Pletcher v. Superintendent
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER: The Court DENIES the habeas corpus petition pursuant to Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 4 and DIRECTS the Clerk to close this case. Signed by Judge Joseph S Van Bokkelen on 10/27/2016. (lhc)(cc: Pletcher)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
JOSIAH PLETCHER,
Petitioner,
v.
Case No. 3:15-CV-537 JVB
SUPERINTENDENT,
Respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER
Josiah Pletcher, a pro se prisoner, filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the prison
disciplinary hearing (WCC 15-09-43) where a disciplinary hearing officer (DHO) at the
Westville Correctional Facility found him guilty of Trafficking in violation of A-113/111 on
September 9, 2015. As a result, he was sanctioned with the loss of 90 days earned credit time and
demoted to Credit Class 2. Pletcher raises three grounds in his petition.
In Ground One, Pletcher argues that he was found guilty of the wrong charge. He argues
that he should have been found guilty of Attempted Trafficking, rather than Trafficking. This is a
technical argument which is based solely on the omission of the word “Attempted” from the
Disciplinary Hearing Report. The Conduct Report charged him with “Attempting to engage in
trafficking” in violation of 111/113. DE 1-1 at 1. The Conduct Report stated that Pletcher sent an
email to a person outside of the prison stating that she should have received the money by now to
purchase illegal drugs. It stated that he twice called the same person asking for additional drugs.
The code number for attempting a Class A violation is 111.1 The code number for trafficking is
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https://secure.in.gov/idoc/files/02-04-101_APPENDIX_I-OFFENSES_6-1-2015(1).pdf
113.2 Both the Conduct Report and the Disciplinary Hearing Report contain those numbers. By
number, he was charged with attempted trafficking. By number he was found guilty of attempted
trafficking. There is no indication that the omission of the word “Attempted” from the text of the
Disciplinary Hearing Report changed the factual basis of the charge against him. “Prison
disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due
a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).
“In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction
violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62,
68 (1991). Here, there is no indication that the omission of the word “Attempted” from the
Disciplinary Hearing Report violated those rights. Therefore Ground One is not a basis for
habeas corpus relief.
In Ground Two, Pletcher argues that his hearing officer was not impartial because she had
written an unrelated conduct report on him five months before. In Ground Three he argues that the
sanctions were too harsh. He acknowledges that he did not present either of these two grounds
during his administrative appeals.
Indiana does not provide judicial review of decisions by prison
administrative bodies, so the exhaustion requirement in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)
is satisfied by pursuing all administrative remedies. These are, we held in
Markham v. Clark, 978 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1992), the sort of “available State
corrective process” (§ 2254(b)(1)(B)(i)) that a prisoner must use. Indiana
offers two levels of administrative review: a prisoner aggrieved by the
decision of a disciplinary panel may appeal first to the warden and then to
a statewide body called the Final Reviewing Authority. Moffat sought
review by both bodies, but his argument was limited to the contention that
the evidence did not support the board’s decision. He did not complain to
either the warden or the Final Reviewing Authority about the board’s
sketchy explanation for its decision. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838,
119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999), holds that to exhaust a claim, and
thus preserve it for collateral review under § 2254, a prisoner must present
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Id.
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that legal theory to the state’s supreme court. The Final Reviewing
Authority is the administrative equivalent to the state’s highest court, so the
holding of Boerckel implies that when administrative remedies must be
exhausted, a legal contention must be presented to each administrative level.
Moffat v. Broyles, 288 F.3d 978, 981-82 (7th Cir. 2002). Because Pletcher did not present these
two grounds to the Final Reviewing Authority, they are unexhausted.
Additionally, even if Grounds Two and Three had been exhausted, they would not be a
basis for habeas corpus relief. “A hearing officer is not automatically deemed biased . . . simply
because he adjudicated or was involved in a previous disciplinary charge against the prisoner.
See Piggie, 342 F.3d at 666-67; Pannell, 306 F.3d at 502.” Perotti v. Marberry, 355 Fed. Appx.
39, 43 (7th Cir. 2009). And the harshness of sanctions is not a valid basis for challenging a
punishment that is within the range of the offense for which the inmate was found guilty. Cf.
United States ex rel. Long v. Pate, 418 F.2d 1028, 1031 (7th Cir. 1970) (Where a sentence is
“within the range established by the legislature . . . this court will not [on habeas corpus review]
question the trial judge’s discretion in imposing sentence, nor will it question the refusal of the
Illinois Supreme Court to reconsider appellant’s petition for reduction of sentence.”). Pletcher’s
sentence was within the limits permitted by Indiana’s Disciplinary Code for Adult Offenders for
a Class A offense.
For these reasons, the Court DENIES the habeas corpus petition pursuant to Section
2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 4 and DIRECTS the Clerk to close this case.
SO ORDERED on October 27, 2016.
s/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen
JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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