Boyd v. Commissioner Indiana Department of Correction et al

Filing 17

OPINION AND ORDER: GRANTING Pla leave to proceed against Bruce Lemmon in his official capacity as Commissioner of the IDOC for injunctive relief seeking kosher meals containing kosher meats under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42:2000cc-1(a); GRANTING Pla leave to proceed on a claim against David Liebel, Sharon Hawk, and Chaplains Ungrodt and Green, in their official capacities for injunctive relief seeking the right to be permitted to practice his religious beliefs and practices which include the ability to pray in the dorm, wash three times a day before consuming food, and wash after using the toilet pursuant to the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42:2000cc-1(a ); GRANTING Pla leave to proceed on a claim against Sgt. Johnson and Sharon Hawk in their individual capacities for compensatory and punitive damages for substantially burdening the practice of his religion by denying him the right to possess religi ous materials and to pray in the dorm in violation of the First Amendment; GRANTING Pla leave to proceed on a claim against Sgt. Johnson in her individual capacity for injunctive relief for substantially burdening the practice of his religion by de nying him the right to possess religious materials and to pray in the dorm in violation of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42:2000cc-1(a); GRANTING Pla leave to proceed on a claim against Chaplains Ungrodt and Green in their individual capacities for compensatory and punitive damages for substantially burdening the practice of his religion by denying him the opportunity to shower before eating and after using the toilet, the opportunity to pray in the dorm, and to possess religious material in violation of the First Amendment; DISMISSING all other claims; GRANTING the requests for service by the USMS 15 , 16 and DIRECTING the USMS, pursuant to 28:1915(d), to effect service of process o n Bruce Lemmon, David Liebel, Sgt. Johnson, Sharon Hawk, Chaplain Ungrodt, and Chaplain Green; and ORDERING, pursuant to 42:1997e(g)(2), that Bruce Lemmon, David Liebel, Sgt. Johnson, Sharon Hawk, Chaplain Ungrodt, and Chaplain Green respond, as provided for in the Fed. R. Civ. P. and N.D. IND. L.R. 10.1, only to the claim for which the pro se pla has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order. Signed by Judge Robert L Miller, Jr on 5/26/2015. (lhc)(cc: Pla)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
SHAVON TYVELL BOYD,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER, INDIANA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
et al.
Defendants.

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CAUSE NO. 3:15-CV-082 RM

OPINION AND ORDER
Shavon Tyvell Boyd, a pro se prisoner, filed an amended complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. (DE 10.) A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint,
however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers . . ..” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nevertheless, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this court must review the complaint and dismiss it if the action is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief.
Mr. Boyd alleges that he is a practicing “Black Jew” whose religious beliefs include
that his meals must be kosher and contain one of the three meats described in Leviticus of
the Tanakh (Hebrew Bible). To comply with this religious principle, he asked the Indiana
Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) to provide him with kosher meals that contain one
of the required meats. The IDOC refused his request and provided him with a vegetarian-1-

based kosher diet. Mr. Boyd’s religious beliefs and practices also include showering before
eating and after using the toilet, praying regularly, and possessing religious material,
including a prayer rug, prayer cap and Tanakh. He alleges the defendants have prevented
him from exercising these religious beliefs and practices.
Prisoners enjoy a right to exercise their religion under the First Amendment,
Vinning-El v. Evans, 657F.3d 591, 592-93 (7th Cir. 2011), but the right is “subject to limits
appropriate to the nature of prison life.” Id. Restrictions that limit the exercise of religion
are permissible if they are reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives, which
includes security and economic concerns. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–91 (1987); Ortiz
v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 2009).
Inmates are entitled to broader religious protection under RLUIPA. Holt v. Hobbs,
135 S. Ct. 853 (2015). The statute provides in pertinent part:
No government shall impose . . . a substantial burden on the religious
exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . unless the
government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). A“substantial burden” on religious exercise is “one that necessarily
bears direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility for rendering religious
exercise. . . effectively impracticable.” Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of
Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003). Furthermore, RLUIPA does not “elevate
accommodation of religious observances over an institution’s need to maintain order and

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safety . . . [and] an accommodation must be measured so that it does not override other
significant interests.” Cutter v. Wilkinson , 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005). Courts apply RLUIPA
“with due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators in
establishing necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security and
discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and limited resources.” Id. at 723. While
RLUIPA can be used to obtain injunctive relief, it doesn’t provide a cause of action for
money damages against state prison officials. Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S.Ct. 1651 (2011).
Mr. Boyd says that a fundamental tenet of his religious beliefs is that he must eat a
kosher meal that contains one of the required meats. He alleges that the IDOC’s kosher diet
substantially burdens his religious exercise because it doesn’t contain any of these meats
in accordance with Mr. Boyd’s sincerely held religious beliefs. Mr. Boyd has sued Bruce
Lemmon, the Commissioner of the IDOC, in his official capacity under RLUIPA in an effort
to obtain koshers meal containing kosher meats. Although further factual development
might show that the prison had legitimate reasons for refusing to let Mr. Boyd have a
kosher diet containing kosher meats, he has alleged enough to proceed past the pleading
stage.1 See Vinning-El v. Evans, 657 F.3d at 593 (reversing judgment for defendant where
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It cannot go unnoticed, however, that in September 2013 he brought a claim pursuant to RLUIPA
against the IDOC in the Southern District of Indiana under Cause No. 3:13-CV-185. There, Mr. Boyd
alleged that the DOC refused to provide him with a kosher diet. Mr. Boyd settled that case in December
2014 and the DOC agreed to provide him with a kosher diet. (DE 10 at 16-19.)The terms of the settlement
in 3:13-CV-185 included that in exchange for the DOC “granting of a kosher diet subject to the IDOC
kosher diet policies, I, Shavon Boyd, do hereby release, acquit and forever discharge [the State of Indiana
and the Department of Corrections] from any and all actions. . . resulting or to result from the denial of a
kosher diet by Defendants . . . which are the subject of [this] lawsuit or . . . any claim that could have been
raised concerning the denial of a kosher diet and any claim that may exist against Defendants concerning
the denial of a kosher diet . . ..” (DE 10 at 16.) It may very well be that the defendants will assert an
affirmative defense to allege that this settlement agreement bars or otherwise affects Mr. Boyd’s claim.

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prisoner claimed he was denied a vegan diet in accordance with his religious beliefs);
Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 880 (7th Cir. 2009) (refusal to provide Roman Catholic
inmate a non-meat diet on Fridays and during Lent substantially burdened his religious
practice); Hunafa v. Murphy, 907 F.2d 46, 47-48 (7th Cir. 1990) (denying Muslim inmate a
non-pork diet unduly burdened his religious practice).
Mr. Boyd also claims that David Liebel, the Religious Director for IDOC, violated
his First Amendment and RLUIPA rights by directing chaplains to prevent him from
praying in the dorm and from bathing before consuming food and after using the
bathroom, as required by his religion. Mr. Boyd sues Mr. Liebel in his official capacity as
the Director of Religious and Volunteer Services at the IDOC. Not allowing Mr. Boyd to
engage in prayer without a compelling governmental interest would violate the First
Amendment and RLUIPA. See Lindh v. Warden, Federal Correctional Institute, Terre
Haute, Ind., No. 2:09-CV-215, 2013 WL 139699 (S.D. Ind. January 11, 2013). Similarly, not
allowing him to engage in specific, meaningful acts of religious expression, such as
washing as required by his religion, can violate RLUIPA. Meyer v. Teslik, F.Supp.2d 983,
989 (W.D. Wisc. 2006). Giving Mr. Boyd the inferences to which he is entitled at this stage,
he has stated a claim against David Liebel in his official capacity.
Mr. Boyd claims Sgt. Johnson violated his First Amendment and RLUIPA rights by
However, because Mr. Boyd is asserting that his current claim is a new violation of RLUIPA, the
affirmative defense is not so plain from the face of the complaint that the court will decide it at this time.
See Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen the existence of a valid affirmative
defense is so plain from the face of the complaint that the suit can be regarded as frivolous, the district
judge need not wait for an answer before dismissing the suit.”). Instead, the defendants may raise any
such affirmative defense on their own.

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destroying his sacred religious materials and for threatening to issue him a conduct report
if he is caught praying in the dorm. He sues Sgt. Johnson in both her official and individual
capacities. Since the alleged acts could plausibly substantially burden Mr. Boyd’s practice
of his religion and his right to engage in specific acts of meaningful religious expression,
Mr. Boyd has pleaded a First Amendment and RLUIPA claim against Sgt. Johnson. Because
“public employees are responsible for their own misdeeds” Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d
592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009), Mr. Boyd has stated a claim against Sgt. Johnson in her individual
capacity.
An official capacity claim requires more. “[A] suit against a[n] . . . official in his or
her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s
office.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), allows suits against municipalities based
on a policy, practice, or custom. There is no allegation that Sgt. Johnson was any sort of
policymaker or was carrying out any policy. Mr. Boyd can’t proceed under this complant
with an official capacity claim against Sgt. Johnson.
Mr. Boyd claims Sharon Hawk, director of Therapeutic Community, violated his
First Amendment and RLUIPA rights by directing staff of Therapeutic Community not to
let him pray in the dorm and to prevent him from showering after using the bathroom. Ms.
Hawk has been sued in both her official and individual capacities. According to Mr. Boyd,
Ms. Hawk did this because she didn’t want him to exercise his religion while being a part
of her program. These allegations are sufficient to establish both a First Amendment and
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RLUIPA claim against Ms. Hawk in her individual capacity. See Lindh v. Warden, 2013
WL 139699 at *11. And because she was solely in charge of Therapeutic Community, a
federally funded program designed to help offenders with drug addiction problems and
established its policies, Mr. Boyd has also stated a claim against her in her official capacity.
Finally, Mr. Boyd claims Chaplains Ungrodt and Green violated his First
Amendment and RLUIPA rights by depriving him of the opportunity to shower before
eating and after using the restroom, the opportunity to pray in the dorm, and to possess
religious material, which has imposed a substantial burden on his ability to exercise his
religion. He sues both chaplains in their official and individual capacities. Mr. Boyd alleges
the chaplains are discriminating against him because they don’t believe “Black Jews” are
a true religion. Although further factual development may show otherwise, Mr. Boyd has
stated enough against Chaplains Ungrodt and Green in their individual capacities to
proceed past the pleading stage. See Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d at 669-770 (inmate stated
claim based on his allegation that prison denied him religious articles without adequate
penological justification). There are no allegations that these defendants were in charge of
the religious programing at the IDOC or established the prison’s religious policies. Because
of that, Mr. Boyd has not stated a claim against them in their official capacities.
For these reasons, the court:
(1) GRANTS Shavon Tyvell Boyd leave to proceed against Bruce Lemmon in
his official capacity as Commissioner of the IDOC for injunctive relief seeking
kosher meals containing kosher meats under the Religious Land Use and
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Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a);
(2) GRANTS Shavon Tyvell Boyd leave to proceed on a claim against David
Liebel in his official capacity for injunctive relief seeking the right to be permitted
to practice his religious beliefs and practices which include the ability to pray in the
dorm, wash three times a day before consuming food, and wash after using the
toilet pursuant to the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a);
(3) GRANTS Shavon Tyvell Boyd leave to proceed on a claim against Sgt.
Johnson in her individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for
substantially burdening the practice of his religion by denying him the right to
possess religious materials and to pray in the dorm in violation of the First
Amendment;
(4) GRANTS Shavon Tyvell Boyd leave to proceed on a claim against Sgt.
Johnson in her individual capacity for injunctive relief for substantially burdening
the practice of his religion by denying him the right to possess religious materials
and to pray in the dorm in violation of the First Amendment and the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a);
(5) GRANTS Shavon Tyvell Boyd leave to proceed on a claim against Sharon
Hawk in both her official and individual capacities for compensatory and punitive
damages for substantially burdening the practice of his religion by denying him the
right to possess religious materials and to pray in the dorm pursuant to the First
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Amendment;
(6) GRANTS Shavon Tyvell Boyd leave to proceed on a claim against Sharon
Hawk in both her official and individual capacities for injunctive relief seeking the
right to be permitted to practice his religious beliefs and practices which include the
ability to pray in the dorm, wash three times a day before consuming food, and
wash after using the toilet pursuant to the First Amendment and the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) ;
(7) GRANTS Shavon Tyvell Boyd leave to proceed on a claim against
Chaplains Ungrodt and Green in their individual capacities for compensatory and
punitive damages for substantially burdening the practice of his religion by denying
him the opportunity to shower before eating and after using the toilet, the
opportunity to pray in the dorm, and to possess religious material in violation of the
First Amendment;
(8) GRANTS Shavon Tyvell Boyd leave to proceed on a claim against
Chaplains Ungrodt and Green in their individual capacities for injunctive relief
seeking the right to be permitted to practice his religious beliefs and practices which
include the ability to pray in the dorm, wash three times a day before consuming
food, wash after using the toilet, and possess religious material, in violation of the
First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a);
(9) DISMISSES all other claims;
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(10) GRANTS the requests for service by the U.S. Marshals Service (DE 15,
16) and DIRECTS the U.S. Marshals Service, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to
effect service of process on Bruce Lemmon, David Liebel, Sgt. Johnson, Sharon
Hawk, Chaplain Ungrodt, and Chaplain Green; and
(11) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that Bruce Lemmon, David
Liebel, Sgt. Johnson, Sharon Hawk, Chaplain Ungrodt, and Chaplain Green
respond, as provided for in the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE and N.D. IND.
L.R. 10.1, only to the claim for which the pro se plaintiff has been granted leave to
proceed in this screening order.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: May 26 , 2015.
/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr.
Judge
United States District Court

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