Williams v. Wilson et al

Filing 37

OPINION AND ORDER denying 34 MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER for notary public services, and denying 33 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order filed by Jerome Williams. Signed by Senior Judge James T Moody on 11/4/2015. (cc: Williams)(kds)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
JEROME WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
WILLIAM WILSON, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 3:15 CV 163

OPINION AND ORDER
Jerome Williams, a pro se prisoner, was granted leave to proceed under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against Defendants William Wilson and L.A. Vanatta for refusing to allow him to
enter into a book publishing contract at the Indiana State Prison (“ISP”), on the ground
that this violated his First Amendment right to free speech. According to the complaint,
Wilson and L.A. Vanatta denied him the right to publish a book based upon the views
expressed within, which are about Black men and responsibility. Wilson now seeks a
preliminary injunction requiring the superintendent of ISP to oversee the copying of
various documents that will be involved in this litigation. (DE #33.) Simultaneously,
Williams filed a motion seeking the court to order ISP to provide notary public services
for affidavits in his possession. (DE #34.)
“[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that
should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of
persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). To obtain preliminary
injunctive relief, the moving party must demonstrate that he or she has a reasonable

likelihood of success on the merits, lacks an adequate remedy at law, and will suffer
irreparable harm if immediate relief is not granted. Girl Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc. v.
Girl Scouts of U.S., Inc., 549 F.3d 1079, 1086 (7th Cir. 2008). The PLRA circumscribes the
scope of the court’s authority to enter an injunction in the corrections context:
Where prison conditions are found to violate federal rights, remedial
injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and use the least
intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. This
section of the PLRA enforces a point repeatedly made by the Supreme
Court in cases challenging prison conditions: Prison officials have broad
administrative and discretionary authority over the institutions they
manage.
Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks, brackets, and citations
omitted).
Here, Williams anticipates that the defendants will serve and file a Rule 34
request for production seeking various documents that are in his possession. If and
when they do, Williams believes he will be required to send those documents to the law
library for copying. He further believes that he will have a hard time obtaining those
copies, because many law library employees are defendants in another suit he has filed.
(See Case No. 3:15-CV-428, filed on Sept. 21, 2015). As a result, he seeks an order
requiring the superintendent, Ron Neal, to order that copying of these documents be
performed under his supervision. Williams also seeks an order requiring a notary
public at the prison to notarize two affidavits from fellow inmates that he intends to use
in this case.

2

The court finds that Williams is not be entitled to the extraordinary relief that he
seeks because he has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. Williams’ general
concern that he cannot obtain copies of his legal materials and complaint that he is
being denied the services of a notary have no merit. As a threshold matter, there is no
“abstract, freestanding right to a law library . . . [and] an inmate cannot establish
relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison's law library or legal
assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351
(1996).
In Lewis the Supreme Court repudiated language in earlier case law and
explained that state actors have no duty to assure that prisoners can litigate claims
effectively once they have been raised in court. The right to access goes no further:
It must be acknowledged that several statements in Bounds went beyond
the right of access recognized in the earlier cases on which it relied, which
was a right to bring to court a grievance that the inmate wished to present
. . . . These statements appear to suggest that the State must enable the
prisoner to discover grievances, and to litigate effectively once in court. . . .
These elaborations upon the right of access to the courts have no
antecedent in our pre-Bounds cases, and we now disclaim them.
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354. Lewis only requires that an inmate be given access to file a
complaint or appeal, but state actors have no duty to assure that prisoners can litigate
those claims effectively once they have been raised in court. That is to say, Lewis does
not require a prospective order for Williams to receive notary public services1, copies or

1

The issue would be different if Williams were alleging that notary services are already required
and have been refused. See Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, (7th Cir. 1995) (“meaningful access” includes
some quantity of basic scribe materials).

3

even be permitted access to the law library. Lewis only requires that he be permitted to
file a complaint or appeal. He does not allege, and based on his filings it would not be
reasonable to infer, that he was denied the opportunity to file a complaint or appeal, or
that he has been denied basic scribe materials necessary to pursue his case. Therefore,
his motions will be denied.
As a practical matter, there is no need for the requested copies or notary services.
The defendants have not yet sought the documents Williams intends to copy. If the
defendants do request those materials in discovery, Williams will not be required to
produce any copies in response to a Rule 34 request for production of documents.
Instead, he need only make his documents available so that the defendants or their
representative can inspect and copy them. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1). Thus, there is no need
for Williams to make the requested copies. And, contrary to his belief, Williams does
not need notarized affidavits. Providing unsworn declarations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1746 will suffice.2 Thus, there is no need for the requested notary services either.

2

The statute provides: “Wherever, under any law of the United States or under any rule, . . . or
requirement made pursuant to law, any matter is required or permitted to be supported, evidenced,
established, or proved by the sworn declaration, verification, certificate, statement, oath, or affidavit, in
writing of the person making the same . . . such matter may, with like force and effect, be supported,
evidence, established or proved by the unsworn declaration, certificate, verification, or statement, in
writing of such person which is subscribed by him, as true under penalty of perjury, and dated, in
substantially the following form:
***
(2) If executed within the United States . . .: “I declare (or certify, verify or state) under penalty of perjury
that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date).
(Signature).”

4

For these reasons, the court:
(1) DENIES the motion for temporary restraining order (DE #33); and
(2) DENIES the motion (DE #34) for notary public services.
SO ORDERED.
Date: November 4, 2015
s/James T. Moody
JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT