Wilkins v. Lemon et al

Filing 25

OPINION AND ORDER re 2 Pro Se Complaint the court GRANTS leave to proceed on an official capacity clam for injunctive relief again Bruce Lemmon for preventing him from practicing his religion by denying him Halal meat, prayer oil and festive foo ds during religious holidays; court GRANTS leave to proceed on an individual capacity claim for compensatory and punitive damages against Religious Services Director David Liebel for preventing him from practicing his religion by denying him Halal me at, prayer oil, and festive food during religious holidays; DISMISSES all other claims; Dismisses Mark Sevier; DIRECTS the clerk and the US Marshals Service to issue and serve process on Bruce Lemmon and David Liebel with a copy of this order and complaint; ORDERS that Bruce Lemmon and David Liebel respond only to the claims for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order. Signed by Judge Jon E DeGuilio on 10/17/2016. (lpw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
DANIEL E. WILKINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
BRUCE LEMON, DAVID LIEBEL, AND
MARK SEVIER,
Defendants.

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Cause No. 3:15-CV-514 JD

OPINION AND ORDER
Daniel E. Wilkens, a pro se prisoner, alleges that he is being prevented from practicing his
religion in three distinct ways. He brings this claim against three defendants based on three legal
theories and seeks both monetary damages and injunctive relief. “A document filed pro se is to be
liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Nevertheless, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,
the court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against
a defendant who is immune from such relief.
The first way Wilkens alleges that he is being prevented from practicing his religion is by
being denied “Halal meat that has been slaughtered in the name of Allah [by a] trained Muslim
man . . . with a very sharp knife across the jugular vein [while] prayers are said throughout the
proceedings.” DE 2 at 6. The second way is by being denied Halal prayer oils from a reliable
source which are “essential to the (5) five obligatory daily prayers [and] Jumah Friday prayer in
congregation.” DE 2 at 7. The third is way is by being denied “festive foods such as dates, sheep,

chicken, beef, lamb & goat . . . fruits, milk, [and] special breads [during the] three days [of] EidUl-Fitr and Eid-Ul-Adha Islamic festival according to the Islamic traditions.” DE 2 at 8.

1. FIRST AMENDMENT
Wilkins alleges that the defendants are violating his First Amendment right to practice his
religion. Prisoners have a right to exercise their religion under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. Vinning-El v. Evans, 657 F.3d 591, 592-93 (7th Cir. 2011). Nevertheless, restrictions
that limit the exercise of religion are permissible if they are reasonably related to legitimate
penological objectives, which include safety, security, and economic concerns. Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987). At this stage of the litigation, it is unclear why Wilkins is being denied
the ability to practice his religion. Therefore he will be granted leave to proceed for injunctive
relief against Commissioner Bruce Lemmon in his official capacity for violating the First
Amendment. Though he has also sued the two other defendants in their official capacity, it is
unclear whether either of them have the authority to provide the relief sought. What is clear is that
the Commissioner does have the required authority and that it is unnecessary to have more than
one official capacity defendant.
Wilkins also asks for monetary damages from David Liebel on his First Amendment
claims. The complaint alleges that Liebel “is the Director of IDOC Religious Services and a
member of the Religious Practice Committee responsible for religious policies and procedures.”
DE 2 at 5. Attached to the complaint is a Grievance Response Report showing that Liebel denied
his request for meals with Halal meats. DE 2-1 at 22. Attached is a Grievance Response Report
showing that Liebel denied his order for prayer oil. DE 2-1 at 30. Also attached is a Grievance
Response Report showing that Liebel denied his request for festive foods. DE 2-1 at 41. Based on

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these allegations, Wilkins will be granted leave to proceed for monetary damages against Religious
Services Director David Liebel for violating the First Amendment right to practice his religion.

2. RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT
Wilkins alleges that the defendants are preventing him from practicing his religion in
violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act or RLUIPA. This statute
affords even broader protections than the First Amendment by providing that “No government
shall impose . . . a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined
to an institution . . . unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that
person – (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). See also
Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. __, __; 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015). However, the statute does not authorize an
award of money damages against state officials; an inmate may only obtain injunctive relief under
RLUIPA. Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. __, __; 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1658-59 (2011). Therefore,
Wilkins will only be granted leave to proceed for injunctive relief against Commissioner Bruce
Lemmon in his official capacity for violating RLUIPA.

3. EQUAL PROTECTION
Wilkins alleges that the defendants are violating his Equal Protection rights by preventing
him from practicing his religion while allowing other similarly situated inmates to practice their
religions. He alleges that other religious groups “purchase ritual items from outside venders . . ..”
DE 2 at 10. He alleges that Christian Kiros celebrates “their yearly retreat with foods from an
outside vendor Burger King, McDonalds, and other pre-cooked foods . . ..” DE 2 at 11.

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Prisons must permit inmates the reasonable opportunity to exercise
religious freedom. However, prison restrictions that infringe on an inmate’s
exercise of his religion are permissible if they are reasonably related to a legitimate
penological objective, such as security and economic concerns. The court must
balance [the prisoner]’s right to be afforded a reasonable opportunity to exercise
the religious freedom guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments against
the legitimate penological goals of the prison. Within these confines, a prison is
required to make only reasonable efforts to provide some opportunity for religious
practice. This test is less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to infringements on
constitutional rights in consideration of the need to give appropriate deference to
prison officials, avoiding unnecessary judicial intrusion into security problems and
other prison concerns.
In providing this opportunity, the efforts of prison administrators, when
assessed in their totality, must be evenhanded. Prisons cannot discriminate against
a particular religion except to the extent required by the exigencies of prison
administration. The rights of inmates belonging to minority or non-traditional
religions must be respected to the same degree as the rights of those belonging to
larger and more traditional denominations. Of course, economic and, at times,
security constraints may require that the needs of inmates adhering to one faith be
accommodated differently from those adhering to another. The treatment of all
inmates must be qualitatively comparable.
Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 719–20 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets
omitted).
Again, at this stage of the litigation, it is unclear why Wilkins is being denied the ability to
practice his religion. Therefore he will be granted leave to proceed on a claim for injunctive relief
against Commissioner Bruce Lemmon in his official capacity for violating his right to Equal
Protection. He will also be granted leave to proceed on a claim for monetary damages against
Religious Services Director David Liebel in his individual capacity for violating his right to Equal
Protection.
For these reasons, the court:
(1) GRANTS Daniel E. Wilkens leave to proceed on an official capacity claim for
injunctive relief against Commissioner Bruce Lemmon for preventing him from practicing his

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religion by denying him Halal meat, Halal prayer oil, and festive foods during religious holidays
in violation of his First Amendment, RLUIPA, and Equal Protection rights;
(2) GRANTS Daniel E. Wilkens leave to proceed on an individual capacity claim for
compensatory and punitive damages against Religious Services Director David Liebel for
preventing him from practicing his religion by denying him Halal meat, Halal prayer oil, and
festive foods during religious holidays in violation of his First Amendment and Equal Protection
rights;
(3) DISMISSES all other claims;
(4) DISMISSES Mark Sevier;
(5) DIRECTS the clerk and the United States Marshals Service to issue and serve process
on Bruce Lemmon and David Liebel with a copy of this order and the complaint (DE 2) as required
by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); and
(6) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that Bruce Lemmon and David Liebel
respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only
to the claims for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: October 17, 2016

/s/ JON E. DEGUILIO
Judge
United States District Judge

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