Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Trinity Health Corporation

Filing 20

OPINION and ORDER: Court OVERRULES Trinity Healths 16 Motion for Review of Magistrate Judge Decision by a District Judge re 15 Order; Court ADOPTS the findings and conclusions of the December 16, 2014 Order, GRANTS the EEOCs request to enforce Subpoena No. IN-14-34S, and ORDERS Trinity Health to comply with the subpoena within twenty days of this date.. Signed by Judge Robert L Miller, Jr on 5/11/15. (mc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff
vs.
TRINITY HEALTH CORPORATION,
Defendant

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CAUSE NO. 3:15-CV-42 RLM

OPINION and ORDER
Trinity Health seeks reconsideration of Magistrate Judge Christopher A.
Nuechterlein’s December 16, 2014 order granting the EEOC’s request to enforce
an administrative subpoena. Trinity Health objects to having to comply with
Subpoena No. IN-14-34S based on its arguments that (a) the information sought
by the EEOC is irrelevant to the Commission’s investigation of the underlying
case, and (b) compliance with the subpoena would be unduly burdensome. Trinity
Health asks that the court conduct a de novo review of the December 16 Order,
sustain its objections to that order, and stay enforcement of the subpoena pending
final resolution of the issues in this case.

BACKGROUND
The EEOC investigation underlying this action is based on a charge of
discrimination Simore Hasan filed in October 2013 alleging that her employer, St.
Joseph Regional Medical Center, a subsidiary of Trinity Health, violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., when it first suspended
her based on a disability-related absence and then terminated her employment
because of her disability. In February 2014, an EEOC investigator requested
information and documents from Trinity Health, including the identity of
employees with disabilities who had been adversely affected by the company’s nofault attendance policy. Trinity Health provided the EEOC with the documents it
thought relevant (e.g., a copy of Ms. Hasan’s personnel file, her employee medical
file, her leave requests, the names of the individuals involved in her termination
decision), but missing was the requested information about disabled employees
who were terminated under the no-fault attendance policy. The EEOC investigator
then contacted Trinity Health about the requested information – explaining that
the issue of the company’s no-fault attendance policy was necessary to evaluate
an issue that had arisen during the investigation of Ms. Hasan’s case – but no
documents were forthcoming.
The EEOC issued a subpoena in July 2014 requesting Trinity Health to
“identify all employees who used up or had no FMLA and who were then
terminated, at any time since January 1, 2011, pursuant to the no fault

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attendance policy” and to provide certain documentation relating to the persons
identified. Trinity Health didn’t produce the information and instead filed a
petition to revoke or modify the subpoena in which it objected to disclosing any
of the information sought because, the company said, the information was
irrelevant to Ms. Hasan’s claims and production would be unduly burdensome.
The EEOC denied Trinity Health’s petition to revoke or modify the subpoena on
July 24, 2014 and directed that all documents requested in the subpoena be
produced within ten days of that date.
Trinity Health again declined to produce the requested information, so on
August 19, the EEOC filed this action asking the court to issue an order to Trinity
Health to show cause why the subpoena shouldn’t be enforced. On September 16,
the court gave Trinity Health to and including October 3, 2014 to show cause why
the EEOC’s subpoena shouldn’t be enforced against it. When briefing was
completed, Magistrate Judge Nuechterlein held a hearing on the EEOC’s
application, and on December 16, he granted the EEOC’s request and ordered
Trinity Health to comply with the subpoena no later than January 19, 2015.
The cause is now before the court on Trinity Health’s objections to the
December 16 Order.

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DISCUSSION
The Federal Magistrate’s Act provides two standards for judicial review of
a magistrate judge’s decision: “de novo” review of a magistrate judge’s resolution
of a dispositive matter, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C), and “clearly erroneous or
contrary to law” review of the resolution of a nondispositive matter. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(A); accord FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a), (b); see also Hall v. Norfolk Southern Ry.
Co., 469 F.3d 590, 594-595 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provide that when parties object to a magistrate judge’s order, district judges are
to review nondispositive decisions for clear error and dispositive rulings de novo.”).
A motion to enforce a subpoena is generally viewed as a non-dispositive matter,
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., Inc. v. Transgroup Express, Inc., No. 09 C3473, 2009 WL
2916832, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2009), but because the magistrate judge’s order
“would be dispositive of the entire matter before the court (that is, whether to
enforce the administrative subpoena[]), the court will review the [December 16]
ruling de novo.” NLRB v. G. Rabine & Sons, Inc., No. 00 C 5965, 2001 WL
1772333, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2001); see also EEOC v. Schwan’s Home Serv.,
707 F. Supp. 2d 980, 987 (D.Minn. 2010) (“[A]n application to enforce an
administrative subpoena duces tecum, where there is no pending underlying
action before the Court, is generally a dispositive matter, and therefore, when a
Magistrate Judge considers such an application, the district court reviews the
Magistrate Judge’s determinations de novo.” ); EEOC v. Nestle Prepared Foods,

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No. 5:11-cv-358, 2012 WL 1888130, at *2 (E.D. Ky. May 23, 2012) (“Because the
EEOC’s motion to enforce the subpoena sets forth all of the relief requested in this
matter, the Court views it as a dispositive motion.”); U.S. EEOC v. Dolgencorp.,
No. 07 C 6672, 2008 WL 4542973, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2008) (“Because the
Magistrate’s order would dispose of the entire matter at issue in this case,
however, the order is more properly treated as a Report and Recommendation,
subject to de novo review.”).
The court will conduct a de novo review of the portions of the order to which
Trinity Health objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). The court
may accept, reject, or modify the magistrate judge’s decision, receive further
evidence, or remand the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(3).

A
Trinity Health’s first objection to the subpoena is that the information
sought by the EEOC isn’t relevant to Ms. Hasan’s case. Trinity Health complains
that the subpoena asks for the identity of individuals who aren’t comparable to
Ms. Hasan, i.e., individuals who weren’t eligible for FMLA leave or had exhausted
their FMLA entitlement and were terminated pursuant to the company’s no-fault
attendance policy, while Ms. Hasan was eligible for FMLA leave, hadn’t exhausted
her FMLA leave, and wasn’t discharged for violating the attendance policy. So, the

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company says, Ms. Hasan isn’t similarly situated to the employees who would be
identified pursuant to the subpoena. Trinity Health claims it shouldn’t be required
to help the EEOC identify other employees who might have other claims against
it.
Ms. Hasan has alleged that she was subjected to discrimination when she
was suspended and then terminated based on her disability. The EEOC has the
authority to investigate charges of employment discrimination based on a
disability, 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a), with access to “virtually
any material that might cast light on the allegations against the employer.” EEOC
v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 68–69 (1984). “[T]he role given to the Commission in
the statute calls for a relevance standard broad enough to ensure that the
‘Commission’s ability to investigate charges of systemic discrimination not be
impaired.’” EEOC v. Konica Minolta Business Solutions U.S.A., Inc., 639 F.3d
366, 369 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 69). “‘Any
violations that the EEOC ascertains in the course of a reasonable investigation of
the charging party’s complaint are actionable.’ The charge incites the
investigation, but if the investigation turns up additional violations the
Commission can add them to its suit.” EEOC v. Caterpillar, Inc., 409 F.3d 831,
833 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting General Tele. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 331 (1980));
see also U.S. E.E.O.C. v. ABM Janitorial-Midwest, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1004
(N.D. Ill. 2009) (“‘The EEOC’s role in the claims process is to investigate a claim

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thoroughly and reasonably and remedy any unlawful discrimination that it
uncovers.’” (quoting EEOC v. Tempel Steel Co., 723 F. Supp. 1250, 1253 (N.D. Ill.
1989) (emphasis in original))).
Courts generally enforce an administrative subpoena if “(1) it reasonably
relates to an investigation within the agency’s authority, (2) the specific inquiry is
relevant to that purpose and is not too indefinite, (3) the proper administrative
procedures have been followed, and (4) the subpoena does not demand
information for an illegitimate purpose.” Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 233 F.3d 981, 986 (7th Cir. 2000); see also
EEOC v. United Air Lines, Inc., 287 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2002) (“As long as the
investigation is within the agency’s authority, the subpoena is not too indefinite,
and the information sought is reasonably relevant, the district court must enforce
an administrative subpoena.”) (quoting EEOC v. Tempel Steel Co., 814 F.2d 482,
485 (7th Cir. 1987)). The court doesn’t consider the merits of the underlying
charge of discrimination. EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 72 n.26 (1984).
The EEOC explains that early in its investigation of Ms. Hasan’s claim, the
EEOC obtained information from Trinity Health about the company’s no-fault
attendance policy. The EEOC says the record of Ms. Hasan’s case contained
evidence that she might have been adversely impacted by that policy, so the
agency determined that additional information about the policy was necessary to
its investigation. The EEOC maintains that because the agency’s attempts to

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obtain information and documentation relevant to its investigation have been
unsuccessful, the subpoena should be enforced and Trinity Health ordered to
comply.
The EEOC maintains Trinity Health’s own assessment of the facts relating
to Ms. Hasan’s charge isn’t properly considered in the court’s determination of
what is relevant to the EEOC’s investigation. According to the EEOC, “while
[Trinity Health] may ultimately have the opportunity to argue the merits of [Ms.]
Hasan’s allegations, a subpoena enforcement proceeding is not the proper forum.”
Resp., at 5. The EEOC says the agency, not Trinity Health, “is tasked with the
responsibility of assessing relevance.” Resp., at 4. The court agrees. “Congress has
delegated to the EEOC the authority to investigate charges of discrimination, and
naturally the agency has developed expertise in that area. . . . [W]here an agency
is tasked with investigation, we defer to an agency’s own appraisal of what is
relevant so long as it is not obviously wrong.” EEOC v. Randstad, 685 F.3d 433,
448 (4th Cir. 2012). That Trinity Health disagrees with the EEOC’s evaluation of
what evidence is necessary to its investigation doesn’t demonstrate that the
EEOC’s determination of what is relevant is “obviously wrong.”
The EEOC says, too, that Trinity Health’s comparison of this case to the
decisions denying the enforcement of EEOC subpoenas in EEOC v. Royal
Caribbean, 771 F.3d 757 (11th Cir. 2014), and EEOC v. United Airlines, 287 F.3d
643 (7th Cir. 2002), is misplaced because the burden of production in those cases

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far exceeded the burden claimed in this case and a significant jurisdictional issue,
not present here, factored into both those decisions. The court agrees with the
EEOC’s position and with the Magistrate Judge’s review of the facts and decisions
of those cases in the December 16 Order, as well as his conclusion that
There is no doubt that [EEOC v. Royal Caribbean and EEOC v.
United Airlines] define the limits of relevance in administrative
subpoenas in light of the Supreme Court’s broad definition of
relevance in [EEOC v. Shell Oil, 466 U.S. 54 (1984)]. Yet, the EEOC’s
subpoena to Trinity in this case does not approach these limits. [St.
Joseph Regional Medical Center] employs only about 2,000 people
from which an even smaller pool would meet the subpoena’s criteria
for production. In addition, the question of whether SJRMC’s
application of the attendance policy provided proper accommodation
for Ms. Hasan’s disability-related absences remains unresolved. As
a result, the court is persuaded that the EEOC’s subpoena seeks
information relevant to Ms. Hasan’s charge and should be enforced.
Ord. (Dec. 16, 2014), at 8.
The first three prongs of the court’s inquiry under Commodity Trend Service
v. Commodity Futures, 233 F.3d at 986, are met: the investigation being
undertaken by the EEOC is within the agency’s statutory authority, the requested
information is specific, and neither party has argued or alleged that the
administrative procedures employed were improper. See EEOC v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 287 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2002) (“As long as the investigation is within the
agency’s authority, the subpoena is not too indefinite, and the information sought
is reasonably relevant, the district court must enforce an administrative
subpoena.”). Lastly, Trinity Health’s unsupported claim that “[a]t worst, the sole
purpose of the subpoena is . . . to identify other employees who may have claims,”
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Pltf. Obj., at 11, is insufficient to establish that the information being sought is
intended for an illegitimate purpose as required under the fourth prong of the
court’s inquiry. See National Labor Relations Bd. v. Marano, 996 F. Supp. 2d 720,
723 (E.D. Wis. 2014) (“Ultimately, the burden on the party to whom the subpoena
is addressed is not a meager one. It must come forward with facts suggesting that
the subpoena is intended solely to serve purposes outside of the jurisdiction of the
issuing agency.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)). The court overrules
Trinity Health’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s order and conclues that the
EEOC’s request for information about Trinity Health’s no-fault attendance policy
is relevant to a determination of whether Trinity Health’s policies amount to
disability discrimination.

B
Trinity Health claims the magistrate judge incorrectly determined that there
was no undue burden on Trinity Health to comply with the subpoena, especially
since the information sought is irrelevant to the charge under investigation by the
EEOC. Trinity Health again maintains that the decisions in EEOC v. Royal
Caribbean, 771 F.3d 757 (11th Cir. 2014), and EEOC v. United Airlines, 287 F.3d
643 (7th Cir. 2002), support a finding that responding to the EEOC subpoena
would be unduly burdensome.

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“[T]he presumption is that compliance should be enforced to further the
agency’s legitimate inquiry into matters of public interest. Consequently, a court
may modify or exclude portions of a subpoena only if the employer carries the
difficult burden of showing that the demands are unduly burdensome or
unreasonably broad.” EEOC v. United Air Lines, Inc., 287 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir.
2002) (internal quotation and citation omitted). “An unduly burdensome or
unreasonably broad subpoena is one that threatens ‘the normal operation of a
respondent’s business.’” U.S. Dep’t of Educ. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
No. 1:06-cv-1333, 2006 WL 3198822, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 8, 2006) (quoting
EEOC v. United Air Lines, Inc., 287 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir. 2002)).
Trinity Health estimates that identifying and locating documents that meet
the EEOC’s criteria would require a minimum of 80 hours. Magistrate Judge
Nuechterlein’s analysis of the argument is persuasive:
The court acknowledges that costs will result from the requested
production. Yet the costs Trinity has identified do not suggest that its
normal operation of business will be threatened if required to comply
with the EEOC’s subpoena. Moreover, cases where courts have
refused to enforce comparable administrative subpoenas have
involved production costs considerably higher [] in terms of time and
money compared to available institutional resources. In this case, [St.
Joseph Regional Medical Center’s] human resources department is
sophisticated enough to deal with the myriad of issues generated by
2,000 employees. Moreover, SJRMC and Trinity are engaged in the
highly regulated health care industry suggesting, at the very least, a
familiarity with the processes of regulatory compliance. As a result,
the court is convinced that SJRMC is sufficiently equipped to absorb
the costs of production based on its own estimate. More importantly,
the relevance of the requested information to the question of whether

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SJRMC discriminated against Ms. Hasan in violation of the ADA
outweighs the costs SJRMC has identified.
Ord. (Dec. 16, 2014), at 11-12 (citations omitted).
The court overrules Trinity Health’s objection to the Magistrate Judge’s
conclusion that compliance with the subpoena wouldn’t be unduly burdensome
for the company.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the court OVERRULES Trinity Health’s objections
[docket # 16] to the December 16, 2014 Order [docket # 15], ADOPTS the findings
and conclusions of the December 16, 2014 Order, GRANTS the EEOC’s request
to enforce Subpoena No. IN-14-34S, and ORDERS Trinity Health to comply with
the subpoena within twenty days of this date.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED:

May 11, 2015

/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr.
Judge, United States District Court

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