Mayweather-Brown v. Biggler et al

Filing 8

OPINION AND ORDER: Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to proceed against Lt. Steffany Biggler as outlined in the opinion and order; DISMISSES all other claims; DISMISSES Judge S. Bowers, Sheriff Brad Rogers and Ron Harvey; DIRECTS the United States Marsh als Service to effect service of process on Lt. Steffany Bigler; and ORDERS Lt. Steffany Biggler to respond as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, only to the claim for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order. Signed by Senior Judge James T Moody on 6/2/2015. cc: Pro se pltf, USMS (tc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
QUINTIN JAMAR
MAYWEATHER-BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v.
STEFFANY BIGGLER, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 3:14 CV 2089

OPINION AND ORDER
Quintin Jamar Mayweather-Brown, a pro se prisoner, filed a complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. (DE #1.) The court must review the complaint and dismiss it if the action
is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief against
a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. To survive dismissal,
the complaint must state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bissessur v. Indiana
Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 603.
Thus, the plaintiff “must do better than putting a few words on paper that, in the
hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has happened to her that
might be redressed by the law.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir.
2010). Nevertheless, the court must bear in mind that “a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and

citations omitted). “In order to state a claim under § 1983 a plaintiff must allege: (1) that
defendants deprived him of a federal constitutional right; and (2) that the defendants
acted under color of state law.” Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006).
Mayweather-Brown is currently incarcerated at the Newcastle Correctional
Facility (“Newcastle”). He brings a number of claims against four different defendants
arising out of his incarceration at the Elkhart County Jail, where he was confined as a
pretrial detainee. To start, Mayweather-Brown alleges that while incarcerated at the
Elkhart County Jail, he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment under the
orders of the warden, Lt. Steffany Biggler. Mayweather-Brown complains that he was
denied a mattress for eighteen hours a day, requiring him to sleep on the concrete floor.
This resulted in Mayweather-Brown having consistent migraines, neck pains and sleep
deprivation.
Because Mayweather-Brown was a pretrial detainee at the time of these events,
the Fourteenth rather than the Eighth Amendment applies. Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d
467, 473 (7th Cir. 2009). The governing standards are functionally equivalent, and
“anything that would violate the Eighth Amendment would also violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Id. In evaluating an Eighth Amendment claim, the court conducts both
an objective and a subjective inquiry. Id. The objective prong asks whether the alleged
deprivation or condition of confinement is “sufficiently serious” so that “a prison
official’s act results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.”
Id. Although “the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons,” Rhodes v.
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Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981), inmates are entitled to adequate food, clothing,
shelter, medical care, bedding, hygiene materials, and sanitation. Knight v. Wiseman, 590
F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2009); Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2006).
Conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation in
combination when each condition alone would not satisfy the standard. Gillis, 468 F.3d
at 493.
If the conditions are serious enough to satisfy the objective inquiry, the court
must then determine whether the prison official acted with deliberate indifference to
the inmate’s health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). As the Seventh
Circuit has explained:
[C]onduct is deliberately indifferent when the official has acted in an
intentional or criminally reckless manner, i.e., the defendant must have
known that the plaintiff was at serious risk of being harmed and decided
not to do anything to prevent that harm from occurring even though he
could have easily done so.
Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
Here, giving Mayweather-Brown the inferences to which he is entitled, he alleges
that he was denied adequate bedding, satisfying the objective prong of the Eighth
Amendment inquiry. See Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 773-74 (7th Cir. 2008) (lack of
proper bedding constituted denial of civilized measure of life’s necessities); Murphy v.
Walker, 51 F.3d 714, 720-21 (7th Cir. 1995) (pretrial detainee’s allegation that he was

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housed for approximately 10 days without adequate heat, clothing, and bedding stated
a Fourteenth Amendment claim).
With respect to the subjective prong, Mayweather-Brown alleges that Lt. Biggler
was not only personally aware of these conditions, but that she ordered MayweatherBrown be deprived of a bed so that he would have to sleep on a concrete floor. If
proven, these allegations could establish deliberate indifference. See Reed v. McBride, 178
F.3d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 1999) (where inmate repeatedly complained about severe
deprivations but was ignored, he established a “prototypical case of deliberate
indifference”); see also Vinning-El v. Long, 482 F.3d 923, 924-25 (7th Cir. 2007) (observing
that deliberate indifference can be established through circumstantial evidence, by
showing that the conditions would have been obvious to prison personnel “working in
the vicinity”). Although further factual development may show that MayweatherBrown was housed under these conditions to prevent him from hurting himself or for
some other legitimate reason, giving him the inferences to which he is entitled at this
stage, he has stated enough to proceed with this claim.
Next, Mayweather-Brown alleges Lt. Biggler inflicted cruel and unusual
punishment by instructing officers to allow plaintiff to harm himself. MayweatherBrown inflicted injuries upon himself while confined at the Elkhart County Jail by tying
things around his neck and cutting his left arm. However, no officers intervened
because Lt. Biggler instructed them only to document these incidents, not to get
involved. While further factual development may show Lt. Biggler’s instructions were
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reasonable or justified, Mayweather-Brown has stated a claim. Indeed, this court can
imagine a scenario where Lt. Biggler had the authority, and would be constitutionally
obligated, to stop Mayweather-Brown from harming himself. Freeman v. Berge, 441 F.3d
543 (7th Cir. 2006). It is plausible that failing to take any corrective action could be
found to be deliberate indifference. Duane v. Lane, 959 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1992).
Mayweather-Brown’s remaining claims do not state a plausible claim for relief.
He claims that he was denied a phone call from a law firm. However, even pre-trial
detainees are not entitled to use of the telephone. State Bank of St. Charles v. Camic, 712
F.2d 1140, 1145 n.2 (7th Cir. 1983) (“We find no Sixth Amendment right to place a phone
call, be it to an attorney or family members.”). Furthermore, “[t]he very object of
imprisonment is confinement . . . [a]nd, as our cases have established, freedom of
association is among the rights least compatible with incarceration.” Overton v. Bazzetta,
539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003) (citations omitted).
Next, Mayweather-Brown complains that he was denied legal copies and his
legal material was thrown away. Inmates have a First Amendment right of access to the
courts, but there is no “abstract free-standing right” to a law library or to legal
materials. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). In other words, “the mere denial of
access to a prison law library or to other legal materials is not itself a violation of a
prisoner’s rights; his right is to access the courts,” and only if the defendant’s conduct
prejudices a potentially meritorious legal claim has the right been infringed. Marshall v.
Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2006). Thus, to state a claim, an inmate must “spell
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out” the connection between the denial of access to legal materials and the resulting
prejudice to a potentially meritorious legal claim. Id. The court must also bear in mind
that prison officials are afforded discretion in regulating how and when inmates are
given access to legal materials. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-52; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
546 (1979).
Here, Mayweather-Brown merely states that he was denied legal copies when he
was pro se and that officers threw away some undescribed legal material. As explained
above, this alone does not give rise to an actionable First Amendment claim. He must
spell out some type of prejudice to a potentially meritorious legal claim, and he has not
done so. In sum, he has not alleged a plausible claim for denial of access to the courts.
Next, Mayweather-Brown sues Judge S. Bowers, an Elkhart Superior Court Judge
who presided over his underlying criminal case, because he told Judge Bowers of his
problems with Elkhart County Jail but Judge Bowers did nothing to remedy the
problem. Mayweather-Brown’s claim cannot proceed, because the judge is entitled to
absolute immunity for his actions taken in connection with Mayweather-Brown’s
criminal case. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978) (a judge is entitled to absolute
immunity for judicial acts regarding matters within his jurisdiction, even if the judge’s
“exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.”). This is
true even if Mayweather-Brown believes the judge acted improperly. See id.
Accordingly, Judge Bowers will be dismissed as a defendant.

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Next, Mayweather-Brown brings suit against Sheriff Brad Rogers for not
responding to Mayweather-Brown’s complaints of officer misconduct at the Elkhart
County Jail. High-ranking correctional officials cannot be held liable simply because
they may have received inmate correspondence about a problem. Burks v. Raemisch, 555
F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1428-29 (7th Cir.
1996) (concluding that even if written complaints were addressed to the sheriff and
another correctional official, “neither could realistically be expected to be personally
involved in resolving a situation pertaining to a particular inmate unless it were of the
gravest nature.”). Because there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, Sheriff Rogers cannot be held liable simply because he oversees operations at the
jail or supervises other correctional officers. Burks, 555 F.3d at 594. Accordingly, Sheriff
Rogers will be dismissed as a defendant.
Finally, Mayweather-Brown alleges Investigator Ron Harvey disposed of a video
of an officer making false accusations against him. It appears as though MayweatherBrown was convicted of a crime based on an officer’s accusations and Investigator
Harvey destroyed video evidence which showed the officer’s accusations were false.
To the extent Mayweather-Brown claims Investigator Harvey did something improper
that resulted in him being convicted of a crime, that would be barred by Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), in any event. In Heck, the Supreme Court held:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness
would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must
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prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a
federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Id. at 486-87. In other words, a Section 1983 claim is not cognizable when “a judgment
in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence . . . unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has
already been invalidated.” Id. at 487. Unless Mayweather-Brown’s conviction is vacated
or otherwise invalidated, he cannot seek damages for any alleged wrongful conviction
or false imprisonment. As such, he cannot proceed on these claims at this juncture.
For these reasons, the court:
(1) GRANTS Quintin Jamar Mayweather-Brown leave to proceed against Lt.
Steffany Biggler in her individual capacity for monetary damages for failing to provide
him with adequate bedding while at the Elkhart County Jail in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment;
(2) GRANTS Quintin Jamar Mayweather-Brown leave to proceed against Lt.
Steffany Biggler in her individual capacity for monetary damages for cruel and unusual
punishment by allowing Mayweather-Brown to inflict harm upon himself while at the
Elkhart County Jail in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment;
(3) DISMISSES all other claims;
(4) DISMISSES Judge S. Bowers, Sheriff Brad Rogers and Ron Harvey;

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(5) DIRECTS the United States Marshals Service to effect service of process on
Lt. Steffany Biggler pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); and
(6) ORDERS Lt. Steffany Biggler to respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, only to the claim for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to
proceed in this screening order.
SO ORDERED.
Date: June 2, 2015
s/ James T. Moody
JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT