Gorman v. Superintendent

Filing 3

OPINION AND ORDER: The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED pursuant to Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 4 and this case is DISMISSED. Signed by Judge Robert L Miller, Jr on 7/27/2015. (cc: Gorman)(rmc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
ANDRE L. GORMAN,
Petitioner,
vs.
SUPERINTENDENT,
Respondent.

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CAUSE NO. 3:15-CV-295 RLM

OPINION AND ORDER
Andre L. Gorman, a pro se prisoner, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
challenging the prison disciplinary hearing (WCC 15-02-321) where the Disciplinary
Hearing Body (DHB) at the Westville Correctional Facility found him guilty of Disorderly
Conduct on March 17, 2015, in violation of B-236 and sanctioned him with the loss of 90
days earned credit time and demoted him from Credit Class 2 to Credit Class 3. Mr.
Gorman presents four grounds in his petition.
In ground one, Mr. Gorman argues that the charges against him were false and
without factual basis. In evaluating whether adequate evidence supports the findings of
a prison disciplinary hearing, “the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the
record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.”
Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985). “This is a lenient standard, requiring no
more than a modicum of evidence.” Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000)
(citations and quotation marks omitted). Even a conduct report alone can be sufficient
evidence to support a finding of guilt. McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir.

1999). Such is the case here.
On 2/18/15 at approximately 1:20 pm offender Andre Gorman yelled
at Ms. Hawk, “Get your foot off my neck!” in a loud boisterous voice. I, C.
Gann, had Gorman to step into the hallway. As he stepped into the hallway
he stated, “That Hefer right there!” as he pointed to Ms. Hawk. I informed
him, “you will not be disrespectful towards staff in the law library or in front
of me.” I told Gorman if he wanted to remain in the law library to have a seat
and finish his work. At approximately 1:45 pm Gorman walked out of the
law library & became boisterous again and stated, “Just mail my Shit OUT!
MAKE SURE IT GOES OUT THIS TIME!!” Andre Gorman 904846 interfered
with the running of the law library twice in one session, so far as I had to
actually step out of the law library twice because of his behavior. Therefore
causing disruption of the law library session.
DE 1-1 at 88. Though Mr. Gorman disputes how disruptive he was and exactly what C.
Gann saw and heard, “[i]n reviewing a decision for some evidence, courts are not required
to conduct an examination of the entire record, independently assess witness credibility,
or weigh the evidence, but only determine whether the prison disciplinary board’s decision
to revoke good time credits has some factual basis.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445,
457 (1985) (quotations marks and citation omitted). “The Federal Constitution does not
require evidence that logically precludes any conclusion but the one reached by the
disciplinary board.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985). The evidence was
sufficient to have found Mr. Gorman guilty. Therefore ground one is not a basis for habeas
corpus relief.
In ground two, Mr. Gorman argues that the charges were filed against him in
retaliation for his having spoken to and embarrassed the complex director. However, “even
assuming fraudulent conduct on the part of prison officials, the protection from such
arbitrary action is found in the procedures mandated by due process.” McPherson v.
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McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 787 (7th Cir. 1999). Therefore the motivation for filing the charge
against him is not a basis for habeas corpus relief.
In ground three, Mr. Gorman argues that he was punished harshly because he was
placed in segregation before his hearing and he received the maximum punishment
possible for this level of offense. Harshness isn’t a valid basis for challenging a DHB
punishment that is within the range of the offense for which the inmate was found guilty.
Cf. United States ex rel. Long v. Pate, 418 F.2d 1028, 1031 (7th Cir. 1970) (Where a sentence
is “within the range established by the legislature . . . this court will not [on habeas corpus
review] question the trial judge’s discretion in imposing sentence, nor will it question the
refusal of the Illinois Supreme Court to reconsider appellant’s petition for reduction of
sentence.”). Mr. Gorman received the maximum punishment, but because it wasn’t more
than the maximum, ground three isn’t a basis for habeas corpus relief.
In ground four, Mr. Gorman argues that the hearing officer wasn’t impartial because
she called him argumentative and didn’t properly consider his mental illness.
An inmate facing disciplinary charges has the right to an impartial
decisionmaker. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 571. But “the constitutional standard for
impermissible bias is high,” Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003),
and an adjudicator is entitled to a presumption of “honesty and integrity”
absent clear evidence to the contrary, see Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47,
95 S. Ct. 1456, 43 L. Ed. 2d 712 (1975). Due process requires disqualification
of a decisionmaker who was directly or substantially involved in the
underlying incident, Gaither, 236 F.3d at 820, and we have assumed that a
decisionmaker might likewise be impermissibly biased if his spouse is a
crucial witness in the proceeding, see Eads v. Hanks, 280 F.3d 728, 729 (7th
Cir. 2002). A hearing officer is not automatically deemed biased, however,
simply because he adjudicated or was involved in a previous disciplinary
charge against the prisoner. See Piggie, 342 F.3d at 666-67; Pannell, 306 F.3d
at 502.
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Perotti v. Marberry, 355 Fed. Appx. 39, 43 (7th Cir. 2009). Mr. Gorman has not alleged that
the hearing officer was in any way involved in the underlying incident in the law library.
Mr. Gorman’s allegations are all related to how the hearing officer spoke to him and
weighed the evidence presented at the hearing. Even if Mr. Gorman wasn’t argumentative
and even if the hearing officer should have given more weight to his mental health claims,
those rulings don’t present clear evidence of unconstitutional bias and it isn’t for this court
to re-weigh the evidence presented during the hearing. See Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S.
445, 457 (1985). This isn’t a basis for habeas corpus relief.
For these reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED pursuant to
Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 4 and this case is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: July 27, 2015
/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr.
Judge
United States District Court

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