisoners lose earned time credits in a prison disciplinary hearing, they are entitled
to certain protections under the Due Process Clause: (1) advance written notice of the charges; (2)
an opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision maker; (3) an opportunity to call witnesses
and present documentary evidence in defense when consistent with institutional safety and
correctional goals; and (4) a written statement by a fact finder of evidence relied on and the reasons
for the disciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563 (1974). To satisfy due process,
there must also be “some evidence” to support the hearing officer’s decision. Superintendent, Mass.
Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).
Here, Smith raises two claims in his petition: (1) the disciplinary hearing officer was biased;
and (2) he was denied evidence. (DE 1 at 2.)
First, Smith complains that the disciplinary hearing officer was biased because he is close
friends with the reporting officers. “Adjudicators are entitled to a presumption of honesty and
integrity, and thus the constitutional standard for impermissible bias is high.” Piggie v. Cotton, 342
F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Due process is satisfied so long as no member of
the disciplinary board was involved in the investigation or prosecution of the particular case, or has
had any other form of personal involvement in the case. Id. at 667. Here, there are no allegations that
the hearing officer had any such involvement. As a result, this claim cannot succeed.

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Smith next complains that the hearing officer denied him video footage of the cell and
maintenance records of a nearby water leak. Notably, the hearing officer determined that neither
the requested camera footage nor any maintenance records for a leak existed. (DE 5-3 at 1, 14, 17,
18.) “[T]he due process clause does not demand the impossible of government authorities.”
Brockert v. Skornicka, 711 F.2d 1376, 1382 (7th Cir. 1983). Thus, prison officials are not required
to produce video or records that do not exist. Jackson v. Hanlon, No. 1:07-CV-1342, 2009 WL
425965 at *2, 3 (Feb. 19, 2009 S.D. Ind.). Nevertheless, even if this claim could somehow be
categorized as a denial of evidence, to show a due process violation Smith would be required to
show that the evidence was exculpatory and that he was prejudiced based on that denial. Jones v.
Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 847 (7th Cir. 2011); Rasheed-Bey v. Duckworth, 969 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir.
1992). Here, Smith does not explain how not having the maintenance records or video prejudiced
him. In a statement submitted to the hearing officer, Smith claimed that he had complained to
correctional staff that there was a water leak in his cell and he was being ignored so he “took a
Honeybun box and lit it on fire and held it in [his] hand . . . trying to set off the fire alarm to gain
the proper staff’s attention.” (DE 5-3 at 8.) Because Smith admitted to setting the fire without
authorization, there can be no prejudice from not having the requested evidence. Moreover, based
on his admission to setting the fire, neither the video nor the maintenance records would have
exculpated Smith. Thus, this claim is without merit as well.
Not only is there “some” evidence to find Smith guilty of the charged offense, but there has
been no showing that he was deprived any due process along the way. Based on the record, there
is sufficient evidence to find Smith guilty of setting a fire without authorization, a Class B offense
222, and Smith has not made a showing that his due process rights have been violated.

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For the reasons set forth above, the petition (DE 1) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED on March 12, 2015.
s/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen
Joseph S. Van Bokkelen
United States District Judge
Hammond Division

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