Blanton v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Filing 34

OPINION AND ORDER: The Commissioners denial of benefits is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED with instructions to return the matter to the Social Security Administration for further proceeding consistent with this opinion. Signed by Judge Robert L Miller, Jr on 3/21/2016. (rmn)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
DANNY R. BLANTON,
PLAINTIFF,
VS.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,
DEFENDANT.

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CAUSE NO.: 3:15-CV-44-RLM-CAN

OPINION and ORDER
Plaintiff Danny Blanton seeks judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of
the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying his application for
disability benefits. Mr. Blanton asks the court to set aside the August 27, 2014
decision by an Administrative Law Judge finding that while he has two severe
impairments and can’t do his past relevant work, he retains the capacity to
perform a limited range of light work and so is not disabled. The court has
jurisdiction over this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g). For the reasons that
follow, the court reverses and remands this case to the Social Security
Administration for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Blanton, a 43-year old former machine operator and production
supervisor, filed for disability benefits in January 2012, alleging a disability
onset date of April 2010. He claimed that he was unable to work due to seizures,

insomnia, depression, anxiety, and hypomania.1 His application was denied
initially and on reconsideration, and the ALJ held a hearing at which Mr.
Blanton, his sister, and a vocational expert testified.
The ALJ issued a written decision, finding that Mr. Blanton met the
insured status requirements under the Social Security Act and had not engaged
in substantial work since the alleged onset date of April 2010. The ALJ found
that Mr. Blanton’s seizures, hypomania, and insomnia were severe impairments,
and concluded that while these impairments left Mr. Blanton with the physical
capacity to perform work at all exertional levels, he has several non-exertional
limitations. These limitations precluded Mr. Blanton from jobs that involve
driving, unprotected heights, dangerous machinery, open flames, sharp objects,
or climbing. The ALJ also found that Mr. Blanton was limited to low-stress jobs
with little decision making and few changes to the work setting, and to jobs that
require only simple or routine tasks consistent with unskilled work. Because the
vocational expert testified that there are sufficient jobs available that fit these
limitations, the ALJ found Mr. Blanton not disabled.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court must affirm the Commissioner’s determination if it is free of legal
errors and supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The
findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by

Hypomania is a psychological state similar to but less severe than mania. There is very little in
the record or in the ALJ’s opinion about Mr. Blanton’s hypomania, and it isn’t important to any
of the arguments Mr. Blanton makes in this appeal.
1

substantial evidence, shall be conclusive”); Scott v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 734, 739
(7th Cir. 2011). The issue before the court isn’t whether Mr. Blanton is disabled,
but whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that he isn’t
disabled. Id. Substantial evidence means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Micus v. Bowen, 979
F.2d 602, 604 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971). In deciding whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision,
the court “reviews the entire record but does not substitute its judgment for that
of the Commissioner by reconsidering facts, reweighing evidence, resolving
conflicts in evidence, or deciding questions of credibility.” Estok v. Apfel, 152
F.3d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 1998). In reviewing the ALJ’s conclusions, “[t]he court
will conduct a critical review of the evidence, considering both the evidence that
supports, as well as the evidence that detracts from, the Commissioner’s
decision, and the decision cannot stand if it lacks evidentiary support or an
adequate discussion of the issues.” Briscoe v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th
Cir. 2005).
The ALJ isn’t required “to address every piece of evidence or testimony
presented, but must provide a ‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and the
conclusions so that [the court] can assess the validity of the agency’s ultimate
findings and afford the claimant meaningful judicial review.” Jones v. Astrue,
623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 2010). The court can’t uphold an ALJ’s decision
if “contradictions or missing premises” undermine this bridge. Parker v. Astrue,
597 F.3d 920, 921 (7th Cir. 2010).

III. DISCUSSION
Mr. Blanton argues that the ALJ made four errors that require remand: (1)
giving the opinion of treating neurologist Dr. Curfman only partial weight; (2)
concluding that Mr. Blanton’s insomnia was a severe impairment yet not
incorporating it into the RFC; (3) discounting the opinions of Tom Whitehead and
Diane Sigler, Mr. Blanton’s former employers; and (4) finding Mr. Blanton’s
testimony not credible. The last of these arguments warrants reversal, so the
court discusses it first. None of Mr. Blanton’s other arguments for reversal are
persuasive, but because the issues they identify might recur on remand, the
court discusses them briefly.

A. Credibility
Mr. Blanton testified at the hearing that he has problems with talking,
memory,

completing

tasks,

concentrating,

understanding

and

following

instructions, and getting along well with others. He said his seizures started in
2002 but have gotten worse, and now happen two or three times per month.
After a seizure he has soreness, fatigue, confusion, and difficulty concentrating.
Mr. Blanton also testified that he has a pre-seizure “aura” feeling about every
day, and is afraid and embarrassed about having a seizure in public because he
doesn’t know when one will occur. As to insomnia, he stated that he wakes up
every hour or two and often naps during the day.

The ALJ found that Mr. Blanton’s testimony about the persistence and
intensity of his symptoms was not fully credible for two reasons. First, the ALJ
noted that Mr. Blanton “described daily activities that are not limited to the
extent one would expect, given the complaints of disabling symptoms,
limitations, and social functioning.” Second, the ALJ reviewed the objective
medical evidence in the record and concluded that Mr. Blanton’s “testimony of
frequency is not consistent with the medical evidence of record.”
Because the ALJ is in the best position to judge the credibility of parties,
a reviewing court “will not disturb an ALJ’s credibility findings unless they are
patently wrong.” Sims v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 424, 431 (7th Cir. 2002). Still, an
ALJ’s decision “must contain specific reasons for the finding on credibility,
supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific
to make clear…the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements
and the reasons for that weight.” Social Security Ruling 96-7p. A credibility
determination may thus be “patently wrong” if it “lacks any explanation or
support.” Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413-414 (7th Cir. 2008).
The ALJ’s adverse credibility findings were patently wrong because they
weren’t adequately explained. With regard to daily activities, the ALJ simply
noted that Mr. Blanton was “able to perform personal care, clean his room, do
his laundry, shop in stores, handle his finances, spend time with family, and
perform hobbies such as watching television and reading,” and stated that these
activities don’t suggest limitations as serious as Mr. Blanton described. The ALJ
didn’t explain how any of these activities are inconsistent with Mr. Blanton’s

testimony about his symptoms. As already noted, the non-seizure symptoms Mr.
Blanton reported were things like difficulty concentrating, following instructions,
or getting along with others. It isn’t clear how the very simple chores and leisure
activities Mr. Blanton described would be impossible in light of those symptoms.
Mr. Blanton would certainly be incapable of all these things during a seizure,
but he testified that his seizures occur only a few times per month. The ALJ
apparently saw these activities as inconsistent with Mr. Blanton’s claimed
symptoms, but didn’t identify where she perceived the inconsistency to be. The
conclusory statement that Mr. Blanton’s activities aren’t what one would expect
given his symptoms doesn’t make clear “the weight the adjudicator gave to the
individual’s statements and the reasons for that weight” as required by the Social
Security regulations.
The purported inconsistency between Mr. Blanton’s claimed frequency of
symptoms and the objective medical evidence is similarly unexplained. The ALJ
reviewed the medical evidence in some detail, but simply recited it and made no
attempt to compare any of it to Mr. Blanton’s testimony. Nor is any inconsistency
apparent: a 2002 EEG was mildly abnormal in the awake state; Mr. Blanton
reported weekly seizures in 2012 and stopped driving after crashes in 2011; his
concentration during a medical interview was “fair to limited”; he suffered a
grand mal tonic seizure in 2013 and reported having a seizure a few weeks before
that; doctors noted in May 2013 that his seizures were changing from simply
staring spells to more generalized seizures; and he was diagnosed with
intractable seizures, hypomania, and depression. Far from contradicting Mr.

Blanton’s testimony about the frequency and intensity of his seizures, all of that
evidence seems to support it.
The one piece of medical evidence the ALJ may have thought inconsistent
with Mr. Blanton’s claimed frequency of symptoms – though, again, this is
speculation because the ALJ didn’t point to any specific piece of evidence – is the
imaging results from 2013, when a CT scan showed no acute intracranial
abnormality and an EEG was minimally abnormal. Because the ALJ agreed that
Mr. Blanton suffers from seizures, she might have thought those imaging results
consistent with a seizure disorder yet indicative of fewer than two or three
seizures per month. But the ALJ didn’t explain how the scan results are
incompatible with Mr. Blanton’s testimony that he has two or three seizures per
month and auras every day; it isn’t evident to a non-doctor what, if anything,
those specific scan results would mean for a seizure disorder, and no medical
opinion evidence in the record interpreted what frequency of seizures they would
suggest.
Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision must be reversed because its finding that
Mr. Blanton’s testimony was not credible isn’t adequately supported. An ALJ
need only explain his or her reasons for doubting a claimant’s credibility, and a
reviewing court ordinarily won’t second guess those reasons. But if the ALJ
doesn’t explain the reasons at all, meaningful review is impossible and the case
must be remanded.

B. Dr. Curfman’s Opinion

Mr. Blanton also challenges the ALJ’s decision to assign only partial weight
to a medical source statement provided by Mr. Blanton’s long-time neurologist,
Dr. Thomas Curfman. Dr. Curfman completed a seizures medical source
statement in January 2013 and reported that Mr. Blanton has an average of two
seizures per month, has a few seconds of warning before a seizure, requires two
hours of rest after a seizure, and has daily “auras” even on days in which he
doesn’t suffer a seizure. Because Dr. Curfman found that stress could precipitate
Mr. Blanton’s seizures, he concluded that Mr. Blanton is incapable of even low
stress work. He also indicated that Mr. Blanton’s symptoms would cause him to
miss work about three days a month, and that the symptoms and limitations
described in the medical source statement existed since 2002. The ALJ assigned
Dr. Curfman’s opinion only partial weight, reasoning that it was internally
inconsistent --- specifically, that it stated Mr. Blanton had only two seizures per
month yet would be likely to miss more than three days of work per month --and that it said Mr. Blanton’s symptoms existed since 2002, when in fact Mr.
Blanton held down a full-time job from 2002 to 2010.
Mr. Blanton first objects that the ALJ didn’t clarify what she meant by
“partial weight.” Social Security Rule 96-2p, on which Mr. Blanton relies,
requires only that an ALJ’s decision “be sufficiently specific to make clear to any
subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s
medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.” The ALJ’s opinion identified
Dr. Curfman’s findings, stated that those findings were entitled to only partial

weight, and articulated two specific reasons why they weren’t entitled to greater
weight. Nothing more is required.
Mr. Blanton also argues that the ALJ should have given Dr. Curfman’s
opinion more weight because Dr. Curfman was a neurology specialist and had a
long treatment relationship with Mr. Blanton. While an ALJ must consider
factors such as a doctor’s specialties and length of treatment relationship with a
patient, nothing requires an explicit written discussion of every factor the Social
Security regulations identify as relevant. See Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 415416 (7th Cir. 2008) (affirming denial of benefits where, as here, the ALJ discussed
only two of the 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 factors). Having explained why two
particular factors justified her conclusion, the ALJ didn’t need to recite the other
factors.
Next, Mr. Blanton argues that the ALJ mischaracterized Dr. Curfman’s
opinion. Dr. Curfman said that Mr. Blanton would have to miss “about three”
days of work per month, but the ALJ’s opinion mistakenly states that Dr.
Curfman said “over three days.” This was no more than a minor error; the ALJ’s
real point was that Dr. Curfman’s three-day estimate of days missed was
inconsistent with his estimate of only two seizures per month. Mr. Blanton
argues that one of the missed days could be due to insomnia --- which Dr.
Curfman also found Mr. Blanton to suffer from --- rather than seizures. The
medical source statement Dr. Curfman completed, however, was specifically for
seizures. Moreover, the very next question instructed the doctor to add an
additional page to “to describe any other limitations… that would affect your

patient’s ability to work at a regular job on a sustained basis.” If Dr. Curfman
thought Mr. Blanton’s insomnia was a significant limitation on his ability to
work, this question invited the doctor to attach a page explaining that. The record
reflects no attachment, so the ALJ’s reading of the form --- finding that Mr.
Blanton would have two seizures a month yet miss three days a month due to
seizures --- wasn’t unreasonable.2
Lastly, Mr. Blanton argues that the ALJ erred by considering his
employment from 2002-2010 as a reason to discount Dr. Curfman’s findings. He
relies on Wilder v. Chater, in which the court of appeals made clear that proof of
a claimant’s employment during the period of alleged disability doesn’t
automatically defeat a claim for benefits. 64 F.3d, 335, 337-338 (7th Cir. 1995)
(“The fact that someone is employed is not proof positive that he is not disabled,
for he may be desperate and exerting himself beyond his capacity or his employer
may be lax or altruistic.”). This argument is unavailing because while a
demonstrated ability to hold down a full-time job isn’t conclusive proof that a
claimant wasn’t disabled at the time, it can be relevant. See Berger v. Astrue,
516 F.3d 539, 546 (7th Cir. 2008) (affirming denial of benefits where claimant
continued part-time work as a carpenter past the alleged onset date, because
“the fact that he could perform some work cuts against his claim that he was

2 While the ALJ didn’t note it, there is also the problem that Mr. Blanton’s two seizures per month
wouldn’t necessarily come during working hours. Dr. Curfman’s medical source statement found
that the seizures don’t occur at a particular time of day. A 40-hour workweek represents less
than a quarter of the total hours in a week, so even if Mr. Blanton only had seizures when awake
and was only awake for half the hours in a day (an unrealistically generous sleeping schedule
even for someone without insomnia), he would on average only have one seizure per month while
at work. That makes Dr. Curfman’s unexplained conclusion that Mr. Blanton would miss an
average of three days per month even more perplexing.

totally disabled.”). The sheer length of time Mr. Blanton was able to continue
full-time work despite symptoms that Dr. Curfman considered totally disabling
--- eight years --- strongly suggests that Dr. Curfman is mistaken or unreliable
regarding the extent of Mr. Blanton’s limitations.

C. Insomnia
The ALJ included insomnia among Mr. Blanton’s severe impairments, but
didn’t explicitly refer to insomnia when determining Mr. Blanton’s residual
functional capacity. Mr. Blanton argues that this omission is significant: if the
ALJ found insomnia to be a severe impairment it must have caused functional
limitations, yet the RFC doesn’t mention of those limitations. Under 20 C.F.R. §
404.1512(c), Mr. Blanton has the burden of showing not only that he has an
impairment but also “how [his] impairment(s) affects [his] ability to work.” Dr.
Curfman’s opinion noted insomnia as an impairment, but contained nothing else
beyond the label. A diagnosis alone isn’t enough to show disability; a claimant
must present some evidence tying that diagnosis to functional limitations. See
Estok v. Apfel, 152 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 1998). The only evidence in the record
of what effect insomnia had on Mr. Blanton’s functioning was his own testimony
that he wakes up every hour or two and takes naps during the day. The ALJ
found Mr. Blanton’s testimony about his symptoms and limitations not credible,
and also noted that Mr. Blanton reported getting five or six hours of sleep per
night. Given the absence of any evidence about how Mr. Blanton’s insomnia
affected his ability to work, there was no need for the ALJ to speculate about

possible limitations and include these speculations in the functional capacity
finding.

D. The Opinions of Mr. Whitehead and Ms. Sigler
The record before the ALJ contained brief statements about Mr. Blanton’s
job performance from two past employers, Tom Whitehead and Diane Sigler. Mr.
Whitehead was Mr. Blanton’s manager for many years, and said Mr. Blanton was
a good worker but eventually began to have medical issues, disruptive outbursts,
and poor attendance. Ms. Sigler was an HR representative at a company that Mr.
Blanton worked at for less than three weeks, and testified that Mr. Blanton was
fired for absenteeism and not completing enough work. The ALJ noted that these
statements generally support Mr. Blanton’s claims, but assigned them little
weight because they don’t establish that Mr. Blanton is disabled, neither
employer is medically trained to make precise observations about symptoms,
and the statements are not consistent with the medical evidence as a whole.
Mr. Blanton argues that the ALJ erred in assigning these statements little
weight, because when read in light of Dr. Curfman’s opinion they establish that
Mr. Blanton is disabled. All the letters show is that Mr. Blanton skipped work
too frequently and was sometimes inefficient or disruptive when he did show up.
As the ALJ noted, this testimony doesn’t speak to whether Mr. Blanton was
disabled; neither statement connects Mr. Blanton’s absenteeism or poor
workplace behavior to his impairments or symptoms. While Dr. Curfman’s
opinion noted that Mr. Blanton’s seizures would cause him to miss work, it

doesn’t follow that any time he missed work must have been due to seizures.
Because the ALJ rightly recognized that the evidence was not helpful on the
question of whether Mr. Blanton was disabled, she was justified in giving it little
weight.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Commissioner’s denial of benefits is
REVERSED and this case is REMANDED with instructions to return the matter
to the Social Security Administration for further proceeding consistent with this
opinion.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: March 21, 2016

/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr.
Judge
United States District Court