Lippert Components Manufacturing, Inc. v. Mor/Ryde International Inc et al

Filing 181

OPINION AND ORDER: The disputed claim term "pivotally mounted" is construed in the manner set forth in this Opinion and Order. The Court will contact counsel in the near future to schedule a telephonic status conference so that this case may move forward. Signed by Judge Jon E DeGuilio on 6/18/18. (ksp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
LIPPERT COMPONENTS
MANUFACTURING, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
MOR/RYDE INTERNATIONAL INC.,
and MOR/RYDE INC.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:14-CV-1999 JD

OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Lippert Components Manufacturing, Inc. (“Lippert”) alleges that Defendants
Mor/Ryde International, Inc. and Mor/Ryde, Inc. (“Mor/Ryde”) have infringed and contributed
to the infringement of Lippert’s patents (U.S. Patent Nos. 7,918,478 (issued on April 5, 2011)
and 7,296,821 (issued on November 20, 2007), hereinafter referred to as the ‘478 patent and ‘821
patent, respectively), which concern the same suspension system equalizer technology.1 The
accused instrumentality concerns Mor/Ryde’s products known as the CRE/3000 suspension
system [DE 61-2] and the SRE/4000 suspension system [DE 61-3]. The parties initially
identified four terms appearing in the patents that require construction: “suspension system”;
“pivotally mounted”; “generally encapsulated between”; and, “at least partially encapsulated
between”. However, once the claim construction briefs were filed [DE’s 110, 121, 122, 132, 133]

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The patents-in-suit are entitled “Equalizer For Suspension System” and relate to an equalizer for a suspension
system for a trailer. The Abstracts and the Summary of the Invention of the patents-in-suit provide that an equalizer
is configured to absorb or dampen harsh shocks or vibrations coming off of leaf springs to allow for a softer ride in
vehicles or trailers having tandem axles generally between 2,000 to 7,000 pounds with double eye springs. The
invention achieves this softer ride by using one or two independent equalizer arms that are rotatably secured within
the equalizer. Each equalizer arm is associated with one of the leaf springs such that upon upward movement of the
leaf spring, the equalizer arm assembly is forced to rotate within the equalizer and to deform a shock absorber
provided within the equalizer. The shock absorber then, upon deformation, absorbs the shocks and vibrations.

and the claims construction hearing held [DE 168], the parties agreed that the only contested
term requiring the Court’s consideration was the term “pivotally mounted”.2
I.

Legal Standard

As a matter of law, the Court must construe the claims of the patent for the jury.
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 977 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Claim construction is
crucial because it “defines the scope of the protected invention.” Bell Commc'ns Research, Inc. v.
Vitalink Commc'ns Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 619 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
In interpreting a disputed claim, the court must first look at the intrinsic evidence of
record—the patent itself, including the claims, the specification, and (if in evidence) the
prosecution history. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
The process begins with the words of the claims. Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa North American Corp.,
299 F.3d 1313, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2002). “It is a bedrock principle of patent law that the claims of a
patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.” Phillips v.
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted);
Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1324 (“The claim language defines the bounds of claim scope.”). Absent an
express intent otherwise, claim terms should be given “the ordinary and customary meaning . . .
that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the
invention.”3 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. “[T]he context of the surrounding words of the claim

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The parties agree that “suspension system” is properly construed as “component(s) connecting the axle of a vehicle
to the frame of the vehicle” [DE 110 at 2]; and, they withdrew construction of the terms “generally encapsulated
between” and “at least partially encapsulated between”.

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Mor/Ryde does not dispute Lippert’s assertion that the person of ordinary skill in the art is someone who has either
(i) a high-school degree and approximately five years of mechanical experience in suspension systems for trailers or
recreational vehicles or (ii) a mechanical technology degree with approximately a year of experience in suspension
systems for trailers or recreational vehicles.

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also must be considered in determining the ordinary and customary meaning of those terms.”
ACTV, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 346 F.3d 1082, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
However, the claims do not stand alone and they “must be read in view of the
specification, of which they are a part.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at
979). The specification includes the drawings and the written description of the invention.
Playtex Products, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble, Co., 400 F.3d 901, 909 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The
specification “is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is
dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at
1315 (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582). It can resolve ambiguities between the ordinary and
customary meaning of words if the words used in the claim are not sufficiently clear to allow the
scope of the claim to be determined from words alone. Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1325. Yet, there’s a
difference “between using the specification to interpret the meaning of a claim,” which is
permissible, and “importing limitations from the specification into the claim,” which is not.
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. “[T]he general principle is that limitations from the specification are
not to be read into the claims.” Sjolund v. Musland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(citation omitted).
Finally, the court must look to the patent’s prosecution history, which “consists of the
complete record of the proceedings before the [USPTO] and includes the prior art cited during
the examination of the patent.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. “The prosecution history can often
inform the meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how the inventor understood the
invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the course of prosecution, making the
claim scope narrower than it would otherwise be.” Id. A patentee may modify the “meaning of a

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claim term by making a clear and unmistakable disavowal of scope during prosecution.” Purdue
Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms., Inc., 438 F.3d 1123, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Nonetheless, if intrinsic evidence does not resolve the ambiguity in a disputed claim
term, the court may then look to extrinsic evidence, such as expert testimony, inventor testimony,
dictionaries, and treatises. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584. Extrinsic evidence may help the court
better understand “the way in which one of skill in the art might use the claim terms.” AquaTex
Indus., Inc. v. Techniche Solutions, 419 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). But
extrinsic evidence may not be used to “contradict any definition found in or ascertained by a
reading of the patent documents.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1322–23 (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d at
1584, n.6). As the Federal Circuit explained in Phillips: “Ultimately, the interpretation to be
given a term can only be determined and confirmed with a full understanding of what the
inventors actually invented and intended to envelop with the claim. The construction that stays
true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention
will be, in the end, the correct construction.” Id. at 1316 (citation omitted).
II.

Construction of “Pivotally Mounted”

The term “pivotally mounted” appears in the ‘821 patent: Claims 1, 8-10, 12-14, 23-25,
and 27-28 (with Claims 1 and 14 asserted in the independent format); and, in the ‘478 patent:
Claims 1, 4, 15, and 17 (with Claims 1 and 15 asserted in the independent format).
In its opening claim construction brief, Lippert proposes that “pivotally mounted” should
be construed as “mounted for rotation about an axis.” [DE 121 at 13]. Lippert notes that the
specifications of the patents use the description “rotatably secured or pivotally mounted,” and the
figures illustrate that the rotation occurring between the identified components occurs “about an

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axis.” Extrinsically, Lippert argues that its proposed definition is also consistent with the
dictionary definitions that it has provided.
In response, Mor/Ryde argues that Lippert’s claim construction position relative to the
term “pivotally mounted”: (1) is inconsistent with the plain and ordinary meaning given to it by
the specification “because it would include embodiments where the axis point could move nonrotationally” [DE 133 at 7–9]; (2) broadens the claims beyond the inventor’s intention as
evidenced by the inventor’s descriptions of the invention in the patents’ Summary of the
Invention, the Abstract, and the embodiments [Id. at 9–11]; (3) is not consistent with the
remaining dictionary definitions of the word “pivot” [Id. at 11–12]; and (4) will render the
patents-in-suit invalid for failure to comply with the enablement requirement [Id. at 13–14].
Ultimately, Mor/Ryde argues that no construction of the term “pivotally mounted” is necessary
because the ordinary and customary meaning is so apparent—that is, the term necessarily
describes rotational (not linear) movement, around a “fixed” axis. In sum, the parties’ dispute
concerns whether “pivotally mounted” allows rotational movement only from a fixed point.
The Court finds that the intrinsic evidence does not support Mor/Ryde’s overly narrow
reading of the claim term “pivotally mounted”. Claims 1 and 14 of the ‘821 patent recite that a
“first plate [is] pivotally mounted to the frame of the vehicle” and that “at least one equalizer arm
[is] pivotally mounted to said first plate”; and, Claim 14 further recites that the “equalizer [is]
pivotally mounted to the frame of the vehicle.” [DE 121-1 at 27-28]. Similarly, Claims 1 and 15
of the ‘478 patent recite that a “first plate [is] pivotally mounted to the frame of the vehicle” and
that “at least one equalizer arm [is] pivotally mounted to said first plate”; and, Claim 15 further
recites that the “equalizer [is] pivotally mounted to the frame of the vehicle.” [DE 121-2 at 6869].

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The specifications of the ‘821 and ‘478 patents describe that the first plate is “rotatably
secured or pivotally mounted” [DE 121-1 at p. 26, 17:62-18:28; DE 121-2 at p. 54, 20:21-49];
that the equalizer arm is “rotatably secured or pivotally mounted between the first and second
base plates” [DE 121-1, at 26, 17:39-45; DE 121-2 at 54, 19:66-20:6]; and, that the equalizer is
“rotatably secured or pivotally mounted” between extending portions of the center frame hangar
[DE 121-1 at p. 26-27, 17:62-18:28, 18:45-19:6; DE 121-2 at p. 54-55, 20:21-49, 21:3-31].
With respect to the drawings, figures 2 and 35-36 of the ‘821 patent illustrate that the first
plate (104b) of the equalizer (100) is mounted for rotation about an axis (illustrated at point J in
figure 2, see also fastening member (390)) to a center frame hanger (372) of the frame (374) of
the vehicle. DE 121-1 at Figs. 2 and 35-36; see also DE 121-1 at p. 26-27, 18:49-55 (discussing
that the equalizer is “rotatably secured” to the center frame at point J). The figures also illustrate
that the equalizer arm (108b) is mounted for rotation about an axis (illustrated at points R or S in
figure 2, see also fastening members (122b and 122c) and securing members (124b and 124c)) to
the first plate (104b), wherein the rotation can actually be seen in comparing the change in the
side spacing between the first plate (104b) and the equalizer arm (108a/b) across figures 36-38.
Id.; see also DE 121-1 at p. 26-27, 17:39-45; 19:56-60 (discussing that the equalizer arm “rotates
or pivots” about point R); 20:17-21 (discussing that the equalizer arm “rotates or pivots” about
point S).4 Similarly, figures 39-44 of the ‘478 patent illustrate that the first plate (520a) of the
equalizer (500) is mounted for rotation about an axis (illustrated at point J in figure 39, see also
upper pivot tube (532) and bushing (534a)) to a center frame hanger (516) of the frame (760) of
the vehicle. DE 121-2, at Figs. 39-44; see also DE 121-2 at p. 61, 33:9-13 (noting that the

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In the specification of the ‘821 and ‘478 patents, the rotation that occurs between the identified components occurs
“about an axis.” DE 121-1, 3:12-34 (describing the views of Figures 33 through 38); 19:55-60; 20:17-22 (noting
rotation occurs about identified points R and/or S, with said points corresponding with an axes); id. at 18:49-55
(noting rotation occurs about identified point J, with said point corresponding with an axis).

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equalizer “rotates” upwardly and to the left relative to the center hanger (516) about point J);
33:31-35 (noting that the equalizer “rotates” upwardly and to the left relative to the center hanger
(516) about point J). The figures also illustrate that the equalizer arm (524a) is mounted for
rotation about an axis (illustrated at points R or S in figure 39; see also fastening members (750b
and 750c) and securing members (756b and 756b)); see also pivot tubes (590a and 590b) of the
equalizer arms to the first plate (520a). Id.; see also DE 121-2 at p. 61, 33:13-17 (noting that the
equalizer arm “rotates” or pivots upwardly between the first and second plates about point R);
33:35-39 (noting that the equalizer arm “rotates” or pivots upwardly between the first and second
plates about point S).
Thus, the specifications indicate that rotation of parts “pivotally mounted” occur about a
point or axis, but does not necessarily limit the movement to a “fixed” axis point. Mor/Ryde’s
attempt to import such a limitation, without a clear indication in the intrinsic record that the
patentee intended the claims to be so limited, is improper. See Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad,
Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Moreover, the fact that the patentee disclosed particular embodiments, does not
necessarily import such a limitation. GE Lighting Sol’ns, LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304,
1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (reasoning that the specification and prosecution history only compel
departure from the plain meaning in two instances: lexicography and disavowal; and, to act as its
own lexicographer, a patentee must “clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term,”
and “clearly express an intent to define the term[]”; while, disavowal requires that “the
specification [or prosecution history] make[ ] clear that the invention does not include a
particular feature.”). “[I]t is improper to read limitations from a preferred embodiment described
in the specification—even if it is the only embodiment—into the claims absent a clear indication

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in the intrinsic record that the patentee intended the claims to be so limited.” Liebel–Flarsheim
Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Here, the specifications explicitly clarified that “this invention may be susceptible to
embodiment in different forms” and that the embodiments disclosed are “to be considered an
exemplification of the principles of the invention, and . . . not intended to limit the invention to
that as illustrated.” [DE 121-1 at 19; DE 121-2 at 47]. The specifications further provided that
although preferred embodiments “of the invention [are] shown and described, it is envisioned
that those skilled in the art may devise various modifications without departing from the spirit
and scope of the foregoing description and the appended claims.” [DE 121-1 at 27; DE 121-2 at
68]. Thus, the specifications and the prosecution history do not define “pivotally mounted”
(except to alternatively refer to the term as “rotatably secured”) or include any indication that the
inventor intended to act as its own lexicographer. In fact, the inventor expressly identified other
mountings as “fixed,” as distinguished from pivotal mounting. DE 121-2 at p. 69, 49: 1-2 (“a
second plate, spaced from said first plate, which is fixedly mounted to the first plate for pivoting
therewith”) (italics added). Likewise, the specifications do not disavow or disclaim the plain
meaning of “pivotally mounted” or otherwise limit the term to a particular disclosed
embodiment, let alone one that requires rotation from a fixed point.
The Court also concludes that the dictionary definitions provided by the parties need not
be referred to by the Court because the intrinsic evidence makes the meaning of the term
“pivotally mounted” clear. Although it is true that some of the dictionary definitions identified
by Mor/Ryde [DE 133 at 11-12] would indicate that the term “pivot” could require rotation on a
fixed axis (i.e., a basketball player who while stationary pivots on one foot), this extrinsic
evidence may not be used to contradict any definition ascertained by a reading of the patent

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documents. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1322–23. Moreover, other dictionary definitions identified by
Lippert [DE 121 at 15], indicate that the term “pivot” can also relate to rotation about an axis
(i.e., a short rod or shaft on which a related part rotates or swings). Thus, even if the dictionary
definitions were considered, the Court’s claim construction would remain unchanged. Therefore,
the Court concludes that the term “pivotally mounted” means “mounted for rotation about an
axis”.5
III.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the disputed claim term “pivotally mounted” is construed in
the manner set forth in this Opinion and Order. The Court will contact counsel in the near future
to schedule a telephonic status conference so that this case may move forward.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: June 18, 2018
/s/ JON E. DEGUILIO
Judge
United States District Court

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At this time, the Court need not (and cannot) address the defense’s vague assertion and insufficiently developed
argument that such a construction “would likely” render the patents invalid because one of ordinary skill in the art
would be “unlikely to practice the claimed invention”. [DE 133 at 13]. This enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. §
112(a) indicates that one skilled in the art must be enabled to make and use the invention. But the Court has
insufficient facts before it to decide this issue, which is typically resolved on summary judgment. See, e.g., Minerals
Separation Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 270 (1916) (asking whether the experimentation needed to practice the
invention is undue or unreasonable); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988); United States v. Telectronics,
Inc., 857 F.2d 778, 785 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Invalidity must be proven by facts supported by clear and convincing
evidence.”).

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