Ladyman v. Meade et al

Filing 20

OPINION, ORDER AND NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF: Court GRANTS 10 Motion to Dismiss but the complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and with leave to amend. Ladyman must file an amended complaint against her as outlined by 10/31/2016, or the action agai nst Drust will be dismissed with prejudice and without further notice. Court GRANTS 12 Motion to Dismiss as to defendants Shelley Gupta, Charles C. Wicks, and Dean O. Burton, and the action against them is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The State De fendants' 12 Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to defendants Nicholas Meade, Ted Bohner, and Arthur Smith, but on its own motion the court raises the issue whether to dismiss the action against them with prejudice on grounds of res judicata, as the issues in Ladyman' s claims are precluded by his having litigated a motion to suppress and the finality of his conviction. Ladyman must file a responsive memorandum as outlined by 10/31/2016, or the action against Meade, Bohner and Smith wi ll be dismissed with prejudice and without further notice. Ladyman's 14 Motion to Strike has been treated as his response, and the clerk is to terminate its status as a pending motion. Signed by Senior Judge James T Moody on 9/29/2016. cc: Ladyman (tc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
CRAIG C. LADYMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
NICHOLAS MEADE, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 3:14 CV 2038

OPINION, ORDER and NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF
In this action plaintiff Craig C. Ladyman (“Ladyman”), who is proceeding pro se,
alleges various violations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in
connection with a traffic stop and subsequent search of his vehicle, his arrest, and
criminal prosecution. He names as defendants the Indiana State Police troopers who
stopped him and arrested him, and officials involved with his prosecution in Elkhart,
Indiana: the deputy prosecutor, a judge, a magistrate, and a court reporter. Two
motions to dismiss the complaint have been filed, one by the court reporter, Jeanne R.
Drust (“Drust”), and one collectively by the remaining defendants (the “State
Defendants”).
Ladyman did not file any response to Drust’s motion. A few days after a
response the State Defendants’ motion was due, Ladyman filed a “motion to strike”
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). Although a Rule 12(f) motion was not
a proper response and, even if it were, was untimely, the court will nevertheless
consider it as Ladyman’s response because of his pro se status.

Court Reporter Jeanne R. Drust
In his complaint the only allegation Ladyman makes against Drust is that:
Jeanne Drust violated my 5th amendment right to due process of law,
Denial of Access to the Courts. On June 10, 2013 [sic], I received a copy of
the transcript for the Evidence Suppression Hearing on February 28, 2014
and noticed the Reporter, Jeanne R. Drust, did not record the episode of
Judge Charles C. Wicks falling asleep.
(DE # 1 at 5, ¶ 18.) Drust moves to dismiss the complaint against her pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failing to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, on the basis that she has qualified immunity for the act of which Ladyman
complains.
Court reporters carrying out their official duties are entitled to qualified
immunity. Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429 (1993). The court will dismiss a
claim on qualified immunity grounds when the facts of the complaint, taken as true, fail
to allege the violation of a clearly established right.
Qualified immunity shields a government official from liability for
damages when the official’s “conduct does not violate ‘clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.’” Courts use a two-part test to determine whether officers are
entitled to qualified immunity: “(1) whether the facts, viewed in a light
most favorable to the injured party, demonstrate that the conduct of the
officers violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was
clearly established at the time the conduct occurred.”
Doe v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 782 F.3d 911, 915 (7th Cir. 2015). Because qualified
immunity is an immunity from suit, not just damages, the issue should be resolved as
early in the litigation as possible. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32 (2009).

2

Although qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, a plaintiff has the burden of
meeting its two-part test. Eversole v. Steele, 59 F.3d 710, 717 (7th Cir. 1995).
The cases which Drust uses to show that she is entitled to qualified immunity
virtually all pre-date Antoine, and are based on the notion that a court reporter is
entitled to absolute immunity because he or she is performing a discretionary function.
Therefore they are no longer good law and are not helpful.
A bigger problem is that Drust’s argument rests on the premise that Ladyman’s
“claim is based on allegations that she did not accurately transcribe the state court
proceedings.” (DE # 11 at 2.) Strictly speaking, this is true, but it—like Ladyman’s
allegations concerning Drust—is too vague to be of any help. “When qualified
immunity is asserted at the pleading stage, the precise factual basis for the plaintiff's
claim or claims may be hard to identify.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. at 238–39. Here,
from Ladyman’s allegation that Drust “did not record the episode” of the judge falling
asleep, it is unknown whether he means that she intentionally did not transcribe
something said in court about the episode, as opposed to her simply not observing and
noting something that Ladyman saw; or that she made some other error in
transcription.
The difficulty is compounded here by Ladyman’s failure to respond to the
motion and explain what he means. However, things are clarified, somewhat, by
Ladyman’s allegations concerning the judge’s conduct itself. He pleads that during his
attorney’s cross-examination of Trooper Ted Bohner:
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I noticed Judge Charles C. Wicks head bobbing. The Judge fell asleep with
his chin resting on his chest. Then, Shelley Gupta notified my attorney,
Ryan Mehl, in open court that the judge was sleeping. Ryan Mehl stopped
his cross examination of Trooper Ted Bohner during Judge Charles C.
Wicks nap on the bench. No one in the courtroom made an attempted to
wake the sleeping judge. Upon the Judge waking up, Ryan Mehl’s cross
examination resumed. When Trooper Ted Bohner stepped down from the
stand Judge Charles C. Wicks adjourned the court for a ten minute recess.
(DE # 1 at 4, ¶ 16.) [Sic.] From this, it appears that the only thing that Drust could have
transcribed was whatever prosecutor Gupta said to defense attorney Mehl. It is not
clear, however, whether by “in open court” Ladyman means that Gupta spoke in a
voice loud enough for Drust to hear and Drust intentionally failed to transcribe what
she said, or if Gupta approached Mehl and spoke to him quietly so that there would be
nothing for Drust to hear and transcribe.
Without these facts it is impossible to tell whether Ladyman has a plausible claim
or whether Drust is entitled to qualified immunity. “[C]ourt reporters are [not] liable in
a section 1983 case for innocent errors, even if negligent.” Loubser v. Thacker, 440 F.3d
439, 442 (7th Cir. 2006). For this reason Ladyman’s complaint, as to Drust, will be
dismissed without prejudice and he will be given an opportunity to file an amended
complaint that supplies more factual detail, enough to explain what happened in court
that Drust failed to transcribe. He will be allowed 30 days to do so, and failure to file an
amended complaint will result in dismissal of the action against Drust with prejudice
and without further notice.

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The State Defendants
The state defendants are comprised of three Indiana State Police Troopers,
Nicholas Meade, Ted Bohner, and Arthur Smith (collectively, “the Troopers”); the
deputy prosecutor, Shelley Gupta; and two judges, Superior Court Judge Charles C.
Wicks and Magistrate Dean O. Burton. The Troopers request a stay of the case, and the
prosecutor and judges contend that they are entitled to absolute immunity.
As stated above, Ladyman responded to the motion in the form of an untimely
“motion to strike,” which the court is considering as his response. The essence of that
response, however, is: 1) defendants’ immunity defense is frivolous, and so should be
struck; and 2) defendants did not support their motion with any evidence, only
unsupported legal conclusions stated in their memorandum in support. As to this latter
contention, defendants of course did not have to support their motion with evidence
and, if they had, this would be a summary judgment proceeding. As to the former,
defendants’ immunity claims are not frivolous, as is explained below. Ladyman’s
response will not be discussed further herein.
Judges Charles C. Wicks and Magistrate Dean O. Burton
Ladyman’s allegations against the two judges are as follows. He alleges that
Magistrate Burton violated his right to due process by finding that probable cause for
the charges against him existed based upon a false affidavit. (DE # 1 at 5, ¶ 19.) He
alleges that Judge Wicks violated his right to due process by falling asleep during a
hearing on a motion to suppress evidence , (DE # 1 at 4, ¶ 16), and deprived him of his:
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6th amendment right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusations against me. On July 23, 2014 I made a special appearance pro
se at a Status Hearing in Elkhart Superior Court No. 5. During the hearing
Judge Charles C. Wicks refused to tell me the nature and cause of the
charges against me and deprived me of the right to know the jurisdiction
that the court is operating under. Judge Charles C. Wicks asked if I was a
Sovereign Citizen and I said no.
(DE # 1 at 5, ¶ 17.)
A judge is entitled to absolute immunity for judicial acts regarding matters
within the court’s jurisdiction, even if the judge’s “exercise of authority is flawed by the
commission of grave procedural errors,” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978),
and even if the judge acts “maliciously and corruptly.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554
(1967). There is no doubt that Ladyman’s allegations against Judge Wicks and
Magistrate Burton concern judicial acts within their jurisdiction. They are, therefore,
entitled to immunity and Ladyman’s complaint will be dismissed with prejudice as to
them.
Deputy Prosecutor Shelley Gupta
As to deputy prosecutor Gupta, Ladyman alleges that she violated his right to
due process by filing a criminal charging document against him that was not signed
under penalty of perjury as required by Indiana law. (DE # 1 at 4, ¶ 15.) In taking that
action, Gupta was acting in her role as a deputy prosecutor cloaked with her state
prosecutorial authority.
[A]s the Supreme Court held in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431, 96 S.
Ct. 984, 995, 47 L. Ed.2d 128 (1976), a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity
from civil suit under § 1983 for damages “in initiating a prosecution and
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in presenting the State’s case.” This immunity shields the prosecutor even
if he initiates charges maliciously, unreasonably, without probable cause,
or even on the basis of false testimony or evidence.
Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1238 (7th Cir. 1986); Burns v. Reed, 500
U.S. 478, 490–91 (1991). Because Gupta has absolute immunity for the conduct alleged in
Ladyman’s complaint, it will be dismissed with prejudice as to her.
The Troopers
To the extent they are not facially frivolous,1 Ladyman’s claims against the
Troopers all concern violations of his due process right to liberty and right to be free
from an unreasonable search and seizure in connection with the serach of his vehicle
and his arrest after a routine traffic stop. (DE #1 at 2-4, ¶¶ 1-12.) In addition, as to
Trooper Smith only, Ladyman alleges that Smith signed a false affidavit attesting to the
charges against Ladyman. (Id. at 4, ¶¶ 13-14.)
At the time the Troopers filed their motion, as shown by a docket sheet they
attached to the motion to dismiss, Ladyman had already been found guilty in the state
criminal case against him and sentenced, but he had not yet appealed. Thus, the
Troopers asked only that this case be stayed pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971), so as not to interfere with the criminal proceeding, since all of Ladyman’s issues

1

To give two examples, Ladyman alleges that Trooper Bohner violated his First
Amendment right to free speech by thinking that Ladyman “was a Sovereign Citizen
because of the lawful questions” that Ladyman was asking Trooper Meade during a
traffic stop. (DE # 1 at 4, ¶ 12.) Ladyman alleges that Trooper Meade violated his First
Amendment right to freedom of expression by concluding that Ladyman was chewing
gum in a “suspicious” manner. (DE # 1 at 2, ¶ 2.)
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concerning the search and his arrest could be addressed in his direct appeal. The docket
sheet they attached indicated that Ladyman had moved to suppress the evidence
against him, which motion was denied after a hearing (confirmed by Ladyman’s
allegations that Judge Wicks fell asleep during that hearing).
At the present time, however, it appears that Ladyman’s appeal has been
dismissed,2 and the time for him to seek transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court elapsed.
https://public.courts.in.gov/mycase/#/vw/CaseSummary/eyJ2Ijp7IkNhc2VUb2tlbiI6
Ik9HUXdNREV5TmpFM01qa3dPalEwTnpjek1qUXhNbUk9In19 (last accessed
September 27, 2016.) Because Ladyman’s motion to suppress was denied and his
conviction is now final, the state court’s ruling is entitled to preclusive effect, and
Ladyman’s claims against the Troopers are barred by res judicata. Best v. City of Portland,
554 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 2009) (denial of a suppression motion has preclusive effect
when the case terminates with a final judgment of conviction). The court now raises this
issue on its own motion, and gives Ladyman an opportunity to respond. Along with his
amended answer, Ladyman must file a memorandum showing why his claims against
the Troopers are not barred by res judicata. If he fails to do so, his action against the
Troopers will be dismissed with prejudice and without further notice.
Conclusion

2

The docket indicates that Ladyman represented himself at sentencing and, at
least initially, on appeal.
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For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint
are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as follows.
1) Defendant Drust’s motion (DE # 10) is GRANTED but the complaint is
dismissed WITHOUT PREJUDICE and with leave to amend. Ladyman must file an
amended complaint against her as outlined herein on or before October 31, 2016, or the
action against Drust will be dismissed with prejudice and without further notice;
2) The State Defendants’ motion (DE # 12) is GRANTED as to defendants
Shelley Gupta, Charles C. Wicks, and Dean O. Burton, and the action against them is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
3) The State Defendants’ motion (DE # 12) is DENIED as to defendants Nicholas
Meade, Ted Bohner, and Arthur Smith, but on its own motion the court raises the issue
whether to dismiss the action against them with prejudice on grounds of res judicata, as
the issues in Ladyman’s claims are precluded by his having litigated a motion to
suppress and the finality of his conviction. Ladyman must file a responsive
memorandum as outlined herein on or before October 31, 2016, or the action against
Meade, Bohner and Smith will be dismissed with prejudice and without further notice.
4) Ladyman’s motion to strike (DE # 14) has been treated as his response, and the
clerk is to terminate its status as a pending motion.
SO ORDERED.
Date: September 29, 2016
s/James T. Moody
JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT