Maxie v. Hamiton

Filing 5

OPINION AND ORDER: This case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; The 3 & 4 MOTIONS for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis filed by Michael Anthony Maxie are DENIED., ***Civil Case Terminated. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 1/28/15. (jld)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
MICHAEL MAXIE,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
) CAUSE NO. 3:14-CV-2050
)
INDIANA WORKER’S COMPENSATION)
BOARD,
)
)
Defendant.
)

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the: (1) complaint filed by
Michael Maxie on December 1, 2014 (DE #1); (2) the “Motion to
Proceed in Forma Pauperis,” filed on December 11, 2014 (DE #1); and
(3) a “Petition to Proceed Without Pre-payment of Fees or Costs,”
filed by Michael Maxie, on January 12, 2015 (DE #4).

For the

reasons set forth below, the Clerk is ORDERED to DISMISS the
complaint

WITHOUT

PREJUDICE

pursuant

to

28

U.S.C.

§

1915A.

Additionally, the requests to proceed in forma pauperis (DE ##3, 4)
are DENIED.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Michael Maxie, has filed a complaint against the
Worker’s Compensation Board and the Chairman of the Board, Linda
Hamilton (“Hamilton”), alleging violations of both the United

States and Indiana Constitutions, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

1983.1

Maxie indicates he is suing Hamilton in both her individual and
official capacity.

The complaint contains few factual allegations

in support of his claims.

In the facts section of his complaint,

Maxie states verbatim the following:
On 08/27/12, 10/22/12, and Nov. 29, 2012 the
Workers Compensation board set a hearing and
the Plaintiff Michael Maxie fail to appear
because of his incarceration.
Prior to the
above schedule hearing date, Plaintiff on
April 17, 2012 filed a motion for a telephonic
hearing and was not granted, the Workers
Compensation Board did not give me a remedy to
hear plaintiff claim.
(DE #1 at 3).

The remedy Maxie seeks for the alleged violations is

a reversal of the Worker’s Compensation Board’s decision and
monetary damages.

The complaint was signed on November 29, 2014,

but was not filed with the Clerk’s Office until December 1, 2014.

DISCUSSION
Under the federal in forma pauperis statute, an indigent party
may commence an action in federal court, without prepayment of
costs and fees, upon submission of an affidavit asserting an
inability “to pay such costs or give security therefor.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(1).

Here, Maxie asserts that he receives approximately

$1,250 per month in income.

(DE ## 3, 4).

1

From this sum he is

Maxie actually cites 28 U.S.C. § 1983, but this is clearly a
typographical error.

2

obligated to pay $118.74 per week in child support.
He has no significant assets.

(DE # 3 at 1).

Based on these facts, the Court

finds that Plaintiff’s poverty level justifies IFP status.

A

litigant need not be totally destitute to qualify for indigent
status under section 1915.

Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,

335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948).

Instead, section 1915 contemplates a

standard of indigence that can be satisfied by persons other than
those living in abject poverty.

Zaun v. Dobbin, 628 F.2d 990, 992

(7th Cir. 1980).
The inquiry does not end there, however.

The Court has an

obligation under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to screen complaints,
and must dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous or malicious,
fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief against
a defendant who is immune from such relief. Dismissal under the in
forma pauperis statute is an exercise of the court’s discretion.
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33-34 (1992).

In determining

whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same
standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

See Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d

621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006).

To survive dismissal under federal

pleading standards,
[the] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.
3

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted).
Thus, a “plaintiff must do better than putting a few words on paper
that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that
something has happened to her that might be redressed by the law.”
Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010)
(emphasis in original).
Maxie’s complaint lists the Indiana Worker’s Compensation
Board as a Defendant.

The Constitution’s Eleventh Amendment

provides: “The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”

The

Eleventh Amendment bars “a suit by a citizen against the citizens
own State in Federal Court.”

Johns v. Stewart, 57 F.3d 1544, 1552

(10th Cir. 1995).

The Eleventh Amendment’s jurisdictional bar

extends

agencies,

to

state

such

as

the

Indiana

Compensation Board, as well as to the State itself.
Purdue Univ., 813 F.2d 843 (7th Cir. 1987).

Worker’s
Kashani v.

A State may elect to

waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity, but Indiana has not done so.
Meadows v. State of Indiana, 854 F.2d 1068, 1069 (7th Cir. 1988).
Accordingly,

the

Court

will

dismiss

the

Indiana

Worker’s

Compensation Board from this action.
This

leaves

only

Maxie’s

claim

against

Hamilton

in

her

official and individual capacity. The Eleventh Amendment precludes

4

actions against such officials for damages in their official
capacities.

See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985);

Meadows, 854 F.2d at 1069.

State officials, in their official

capacities, are not “persons” within the meaning of section 1983.
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71
(1989).

As such, Hamilton, sued in her official capacity, is also

dismissed from the action.

Maxie has stated no facts in his

complaint that would support a claim against Hamilton in her
individual capacity.
Additionally, Maxie’s claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
appear to be barred by the statute of limitation. Federal district
courts must apply the statute of limitations that govern personal
injury actions in the state where the injury occurred.
Hensley, 735 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2013).

Serino v.

As a result, when claims

arise in Indiana, they must be brought within two years.

Id.

While Maxie signed his complaint precisely two years from the date
he alleges the Worker’s Compensation board last set a hearing on
his claim, he did not file the complaint until two days later.
There are other problems with Maxie’s complaint.

This order

should not be construed as a complete list of all errors requiring
dismissal.

Because it is clear that dismissal is appropriate, no

further discussion is warranted.

5

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth below, the Clerk is ORDERED to
DISMISS the complaint WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A. Additionally, the requests to proceed in forma pauperis (DE
## 3, 4) are DENIED.

DATED: January 28, 2015

/s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court

6