McFerrin v Howmet Casting and Services et al

Filing 23

OPINION AND ORDER: The Court hereby GRANTS Defendants Motion for SummaryJudgment 17 and DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in favor of Defendants Howmet Castings and Services, Inc., and Aloca, Inc. d/b/a/ Alcoa Howmet against Plaintiff Steve McFerrin as to all claims in Plaintiffs Complaint, and DENIES as Moot the Joint Motion to Extend Case Management Deadlines 22 . Signed by Magistrate Judge John E Martin on 6/1/2016. (rmn)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
STEVEN MCFERRIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
HOWMET CASTINGS AND
SERVICES, INC., and ALCOA,
INC. d/b/a ALCOA HOWMET,
Defendants.

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CAUSE NO.: 3:15-CV-35-JEM

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 17], filed
by Defendants Howmet Castings and Services, Inc., and Aloca, Inc. d/b/a/ Alcoa Howmet on
November 23, 2015. Plaintiff Steven McFerrin filed a response on December 21, 2015, and on
December 30, 2015, Defendants filed a reply.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 18, 2014, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in the Laporte Superior Court in
Michigan City, Indiana, raising assorted claims of common law negligence against Defendants. The
case was removed to this Court on January 23, 2015.
On May 14, 2015, upon the oral consent of the parties, the case was reassigned to the
undersigned United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry
of a final judgment in this case. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that motions for summary judgment be
granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Rule 56 further requires the entry
of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party “who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate – in fact, is mandated –
where there are no disputed issues of material fact and the movant must prevail as a matter of law.
In other words, the record must reveal that no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party.”
Dempsey v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 16 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations and
quotations omitted). To demonstrate a genuine issue of fact, the nonmoving party “must do more
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” but must “come
forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis
added).
In viewing the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all
facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all legitimate inferences in favor
of that party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Srail v. Vill. of Lisle, 588
F.3d 940, 948 (7th Cir. 2009); NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-Am., Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 234 (7th Cir.
1995). A court’s role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence, to judge the credibility of
witnesses, or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine
issue of triable fact. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50.

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FACTS1
On May 1, 2010, Howmet Castings and Services, Inc., and Howmet Transportation Services
entered into a three-year agreement with Transport Drivers, Inc. (TDI). Howmet Castings and
Howmet Transport (Howmet) are affiliated sister companies owned by Alcoa, Inc. Under the terms
of the three-year agreement, TDI agreed to provide Howmet with licensed truck drivers for use in
inter – and intra – state commerce. The truck drivers TDI provided to Howmet worked at Howmet
facilities, but remained employees of TDI. To that end, TDI paid their wages and taxes, and retained
total control over labor negotiations, employee grievances, and collective bargaining. Plaintiff was
one of the many truck drivers provided by TDI to Howmet pursuant to the agreement.
On January 3, 2013, Plaintiff’s right foot was run over by a forklift while working in a
Howmet warehouse. On June 24, 2014, Plaintiff filed a claim with the Workers Compensation Board
of Indiana, seeking damages from Howmet and Alcoa related to that injury. On November 14, 2014,
the parties settled Plaintiff’s workers compensation claim.
ANALYSIS
As a threshold matter, in his response to the instant Motion, Plaintiff represents that he
agrees that Alcoa is entitled to summary judgment on his claims against it because Alcoa did not
owe a duty to Plaintiff with respect to the working conditions in Howmet’s warehouse. Accordingly,
noting the parties’ agreement, the instant Motion is granted as to Alcoa.
Howmet argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on the claims Plaintiff asserts against
it because the Indiana Workers Compensation Act provides Plaintiff’s exclusive remedy for the
injury he sustained while working at its warehouse. Howmet specifically argues that both it and TDI

The facts as included here are those that are undisputed and directly relevant to the issues addressed herein.

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are Plaintiff’s joint employers under the Indiana Workers Compensation Act. Plaintiff counters that
he is not an employee of Howmet; therefore, the exclusive remedy provision of the Indiana Workers
Compensation Act does not apply in this case.
The Indiana Workers Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for “recovery of
personal injuries arising out of and in the course of employment.” Taylor v. Ford Motor Co., 944
N.E.2d 78, 81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Ind. Code. § 22-3-2-6). “[T]he Act bars a court from
hearing any common law claim bought against an employer for an on-the-job injury.” Id. The Act
further provides that “[a] parent corporation and its subsidiaries shall each be considered joint
employers of the corporation’s, the parent’s, or the subsidiaries’ employees” and “[both] a lessor and
lessee of employees shall each be considered joint employers of the employees provided by the
lessor to the lessee.” Id. (emphasis added).
In this case, the parties’ three-year agreement, entitled Master for Procurement of Services,
provides, in relevant part:
Driver Lease Attachment “A.” WITNESSETH. WHEREAS, The
Company within the scope of and in furtherance of its nontransportation primary business desires to conduct a common contract
carriage operation; and WHEREAS, The Company desires to utilize
competent and qualified motor vehicle drivers to implement its
common contract carriage operation; and WHEREAS, The Seller has
in its employ qualified drivers and is desirous of supplying drivers
that the Company may use in its common contract carriage
operations.
Plaintiff argues that the parties’ three-year agreement was for the procurement of services,
not the lease of employees. However, Attachment A of the agreement, entitled Driver Lease, plainly
provides for the lease of truck drivers between TDI and Howmet.
Plaintiff also argues that because TDI paid the truck drivers’ wages and taxes and retained

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total control over their labor negotiations, grievances, and collective bargaining, the relationship
between TDI and Howmet was similar to that of a contract between a general contractor and
subcontractor, rather than a lessor and lessee. However, Plaintiff has offered no support for this
argument or any case where a court looking at similar facts found a contractor/subcontractor
relationship, rather than a lessor/lessee. Moreover, even assuming that the parties intended that the
truck drivers TDI provided to Howmet were to remain only TDI employees, their agreement
explicitly provided for the lease of truck drivers. The Indiana Workers Compensation Act requires
that both a “lessor and lessee of leased employees shall be considered joint employers of the
employees provided by the lessor to the lessee,” and the Court will not add an exception to the Act
that the Indiana General Assembly declined to adopt. Ind. Code. § 22-3-2-6; see Romie v. Gagle,
782 N.E.2d 369, 379 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that when the word shall appears in a statue, the
court will construe it as a mandatory provision); Taylor, 944 N.E.2d at 81 (parties cannot contract
out of the exclusive remedy provision of the Indiana Workers Compensation Act).
This case is very similar to Taylor. In Taylor, the plaintiff, an employee of Visteon
Corporation, filed a negligence claim against the Ford Motor Company and Automotive
Components Holdings (ACH) after suffering an injury at a factory owned by Ford and operated by
ACH. 944 N.E.2d at 79. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of
Plaintiff’s claims under the Indiana Workers Compensation Act. Id. The Indiana Court of Appeals
reasoned that the although the agreement between the parties provided that the plaintiff remained
solely an employee of Visteon and that Visteon would pay all employee benefits and wages, the
exclusive remedy for the plaintiff’s injury was before the workers compensation board because
plaintiff was leased by Visteon to Ford and ACH. Similarly, in this case, that TDI paid Plaintiff’s

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wages and taxes and that he remained TDI’s employee is of no legal consequence to his remedy. By
operation of the parties’ three-year agreement, which included an attachment entitled Driver Lease,
both TDI and Howmet are Plaintiff’s joint employers. Therefore, the exclusivity provision of the
Indiana Worker Compensation Act is applicable to Plaintiff’s common law claims against Howmet
pending before the Court. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s sole remedy for the injuries he sustained while
working at Howmet’s warehouse is before the Workers Compensation Board of Indiana and
Howmet “must prevail as a matter of law.” Dempsey, 16 F.3d at 836.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment [DE 17] and DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in favor of Defendants
Howmet Castings and Services, Inc., and Aloca, Inc. d/b/a/ Alcoa Howmet against Plaintiff Steve
McFerrin as to all claims in Plaintiff’s Complaint, and DENIES as Moot the Joint Motion to Extend
Case Management Deadlines [DE 22].
SO ORDERED this 1st day of June, 2016.
s/ John E. Martin
MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN E. MARTIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
cc:

All counsel of record

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