Gorman v. Superintendent
Filing
19
OPINION AND ORDER: The court DENIES the petition (DE # 1 ). The clerk is DIRECTED to close this case. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 8/24/2016. (lhc)(cc: Gorman)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
ANDRE L. GORMAN,
Petitioner,
vs.
SUPERINTENDENT,
Respondent.
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CAUSE NO. 3:15-CV-161
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a Petition under 28 U.S.C.
Paragraph 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a person in State
Custody Seeking Review of a Prison Disciplinary Sanction, filed by
Andre L. Gorman, a pro se prisoner, on April 13, 2015 (DE #1).
Here, Gorman challenges a disciplinary determination made by a
hearing officer at the Westville Correctional Center (“Westville”)
under case number WCC 14-11-0485. For the reasons set forth below,
the court DENIES the petition (DE #1). The clerk is DIRECTED to
close this case.
BACKGROUND
On November 24, 2014, Sgt. Johnson prepared a conduct report
charging Gorman with assault. (DE #1 at 7.) The conduct report
stated as follows:
Approx. 1245 p.m. Officer Collins-Dawson
observed Hagerty, Jason R. #246438 with a
bloody towel on his face. After investigation,
I Sgt. Johnson found out Gorman #904846 struck
Hagerty. On the way to the door to walk Gorman
out of the holding cell, Gorman admitted he
strucked [sic] Hagerty in his mother-fuckin I
guest [sic] you got what you wanted. It’s been
your objective to get me moved you got what
you want.
(Id.)
In addition, the confidential case file was submitted under
seal. (DE #14.) An incident report form was included in the file,
which provides additional details. (Id. at 4.) It states that
Officer Collins-Dawson saw Offender Hagerty holding a bloody towel
on his face and she followed him into the bathroom where she saw a
cut on his nose and a bruised right eye. (Id.) Sgt. Johnson
observed Gorman trying to hide a blood-stained bandage that was
wrapped around his hand. (Id.)
On November 26, 2014, Gorman was notified of the charge. (DE
#12-2.) The screening report reflects that he pled not guilty,
requested a lay advocate, requested witnesses Nurse Cortelyou to
validate his injuries, Ms. Sneed to validate his mental illness and
Officer Miller to say that Gorman had injuries, and video evidence
to show that Hagerty was the aggressor. (Id.)
Offender DeWayne Barner acted as Gorman’s lay advocate. Nurse
Cortelyou provided a statement that confirmed Gorman had a hematoma
on his forehead and had some hair pulled out. (DE #12-4.) Ms. Sneed
stated that Gorman’s diagnosed mental condition did not justify the
incident. (DE #12-5.) Officer Miller stated that he did notice that
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Gorman had a bump on his head and hair pulled out following the
altercation. (DE #12-6.) The hearing officer reviewed the video
from the place and time noted on the incident report form and
observed:
an altercation between the offenders in the
hallway at 1:28 p.m. on 11/23/14. The
offenders then go into an area that can not be
observed on camera. Offender Hagerty comes
back into view at 1:32 pm heading down the
hallway towards the area out of camera view.
Offender Gorman leaves with the officer at
1:38 pm heading towards the dayroom.
(DE #12-9.)
On
December
3,
2014,
a
hearing
officer
conducted
a
disciplinary hearing and found Gorman guilty of the charge of
assault. (DE #12-10.) At the hearing, Gorman’s comment was, “I had
to go to medical. *Submitted written statement. The incident took
place on D2E. I felt compelled to stand up for that guy. I was
defending
myself.”
(DE
#12-10.)
Gorman’s
written
statement
explained that he was just defending himself. (DE 12-#11.) Relying
on staff reports, witness statements, video review, photographs,
and the confidential incident report, the hearing officer imposed
a penalty of 120 days lost earned time credits and demoted him from
credit class 1 to credit class 2. (Id.) Gorman appealed to the
facility head and the final reviewing authority, but his appeals
were denied. (DE #12-13.)
DISCUSSION
3
When
prisoners
lose
earned
disciplinary hearing, they are
time
credits
in
a prison
entitled to certain protections
under the Due Process Clause: (1) advance written notice of the
charges; (2) an opportunity to be heard before an impartial
decision maker; (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present
documentary evidence in defense when consistent with institutional
safety and correctional goals; and (4) a written statement by a
fact
finder
of
evidence
relied
on
and
the
reasons
for
the
disciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563 (1974).
To satisfy due process, there must also be “some evidence” to
support the hearing officer’s decision. Superintendent, Mass. Corr.
Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).
Here, Gorman raises four claims in his petition: (1) the
conduct report listed the wrong time and place of the incident;
(2)the hearing officer denied him a fair hearing by not following
the IDOC’s policy regarding offenders with mental illness; (3) he
was denied an impartial hearing officer; and (4) the sanctions are
unconstitutional.
First, Gorman argues that the conduct report listed the wrong
time and date. Gorman argues that these errors were not corrected,
as required by IDOC policy. However, even if internal rules or
policies were violated, this would not entitle Gorman to federal
habeas relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991)
(habeas relief is only available for a violation of the U.S.
4
Constitution or other federal laws); Hester v. McBride, 966 F.
Supp. 765, 775 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (violation of prison policy in
disciplinary proceeding could not support grant of habeas relief,
since federal habeas court “does not sit to correct any errors of
state law”). Notably, there is no constitutional deficiency in the
Report of Conduct as it put Gorman on notice of the charge against
him. Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003). In
addition, the record demonstrates that the hearing officer was
aware of the errors, as evidenced by his video review of the
correct time and place. (DE #12-9.)
Second, Gorman contends that the hearing officer denied him a
fair investigation by not following IDOC policy regarding offenders
with mental illnesses. However, again, violations of IDOC policies
are not cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Estelle,
502 U.S. at 67-68. Moreover, there is nothing in the record to
establish that Gorman’s mental health issues played any role in
this incident nor did it violate Gorman’s due process associated
with the hearing. The staff was aware of Gorman’s mental illness
diagnosis, but there is no evidence that the diagnosis justified
the incident.
Third, Gorman complains that he was denied an impartial
hearing officer.
In the prison disciplinary context, adjudicators
are “entitled to a presumption of honesty and integrity,” and “the
constitutional standard for improper bias is high.” Piggie, 342
5
F.3d at 666. Due process prohibits a prison official who was
personally and substantially involved in the underlying incident
from acting as a decision-maker in the case. Id. However, due
process is not violated simply because the hearing officer knew the
inmate, presided over a prior disciplinary case, or had some
limited involvement in the event underlying the charge. Id.
Here, Gorman does not clearly explain why he believes the
hearing officer was biased, but there is no indication that he was
involved in any way in the events underlying the charge. He appears
to believe the hearing officer was partial because the officer
refused to credit his version of events. But adverse rulings alone
do not establish impermissible bias. Liteky v. United States, 510
U.S. 540, 555–56 (1994). Gorman complains that the hearing officer
relied on confidential information and also that the hearing
officer did not explain why that information was confidential.
However, the officer was not required to. “Prison disciplinary
boards are entitled to receive, and act on, information that is
withheld from the prisoner and the public[.]” White v. Indian
Parole Board, 266 F.3d 759, 767 (7th Cir. 2001).
Finally, Gorman contends that the sanctions imposed were
unconstitutional because they prevented him from completing a court
ordered substance abuse treatment program, resulting in a contempt
finding and a transfer to a “more aggressive complex” inside the
institution. However, this ground lacks merit because federal
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habeas relief is available only as to sanctions that subject an
inmate to “custody.” Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir.
2000). The only deprivations of earned credit time and reduction of
credit class affect Gorman’s custody. Upon review, the 120 day loss
of good time credit and one-grade reduction in credit class is
permitted for a Class A offense. (DE #12-14.) There is nothing
unconstitutional about either sanction.
As a final matter, it must be pointed out that there is ample
evidence
conduct
to
support
report
the
written
hearing
by
Sgt.
officer’s
Taylor
determination.
recounted
that
The
Gorman
admitting striking Hagerty. This is sufficient evidence by itself.
McPherson, 188 F.3d at 786 (7th Cir. 1999) (conduct report alone
provided some evidence to support disciplinary determination). In
addition, the confidential case file and video review demonstrate
that it is undisputed that an altercation took place between
Hagerty and Gorman, but it was unclear who was the aggressor.
Gorman makes much of the fact that he claims he acted in selfdefense. However, “inmates do not have a constitutional right to
raise
self-defense
disciplinary
as
a
proceedings.
defense
As
such,
in
the
the
context
[DHB]
was
of
prison
under
no
constitutional obligation to allow [the] claim that he was merely
defending himself to serve as a complete defense to the charge . .
..” Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 848 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation
7
omitted). Thus, his self defense argument is not a basis for habeas
corpus relief.
Not only is there sufficient evidence to find Gorman guilty of
the charged offense, but there has been no showing that he was
deprived any due process along the way. Based on the record, there
is sufficient evidence to find Gorman guilty of assault, and Gorman
has not made a showing that his due process rights have been
violated.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the court DENIES the petition
(DE #1). The clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.
DATED: August 24, 2016
/s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court
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