Pringle v. Indiana State of et al

Filing 23

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 21 MOTION To Proceed. Signed by Judge Theresa L Springmann on 1/19/16. cc: Pringle(mc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
ROGER PRINGLE,
Plaintiff,
v.
MONIKA P. TALBOT,
Defendant.

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CAUSE NO.: 3:15-CV-484 TLS

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Proceed [ECF No. 21] filed by the
Plaintiff, Roger Pringle, a pro se prisoner. The Plaintiff’s motion requests that the Court appoint
him counsel for this case. Specifically, the Plaintiff states, “Mr. Pringle would like a court
appointed counsel by Federal law to protect mental people with disabilit[ies].” [ECF No. 21].
The Plaintiff’s motion asserts that “Mr. Pringle cannot understand the law do [sic] to mental
disease and defects,” but he does not identify any specific medical conditions that he suffers
[ECF No. 21]. The Court notes that the Plaintiff has made one other request for the Court to
appoint counsel. This came in the Plaintiff’s Motion for Speedy Trial [ECF No. 6], where the
Plaintiff did not reference any mental illness. On November 23, 2015, the Court issued an Order
[ECF No. 15] denying his request because the Plaintiff was directed to file an amended
complaint, meaning that it was too earlier to determine whether the Plaintiff would need counsel.
On December 23, 2015, the Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint [ECF No. 22], and the Court
now considers his request for court-appointed counsel.

DISCUSSION
“There is no constitutional or statutory right to court-recruited counsel in federal civil
litigation.” Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 760 (7th Cir. 2010). Regardless, a district court has
discretion to recruit counsel for a civil litigant who is unable to afford counsel. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(1). First, the indigent plaintiff must make a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or
have been effectively precluded from doing so. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007)
(en banc). Second, the district court must ask whether the plaintiff appears competent to litigate
the case himself. Id. “There are no fixed requirements for determining a plaintiff’s competence to
litigate his own case,” but the district court will normally consider “the plaintiff’s literacy,
communication skills, educational level, and litigation experience,” and ask whether the factual
and legal “difficulties of the particular case” “exceed the particular plaintiff’s capacity as a lay
person to coherently present it.” Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 784 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Plaintiff’s motions requesting the appointment of counsel do not show that he made a
reasonable effort to obtain counsel or that he was effectively precluded from doing so. A
plaintiff’s status as a prisoner does not automatically satisfy the first requirement. See Olson v.
Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 710–11 (7th Cir. 2014) (observing that the plaintiff inmate submitted
several denial letters from attorneys to prove he attempted to obtain counsel); Allen v. Wine, 297
Fed. App’x 524, 530 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[The plaintiff inmate] has not persuaded us that he
satisfied this threshold requirement of trying to retain counsel himself, which was sufficient
reason for the judge to deny all of [his] requests for counsel.”).

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Even if the Plaintiff had satisfied the threshold requirement, his request for counsel would
still be denied because he is capable of coherently presenting this case. Olson, 750 F.3d at 711
(addressing only the second part of the test, even though the parties disputed whether the plaintiff
satisfied the first part, because the plaintiff’s failure on the second part is dispositive). Although
the Plaintiff’s motions do not elaborate on his alleged mental condition, other parts of the record
include various statements about his health, including some medical records from late 2010 to
early 2011. Navejar v. Iyiola, 718 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013) (“When ruling on a motion to
recruit counsel, the court should take account of all evidence in the record relevant to the
plaintiff’s capacity to litigate.”). The Plaintiff has been prescribed Prozac (ECF No. 1, at 15, 20;
ECF No. 14-1, at 27); he reports suffering from dyslexia (ECF No. 17, at 1), anxiety and paranoia
(ECF No. 1, at 17; ECF No. 14-1, at 23), alcoholism (ECF No. 1, at 18), post-traumatic stress
disorder (ECF No. 1, at 19), anger management problems (ECF No. 1, at 19); and he informed a
medical professional that he was “crazy” (ECF No. 1, at 21) and has a previous suicide attempt
(ECF No. 1, at 17). Many of these conditions are simply asserted without elaboration. The
Plaintiff also contends that Judge Monroe diagnosed him with “paranoia and bipolar [sic].” (ECF
No. 1, at 4). Further, the Plaintiff has a ninth-grade education and extensive experience with the
criminal justice system. (ECF No. 1, at 9, 43–50.) Despite needing to amend his complaint
because he filed multiple complaints on the docket, the Plaintiff’s letters to the Court have been
coherent. Additionally, the Plaintiff was cognizant enough to retain copies of his first complaint
and refile the relevant page in the amended complaint. (Compare Pro Se Compl. 42, ECF No. 1,
with Am. Compl. 4, ECF No. 22.)

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This case is not complex and the Plaintiff has the capacity as a lay person to present his
case coherently. The Plaintiff should know his criminal history and has access to the document
where the Defendant made the alleged defamatory statements. (See ECF No. 1, at 40–41.) The
Plaintiff also presumably has access to the pre-sentence investigation report prepared for
sentencing on his state conviction, which is the document from which the Defendant quoted the
alleged defamatory statements. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, Pringle v. State, No.
03A01-1502-CR-78 (Ind. Ct. App. April 29, 2015), 2015 WL 4399564, at *4–5. Further, this
case does not involve complex medical evidence, which typically causes pro se plaintiffs to
struggle. Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655–56. Since the Plaintiff has not satisfied either part of the test, the
Plaintiff’s request for counsel is denied.
The Court is mindful that it is the appellate court’s function to determine “whether
assistance of counsel could have strengthened the preparation and presentation of the case in a
manner reasonably likely to alter the outcome.” Id. at 660; Navejar v. Iyiola, 718 F.3d 692, 696
(7th Cir. 2013) (“Pruitt nowhere suggests that a district court should consider whether recruiting
counsel would affect the outcome of a case; instead, that inquiry is reserved for the appellate
court’s review of prejudice.”). Alternatively, the Court has also found, and stated by separate
order, that the Plaintiff does not state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Given this outcome, any
request for counsel would be moot.

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CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed [ECF No. 21] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED January 19, 2016
s/ Theresa L. Springmann
THERESA L. SPRINGMANN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FORT WAYNE DIVISION

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