Henderson v. St Joseph County Jail et al
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER: This case is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A. Signed by Judge Jon E DeGuilio on 9/21/15. (cc: Marcus Edward Henderson). (cer)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
MARCUS HENDERSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ST. JOSEPH COUNTY JAIL, et al.,
Defendants.
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CAUSE NO. 3:15-CV-242 JD
OPINION AND ORDER
On June 6, 2015, Marcus Henderson, a pro se prisoner, filed a vague complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against the St. Joseph County Jail, its warden Julie Lawson and six unknown officers
for failing to protect him from being assaulted at the jail. (DE 1.) This complaint did not specify
when any of the complained events took place and was too vague to state a plausible claim against
any defendant. (DE 2.) Henderson was granted leave to file an amended complaint in the spirit of
Luevano v. Wal-Mart, 722 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2013). (Id.) On July 20, 2015, Henderson filed an
amended complaint again naming Julie Lawson and the St. Joseph County Jail as defendants and
adding Sgt. Schorder, Sgt Fisher, David Holt, Sheriff Michael Grzegorek and Sgt. Johnson. (DE 3.)
Henderson has now also specified the dates of when these complained events took place.
“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Nevertheless, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
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content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672 (2009) (quotation marks and citations
omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of the cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. Thus, a plaintiff “must do better than putting a few words on
paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has happened to her
that might be redressed by the law.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010)
(emphasis in original).
Marcus Henderson is currently incarcerated at the Pact Bradley House in Michigan City,
Indiana. He has brought suit for things that occurred while he was serving a sentence at the St.
Joseph County Jail. (DE 3 at 1.) Henderson alleges that on February 15, 2013, he was placed in the
St. Joseph County Jail. On that date, he claims that Warden Julie Lawson had him placed in one of
the jail’s most dangerous pods in retaliation for an ongoing lawsuit he had against her. This claim
has a statute of limitations problem. Though the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense,
“when the existence of a valid affirmative defense is so plain from the fact of the complaint that the
suit can be regarded as frivolous, the district judge need not wait for an answer before dismissing
the suit.” Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005, 1009 (7th Cir. 2002). “Indiana’s two-year statute of
limitations . . . is applicable to all causes of action brought in Indiana under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”
Snodderly v. R.U.F.F. Drug Enforcement Task Force, 239 F.3d 892, 894 (7th Cir. 2001). Because
Henderson filed his complaint against Warden Lawson more than two years after this claim arose,
it is barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.
Next, Henderson alleges that sometime before June 6, 2013, he informed Warden Lawson,
David Holt and Sgt. Schorder about “how the younger inmates were running the pod, disrespecting
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older and younger inmates by beating them up, taking their commissary and phones cards, and how
I felt unsafe in J-8.” (DE 3 at 4.) He requested to be moved to a safer pod and that request was
denied. These claims, too, are likely barred by the statute of limitations.1 Nevertheless, they have
substantive problems as well. Correctional officials have a constitutional duty to protect inmates
“from violence at the hand of other inmates.” Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 777 (7th Cir.
2008). But, “prisons are dangerous places. Inmates get there by violent acts, and many prisoners
have a propensity to commit more.” Id. Therefore, a failure-to-protect claim cannot be predicated
“merely on knowledge of general risks of violence in a detention facility.” Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d
904, 913 (7th Cir. 2005). And, “the fact that an inmate sought and was denied protective custody
is not dispositive of the fact that prison officials were therefore deliberately indifferent to his safety.”
Lewis v. Richards, 107 F.3d 549, 553 (7th Cir. 1997). Instead, the plaintiff must establish that “the
defendant had actual knowledge of an impending harm easily preventable, so that a conscious,
culpable refusal to prevent the harm can be inferred from the defendant’s failure to prevent it.”
Santiago v. Wells, 599 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2010). This is a high bar:
To establish deliberate indifference on the part of the defendants sued individually,
Klebanowski needed to show that the officers acted with the equivalent of criminal
recklessness, in this context meaning they were actually aware of a substantial harm
to Klebanowski’s health or safety, yet failed to take appropriate steps to protect him
from the specific danger. Klebanowski testified during his deposition that he told
officers twice on September 8 that he was afraid for his life and he wanted to be
transferred off the tier. Those statements, and the officers’ knowledge of the first
beating, are the only pieces of evidence in the record that can assist Klebanowski in
his attempt to show that the officers were aware of any risk to him. We have
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According to the amended complaint, these events took place sometime before the week of June 6,
2013.(DE 3 at 4.) The original complaint, naming Warden Lawson, was signed on June 4, 2015. (DE 1 at 6.) If these
events took place before June 4, 2013, then these claims against Warden Lawson would be barred by the applicable
two-year statute of limitations. Snodderly, 239 F.3d at 894. And because Henderson did not name David Holt or
Sgt. Schorder as defendants until July 20, 2015, the claims based on events that took place prior to June 6, 2015, are
clearly untimely as to them. Baskin v. City of Des Plaines, 138 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 1998) (not allowing relation
back when the original complaint identified “unknown police officers” as defendants).
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previously held that statements like those made by Klebanowski are insufficient to
alert officers to a specific threat. Butera, 285 F.3d at 606 (deeming insufficient to
establish deliberate indifference statements by a prisoner that he was “having
problems in the block” and “needed to be removed”). In Butera, we deemed the
inmate’s statements insufficient to give notice to the officers because they did not
provide the identities of those who threatened the inmate, nor state what the threats
were. Id.
The facts of this case make clear our reason for requiring more than general
allegations of fear or the need to be removed. By Klebanowski’s own testimony, the
officers knew only that he had been involved in an altercation with three other
inmates, and that he wanted a transfer because he feared for his life. He did not tell
them that he had actually been threatened with future violence, nor that the attack on
September 8 was inflicted by gang members because of his non-gang status. Without
these additional facts to rely on, there was nothing leading the officers to believe that
Klebanowski himself was not speculating regarding the threat he faced out of fear
based on the first attack he suffered. This lack of specificity falls below the required
notice an officer must have for liability to attach for deliberate indifference.
Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633, 639-40 (7th Cir. 2008) (footnote omitted).
Henderson has not met this standard. He did not communicate any specific or direct threat
to either Warden Lawson, David Holt or Sgt. Schorder. Nor did he provide the identities of any
specific inmate who posed a threat to him. This is not surprising, as he does not even allege that any
specific or direct threat existed. Instead, he had only a general fear for his safety from younger
inmates, which he communicated to the defendants. Unfortunately, this vague description is
insufficient to place the defendants on notice of any substantial risk of any serious harm. Id.
Without specific knowledge of a threat, the defendants cannot be deemed deliberately indifferent
to Henderson’s safety by refusing to place him in protective custody. Lewis, 107 F.3d at 553.
Next, Henderson alleges that during the week of June 6, 2013, he spoke with Sgt. Johnson
about being moved from his cell mate. Henderson told Sgt. Johnson that his cell mate was dangerous
and that he feared for his safety. Sgt. Johnson did not move Henderson. Two days later, Henderson
was beaten up by two inmates, one of them being his cell mate. Henderson’s claims against Sgt.
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Johnson are also subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See Behavioral Inst. of Ind., LLC v.
Hobart City of Common Council, 406 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2005) (Indiana’s two-year limitations
period for personal injury suits applies to Section 1983 claims). While Henderson’s original
complaint was signed and submitted to prison officials within two years of this incident, the
amended complaint naming Sgt. Johnson as a defendant was signed and submitted more than two
years after it occurred. Thus, the claims against Sgt. Johnson can only be considered timely if the
amended complaint relates back to the original complaint pursuant to Rule 15(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 15(c) “permit[s] an amendment to relate back to the original complaint only where there
has been an error made concerning the identity of the proper party and where that party is chargeable
with knowledge of the mistake.” King v. One Unknown Federal Correctional Officer, 201 F.3d 910,
914 (7th Cir. 2000). The mistake requirement concerning the proper party’s identity is essential for
relation back to apply. Id. The Seventh Circuit has consistently held that Rule 15(c) does not
provide for relation back when the reason the original complaint was insufficient was due to a
simple lack of knowledge of the identity of the proper party. Id.; Eison v. McCoy, 146 F.3d 468, 472
(7th Cir. 1998); Baskin v. City of Des Plaines, 138 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 1998) (not allowing
relation back when the original complaint identified “unknown police officers” as defendants).
In the original complaint, Henderson did not make a mistake in naming the unknown officers
as defendants, he simply did not know any of the officers’ actual identities2 at the time he filed his
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Not identifying Sgt. Johnson in the original complaint was not Henderson’s only fatal omission. Upon
review of the original complaint, it is also clear that Henderson did not include the allegations that he feared being
attacked by his cell mate and communicated that fear. (See DE 1.) Thus, not only did he fail to name Sgt. Johnson as
a defendant, but he also failed to allege the facts giving rise to this claim. For both of those reasons, the claim is
untimely.
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original complaint. Therefore, Henderson cannot use relation back under Rule 15(c), as he made
no mistake as to the officer’s identity. See e.g. Worthington v. Wilson, 8 F.3d 1253, 1256-57 (7th
Cir. 1993)(noting that a plaintiff may not use relation back principles to replace “John Doe”
defendants with named defendants after the statute of limitations has expired).
Next, Henderson claims that he was denied access to the South Bend Police Department and
his attorney following the assault. He raised these claims in his original complaint, but failed to
allege who denied him this access. He has not corrected this deficiency, as his amended complaint
does not explain or identify who denied him this access either. “A plaintiff bringing a civil rights
action must prove that the defendant personally participated in or caused the unconstitutional
actions.” Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 776 (7th Cir. 2008). Because he has not named any
defendant in connection with these claims, they will be dismissed.
Next, as a result of the June 2013 altercation between Henderson and the two offenders,
Henderson was charged with fighting at the jail. Henderson brings a claim against the disciplinary
hearing officer, Sgt. Fisher, for his actions in finding Henderson guilty of that offense. He complains
that Sgt. Fisher refused to consider video evidence in the disciplinary hearing. However, the manner
in which Sgt. Fisher conducted the prison disciplinary hearing, even if contrary to prison policies,
can only be challenged in a habeas action brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475, 488 (1973) (habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the
fact or duration of his confinement). Accordingly, this claim must be dismissed as well.
Finally, Henderson brings suit against the St. Joseph County Sheriff Michael D. Grzegorek
and the St. Joseph County Jail. Even if any of his claims were timely, neither the jail nor Sheriff
Grzegorek is a proper defendant here. Though the jail is where these events occurred, the jail is a
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building, not a person or even a policy making unit of government that can be sued pursuant to Title
42 U.S.C. section 1983. See Sow v. Fortville Police Dep’t, 636 F.3d 293, 300 (7th Cir. 2011). In
addition, Henderson does not explain why Sheriff Grzegorek should be liable. But, because there
is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Sheriff Grzegorek cannot be held
liable simply because he oversees operations at the jail or supervises other correctional officers.
Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2009).
For these reasons, the court DISMISSES this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: September 21, 2015
/s/ JON E. DEGUILIO
Judge
United States District Court
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