Hatch v. Indiana Department of Corrections et al

Filing 12

OPINION AND ORDER: DISMISSING the claims against the United States Department of Labor; DISMISSES the United States Department of Labor; DECLINING to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining State law claims; and REMANDING the remaining State law claims to the LaPorte Superior Court. Signed by Chief Judge Philip P Simon on 1/26/2016. (lhc)(cc: Plaintiff and Certified copy to LaPorte Superior Court)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
RONRICO J. HATCH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.

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CAUSE NO. 3:15-CV-279 PS

OPINION AND ORDER
Ronrico J. Hatch, a pro se prisoner, filed an amended complaint (DE 1-2 at 70-82)
on June 5, 2015, in the LaPorte Superior Court which was removed here by the United
States Department of Labor on July 6, 2015 (DE 1). I screened (DE 4) the amended
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Department of Labor and the claims
against it were dismissed but, in the spirit of Luevano v. Wal-Mart, 722 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir.
2013), Hatch was given an opportunity to file a second amended complaint if he
believed that by doing so he could plausibly state a claim against the Department of
Labor. He has now filed a second amended complaint. (DE 11.)
Hatch is an inmate at the Indiana State Prison. In his second amended complaint,
Hatch alleges that from July 6, 2007, to October 28, 2013, he was enrolled in the
Paralegal Apprenticeship Program at the prison. He alleges that program was operated
by the Indiana Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) and registered with the United

States Department of Labor. His participation in the program ended when IDOC
Apprenticeship Coordinator Kristal Kajer discontinued the program in December 2013.
“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint,
however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation
marks and citations omitted). Nevertheless, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, I must
review the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
Originally, Hatch did not attach a copy of the contract which he alleged was
breached and therefore it was unclear why he believed that the Department of Labor
had a contract with him. He has now provided that contract. (DE 8-1 at 3.) However, it
is not a contract with the Department of Labor. Rather it is “a written agreement,
complying with §29.7 between an apprentice [Hatch] and . . . the apprentice’s program
sponsor [IDOC] . . ., which contains the terms and conditions of the employment and
training of the apprentice.” 29 C.F.R. § 29.2. Thus, there is no express contract between
Hatch and the Department of Labor.
Hatch further alleges that the actions of Kristal Kajer, as an agent for the
Apprenticeship Sponsor (IDOC) and Registration Agency (the Department of Labor),
cause the Department of Labor to become liable. Notably, in Lopinson v. United States, 15
Cl. Ct. 712 (1988), the Court of Claims addressed similar claims raised by State prisoners
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seeking to hold the United States liable in connection to apprenticeships programs in
which they participated. There, the court found that the Department of Labor “played a
considerable role in the functioning of the apprenticeship program [and that the]
plaintiff’s decisions to contract were no doubt influenced by [the Department of Labor
employee’s] representations . . ..” Id. at 715. Nevertheless, it found that “such activity
does not bind the Federal Government contractually to the plaintiffs [and] substantial
involvement by a Government agency in contract negotiations simply does not itself
create an implied-in-fact contract.” Id.
Here, Hatch’s allegations demonstrate far less involvement by the Department of
Labor than existed in Lopinson. Kristal Kajer is an employee of the Indiana Department
of Correction, not the Department of Labor. (DE 11 at 4.) Nevertheless, even if she had
been an employee, the United States is not liable for promises made by employees
unless the employee who made the promise had the authority to do so. “Nowhere in
those regulations [cited to by Hatch] is [the Department of Labor] granted authority to
contract with private individuals concerning apprenticeship training . . ..” Lopinson, 15
Ct. Cl. at 715. Moreover, Kajer is not alleged to have promised Hatch something, but
rather to have violated Department of Labor apprenticeship program rules.
Though Hatch argues that the Department owes him a fiduciary duty because it
created and failed to enforce rules which should have benefitted him, “[a]n attempt to
implement standards which promote the common good and general welfare clearly
constitutes a sovereign act.” Id. at 716. As such, the department has sovereign immunity

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and cannot be sued. See F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). For all of these
reasons, Hatch does not state a claim against the Department of Labor and the claims
against it must be dismissed.
This case was removed here solely because the Department of Labor is an agency
of the United States. Without the Department of Labor, it would not be appropriate for
me to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining defendants and claims. See
Al’s Serv. Ctr. v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 599 F.3d 720, 727 (7th Cir.2010) (“When all
federal claims in a suit in federal court are dismissed before trial, the presumption is
that the court will relinquish federal jurisdiction over any supplemental state-law
claims.”) and Doe-2 v. McLean County Unit Dist. No. 5 Bd. of Dirs., 593 F.3d 507, 513 (7th
Cir. 2010) (“Ordinarily, when a district court dismisses the federal claims conferring
original jurisdiction before trial, it relinquishes supplemental jurisdiction over any
state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).”). The parties have been afforded the
opportunity to explain why the court should retain supplemental jurisdiction, but no
attempt was made to do so. Therefore this case will be remanded to the LaPorte
Superior Court.
For these reasons, the court:
(1) DISMISSES the claims against the United States Department of Labor;
(2) DISMISSES the United States Department of Labor;
(3) DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining State
law claims; and

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(4) REMANDS the remaining State law claims to the LaPorte Superior Court.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: January 26, 2016.

s/Philip P. Simon
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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