Wrightsman v. Thatcher et al

Filing 7

OPINION AND ORDER denying 3 MOTION to Appoint Counsel and denying 4 MOTION to Certify Class. This case is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Signed by Judge Theresa L Springmann on 4/28/2015. (cc: Wrightsman)(rmc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
STEVEN WRIGHTSMAN,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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MARION THATCHER, and RON NEAL, )
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Defendants.
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CAUSE NO.: 3:15-CV-87-TLS

OPINION AND ORDER
Steven Wrightsman, a pro se prisoner, filed a Complaint [ECF No. 1] under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleging a violation of his federal constitutional right to Equal Protection because he was
denied entry into the Honor Program at the Indiana State Prison due to his age. “A document
filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must
be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Nevertheless, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if
the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. “In order to state a
claim under § 1983 a plaintiff must allege: (1) that defendants deprived him of a federal
constitutional right; and (2) that the defendants acted under color of state law.” Savory v. Lyons,
469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006). Here, the Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the Defendants
are acting under color of state law, but he has not plausibly alleged the deprivation of a federal
constitutional right.
The Plaintiff states that the Honor Program confers special privileges on a select group of
prisoners. Such privileges include, in part, additional hours of non-confinement and visitation

rights, access to certain exercise equipment, and permission to purchase video games. Compl. ¶
5, ECF No. 1. He explains that to get into the program “the offender must be at least 35 years of
age” and “[t]here must be 24 months with no conduct reports, and 48 months with no conduct
reports involving violence.”1 Id. The Plaintiff attaches a form indicating that he was rejected
because of his age. Id., ECF No. 1-1.
Although it is possible to raise an Equal Protection claim based on age discrimination,
“an age classification is presumptively rational.” Kimel v. Fl. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 84
(2000).
States may discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth
Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest. The rationality commanded by the Equal Protection
Clause does not require States to match age distinctions and the legitimate
interests they serve with razorlike precision. As we have explained, when
conducting rational basis review we will not overturn such government action
unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the
achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude
that the government’s actions were irrational.
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Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a State may rely on age as a proxy for other qualities,
abilities, or characteristics that are relevant to the State’s legitimate interests. The
Constitution does not preclude reliance on such generalizations. That age proves to be an
inaccurate proxy in any individual case is irrelevant. Where rationality is the test, a State
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by
its laws are imperfect.
Id. at 83–84 (quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). In particular, “young age is quite
often relevant to valid state concerns, as the Constitution itself attests.” Hedgepeth ex rel.
Hedgepeth v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 386 F.3d 1148, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing

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The Plaintiff notes, however, that although “the age requirement used to be 35 years to enter the program,”
the age requirement is now 30 years of age. Compl., n. 1.

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U.S. Const. art. I, § 2 (minimum age for House of Representatives); id. § 3 (minimum age for
Senate); id. art. II, § 1 (minimum age for President)).
Given that “a State may rely on age as a proxy for other qualities, abilities, or
characteristics,” Kimel, 528 U.S. at 84, age is permissibly used as a proxy for maturity in a
variety of areas, including voting, marriage, driving, alcohol consumption, and employment. As
such, the use of age as a proxy for maturity when determining admission into the Honor Program
would also be constitutionally permissible, particularly in the context of prison. Statistics show
that young inmates are generally less mature and more prone to criminal behavior. See, e.g.,
Howard N. Snyder, Arrest in the United States, 1990-2010, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau
of Justice Statistics, 3–12 (October 2012), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/aus9010.pdf (only
18% of those arrested for murder were 40 or older; 23% for rape; 11% for robbery; 25% for
aggravated assault; 24% for simple assault; 14% for burglary; 20% for larceny-theft; 15% for
motor vehicle theft; 16% for weapons violations; and 18% for drug abuse violations.) Of course,
there are young inmates who are more mature and less prone to criminal behavior than older
inmates, but such an age generalization—like the age generalizations employed in the areas
noted above—is nevertheless rational. See Lauth v. McCollum, 424 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2005)
(“Governmental action only fails rational basis scrutiny if no sound reason for the action can be
hypothesized.”) Because the Plaintiff cannot overcome the presumption that the distinction
instituted for participation in the Honors Program is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest, a valid Equal Protection claim has not been alleged.
In addition to his Complaint, the Plaintiff filed a Motion [ECF No. 4] seeking to certify
this case as a class action on behalf of every inmate at the Indiana State Prison, along with a

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Motion [ECF No. 3] for appointment of counsel. Because the Complaint does not state a valid
claim for relief, the Plaintiff cannot “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class,” Fed.
R. Civ. Proc. 23(a)(4). Furthermore, without a valid claim for relief, there is no basis for
appointment of counsel. See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
Finally, although it is usually necessary to permit a plaintiff the opportunity to file an
amended complaint when a case is dismissed sua sponte, see Luevano v. Wal-Mart, 722 F.3d
1014 (7th Cir. 2013), that is unnecessary where the amendment would be futile, Hukic v. Aurora
Loan Servs., 588 F.3d 420, 432 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[C]ourts have broad discretion to deny leave to
amend where . . . the amendment would be futile.”). Such is the case here. When the Plaintiff
applied for admission to the Honors Program, he was too young per the program’s stated
requirements. Because the age limit is a rational requirement which does not violate Equal
Protection, and there is no amendment that could change either the operative facts or law on
which this decision is based, the Court finds that it would be futile to permit the Plaintiff to file
an amended complaint.
For the forgoing reasons, the Motions for class certification (ECF No. 4) and
appointment of counsel (ECF No. 3) are DENIED. This case is DISMISSED pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A.
SO ORDERED on April 28, 2015.
s/ Theresa L. Springmann
THERESA L. SPRINGMANN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FORT WAYNE DIVISION

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