Holt v. Countrywide Home Loans
OPINION AND ORDER: The Court GRANTS each of the Defendants' motions to dismiss 39 50 57 . The claims against Altisource are dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The remaining claims are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdict ion to the extent they seek to review or modify the judgment in the state court foreclosure proceeding, and for failure to state a claim to the extent they contest the manner in which the writ of assistance was executed, as explained. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in accordance with this order. Signed by Judge Jon E DeGuilio on 8/10/2017. (Copy mailed to pro se party)(jss)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
KYLE O. HOLT,
BSI FINANCIAL SERVICES, et al.,
Case No. 3:15-CV-557 JD
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Kyle Holt fought a foreclosure proceeding in state court for many years. When
he finally lost in that action and the property was sold at auction, he turned to federal court,
asking this Court to vacate the foreclosure and give him back the deed to the property. He also
argues that the defendants should not have taken possession of the property while he was still
trying to contest the foreclosure, and that some of his belongings were lost or damaged after they
were removed from the property. In his amended complaint, Mr. Holt sued three defendants,
each of which have moved to dismiss. Mr. Holt’s claims face a number of jurisdictional and
substantive impediments. First, one of the defendants moves to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction and for improper service, as it is an entity based in Luxembourg that has no contacts
with Indiana. All of the defendants also move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, as this Court has no jurisdiction to review a judgment from
a state court, and thus cannot vacate the foreclosure judgment or return the property to Mr. Holt.
Finally, the defendants argue that the claims fail even on their merits. The Court addresses each
of the arguments in turn, and grants the motions to dismiss for the reasons explained below.
Plaintiff Kyle Holt owned property in Granger, Indiana, that was secured by a mortgage.
Mr. Holt fell behind on his mortgage payments, so his lender at the time, Countrywide Home
Loans, initiated foreclosure proceedings in state court in St. Joseph County, Indiana. A judgment
of foreclosure was entered in April 2009. Years of delays then ensued. At some point,
Countrywide assigned its interest in the foreclosure judgment to “Christiana Trust, a division of
Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, not in its individual capacity but as Trustee of ARLP
Trust 4” (“Christiana Trust”), and BSI Financial Services took over as the mortgage servicer.
Finally, in June 2015, the state court ordered that the property be sold at a sheriff’s auction, and
the sale took place in August 2015, after the state court denied an emergency motion to vacate
the sale. The property was sold to Christiana Trust, and the sheriff granted Christiana Trust the
deed to the property on August 20, 2015.
In the meantime, Mr. Holt purported to send a notice of rescission under the Truth in
Lending Act to BSI Financial in July 2015 (even though the mortgage had already been
foreclosed and the deadline for a notice of rescission had passed years before, see Mains v.
Citibank, N.A., 852 F.3d 669, 677 (7th Cir. 2017)). Though the property was sold and transferred
to Christiana Trust in August 2015, Mr. Holt did not vacate the property. Accordingly, in
October 2015, Christiana Trust moved in the state court for a writ of assistance in order to take
possession of the property. Mr. Holt did not respond. On November 16, 2015, the state court
granted the writ of assistance. The order declared that Christiana Trust “is entitled to the
immediate possession” of the property. [DE 51-8]. It also directed the sheriff “to enter into and
upon the subject real estate and remove [Mr. Holt] or any persons residing therein, together with
all personal property.” Id.
On November 24, 2015, Mr. Holt, by counsel, filed a complaint in this case, asserting a
claim against Countrywide under the Truth in Lending Act, alleging that it failed to properly
respond to his notice of rescission. The following week, on December 1, 2015, Mr. Holt’s
attorney filed a motion in state court to stay the writ of assistance, arguing that the writ should be
stayed because he was asking a federal court in this case to void the judgment of foreclosure in
the state court. Mr. Holt alleges that his attorney then called and spoke to an attorney for
Christiana Trust, who said that they would not perform the lockout at that time. However, when
Mr. Holt returned to the property that evening, his belongings were being loaded into trucks by a
company called “C and S Roofing,” which Mr. Holt alleges had been hired by an entity named
“Altisource.” Mr. Holt and his attorney notified the movers that they were disputing the
foreclosure and that the lockout was not supposed to be performed, but the movers went forward
and moved the belongings in the property to a storage facility. Mr. Holt has since retrieved the
belongings, but he alleges that some of them were lost or damaged in the process.1 The state
court later denied the motion to stay the writ of assistance.
In this case, Countrywide moved to dismiss Mr. Holt’s complaint. After that motion was
fully briefed, Mr. Holt’s attorney had to withdraw as counsel, and Mr. Holt began proceeding pro
se. The Court held off ruling on the motion to dismiss so that Mr. Holt could consider what
claims he wished to pursue and whether he wished to advance any additional arguments. Mr.
Holt offered an ambiguous response, suggesting that he may wish to proceed instead against
different defendants. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the complaint with leave to amend, and
He also alleges that after he claimed the belongings and moved them to another storage facility,
that facility experienced flooding that damaged some of his belongings. However, he does not
suggest how any party in this case could be liable for damages caused by a flood at a facility
where he chose to store his belongings.
cautioned Mr. Holt as to some of the difficulties his claim under the Truth in Lending Act would
face. Mr. Holt eventually filed an amended complaint. His amended complaint asserts a claim for
negligence, arguing that the defendants negligently foreclosed on his mortgage without having
the right to do so; a claim for “wrongful foreclosure,” again arguing that the defendants
improperly pursued the foreclosure; and a claim for “wrongful seizure of property,” arguing that
the defendants should not have executed the writ of assistance when they did and that some of
his belongings were lost or damaged in the process.
As defendants, Mr. Holt named BSI Financial Services, Christiana Trust,2 and Altisource.
The Court has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as Mr. Holt is a citizen of Indiana
[DE 41 p. 2]; BSI Financial is corporation that is incorporated in Texas [DE 41 p. 2] and has its
principal place of business in Texas [DE 31 ¶ 2]; Christiana Trust is a division of Wilmington
Savings Fund Society, a corporation that is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place
of business in Delaware [DE 41 p. 2]; and Altisource is a citizen of the Grand Duchy of
Luxembourg, as discussed below. The amount in controversy also exceeds $75,000, as set forth
in Mr. Holt’s jurisdictional supplement. [DE 41 p. 1–2]. The defendants have each moved to
dismiss, and Mr. Holt, as a pro se litigant, was advised of his right to respond and of the burdens
that applied to the respective bases for dismissal. Mr. Holt filed a response, and the motions are
The amended complaint actually named two different entities: “Christiana Trust,” and
“Wilmington Savings Fund Society.” However, the magistrate judge granted an unopposed
motion to correct the party name, and substituted “Christiana Trust, a division of Wilmington
Savings Fund Society, FSB, not in its individual capacity, but as Trustee of ARLP Trust 4” in
place of those defendants.
Personal Jurisdiction as to Altisource
First, Altisource moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule
12(b)(2). Altisource indicates that there is no entity whose name is simply “Altisource,” but that
there are a number of entities, both foreign and domestic, whose name includes “Altisource.” It
further indicates that the entity that Mr. Holt named in the complaint and purported to serve3 is
Altisource Solutions S.à r.l., a société à responsabilité limitée, which is headquartered in and
organized under the laws of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.4 Altisource submitted an affidavit
stating that this entity has never done any business in Indiana, has never had an office in Indiana
or anywhere in the United States, did not perform any services with respect to the property at
issue, and has never interacted with Mr. Holt. [DE 56-9]. Accordingly, it argues that it is not
subject to personal jurisdiction in this Court.
A motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction argues that the Court lacks
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant because that defendant does not have sufficient
contacts with the forum state. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471–72 (1985)
Altisource further argues that Mr. Holt’s attempt to serve it by regular mail does not satisfy the
requirements for serving foreign parties, so it moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5). Because the
Court finds that Altisource is not subject to personal jurisdiction, the Court need not reach this
alternative basis for dismissal.
Mr. Holt’s supplement in support of diversity jurisdiction alleged that Altisource is a
“corporation” that originated and was headquartered in Luxembourg. [DE 41]. It is not clear that
a Luxembourg S.á r.l. qualifies for treatment as a corporation for jurisdictional purposes. See
V&M Star, LP v. Centimark Corp., 596 F.3d 354 (6th Cir. 2010). However, even if this entity is
treated as an unincorporated entity, in which case it would have the citizenship of each of its
members or partners, it would still be a citizen of Luxembourg only. According to an affidavit
attached to Altisource’s motion, the sole shareholder of Altisource Solutions S.á r.l. is Altisource
Holdings S.á r.l., whose sole shareholder is Altisource Portfolio Solutions S.A., which is a
société anonyme that is headquartered in and organized under the laws of Luxembourg. [DE 569]. Such an entity does qualify for treatment as a corporation, see Purdue Research Found., 338
F.3d at 775, n.2 (treating a French “S.A.” as a corporation for diversity jurisdiction purposes), so
Altisource is a citizen only of Luxembourg in either event.
(“The Due Process Clause protects an individual’s liberty interest in not being subject to the
binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful contacts, ties, or
relations.” (internal quotation omitted)). When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of making a prima facie case
for personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A.,
338 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2003). On such a motion, the Court may consider affidavits and
materials outside the pleadings. Id. at 782–83. The Court may also consider any allegations in the
complaint, but “once the defendant has submitted affidavits or other evidence in opposition to
the exercise of jurisdiction, the plaintiff must go beyond the pleadings and submit affirmative
evidence supporting the exercise of jurisdiction.” Id. at 783; see also Swanson v. City of
Hammond, Ind., 411 F. App’x 913, 915 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e accept [the plaintiff’s] allegations
relating to personal jurisdiction as true except where the defendants refute them through
Here, Mr. Holt did not respond to the assertions in Altisource’s affidavit, so he failed to
meet his burden of establishing that Altisource is subject to personal jurisdiction in this Court.
According to Altisource’s affidavit, it was formed in and has its headquarters in Luxembourg,
and “has never done business in Indiana and does not transact any business in Indiana.” [DE 569 p. 2]. It further states that it “does not have, and has never had, an office in Indiana or
anywhere else in the United States,” and “does not have, and has never had, any employees
located in Indiana or anywhere else in the United States.” Id. It also states that it “does not
engage in property preservation services in Indiana,” “did not perform services with respect to
Altisource’s motion correctly advised Mr. Holt of this burden, and its “Notice to Pro Se
Litigant” likewise advised him of his need to respond to its motion with affidavits or evidence.
[Mr. Holt’s] property,” and “did not contract with or even communicate with [Mr. Holt]
concerning his property or his mortgage.” Id. These assertions are uncontradicted.
Accordingly, Altisource is not subject to general jurisdiction in Indiana, as it does not
have continuous and systematic business contacts in Indiana. Purdue Research Found., 338 F.3d
at 787. Nor has it engaged in any conduct in or had contacts with Indiana relative to this suit,
such that it could be subject to specific jurisdiction. Therefore, though there might be some other
entity with “Altisource” in its name that could be sued in this jurisdiction, the party that Mr. Holt
actually sued and served in this case—Altisource Solutions S.à r.l.—is not subject to personal
jurisdiction in Indiana, so its motion to dismiss must be granted. Any claims against Altisource
Solutions S.à r.l. are dismissed without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction under Rooker–Feldman
The remaining defendants first seek to dismiss Mr. Holt’s claims for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. Under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine,
federal courts other than the Supreme Court lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear cases that
require them to review or set aside a state court judgment; only the Supreme Court can review
the judgments of state courts. Mains v. Citibank, N.A., 852 F.3d 669, 675 (7th Cir. 2017) (“The
Rooker–Feldman doctrine prevents lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases
brought by state-court losers challenging state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced.”). “Claims that directly seek to set aside a state-court judgment are de
facto appeals that trigger the doctrine.” Id. “Another way of expressing the same point is to ask
whether the federal plaintiff is alleging that his injury was caused by the state-court judgment.”
Id. In short, Rooker–Feldman applies “where the plaintiff seeks relief that is tantamount to
vacating the state judgment,” but it does not apply if the claim “does not seek to vacate the
judgment of the state court and instead seeks damages for independently unlawful conduct.” Id.
Here, Mr. Holt’s first two claims are clearly barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. The
first claim asserts that the defendants were negligent in that they foreclosed on the property
without having the legal authority or proper documentation to do so. The second claim, for
“wrongful foreclosure,” asserts that the wrong parties received the foreclosure judgment and that
there was “deception” in the foreclosure proceedings. In his prayer for relief, Mr. Holt asks that
the Court declare that the foreclosure of his residence was wrongful, issue him a new deed to the
property, and vacate and set aside the foreclosure. These claims fall squarely within the Rooker–
Feldman doctrine, as they assert that the injury was caused by the state foreclosure judgment,
and they explicitly ask this Court to vacate that judgment. Mains v. Citibank, N.A., 852 F.3d 669,
675 (7th Cir. 2017); Davenport v. Roundpoint Mort. Serv. Corp., 668 F. App’x 659, 659 (7th Cir
2016) (“[T]he federal lawsuit sought to ‘clear title’ to the foreclosed property and thus
represented an improper collateral challenge to the state-court judgment.”); Sturdivant v. U.S.
Bank, N.A., 653 F. App’x 466, 467 (7th Cir. 2016) (affirming a judgment that held that “[t]o the
extent [the plaintiff] sought an order declaring her to be the sole property owner” of the
foreclosed property, the claim was “barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine”); Riddle v.
Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 599 F. App’x 598, 600 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that the
plaintiff’s “federal lawsuit [challenging the judgment of foreclosure] is thus an attack on that
judgment and is barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine”); Carpenter v. PNC Bank, Nat’l Ass’n,
633 F. App’x 346, 347–489 (7th Cir. 2016); Grisham v. Integrity First Bank, No. 13-cv-587,
2014 WL 1315411, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 1, 2014) (“The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit has applied the Rooker–Feldman doctrine consistently to cases in which plaintiffs ask the
court to set aside a state court foreclosure judgment.”) (collecting cases). The Court lacks
jurisdiction over those claims, so the motions to dismiss are granted to that extent, and those
claims are dismissed without prejudice.
Mr. Holt’s remaining claim is for “wrongful seizure of property.” This claim arises out
the execution of the writ of assistance, by which his personal property was removed and he was
locked out of the property. To the extent Mr. Holt argues that the seizure was wrongful because
the writ of assistance was invalid, or because the foreclosure judgment itself was invalid, this
claim is likewise barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine for the same reasons. However, this
claim also appears to challenge the manner in which the writ of assistance was executed. Mr.
Holt argues that the defendants should not have executed the writ of assistance when he had
notified them that he was contesting the foreclosure, and he also argues that some of his property
was lost or damaged after it was removed.
To that limited extent, this claim is not barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, as the
claim does not challenge or seek to set aside the state judgment, but asserts that the defendants
executed the judgment in an impermissible manner. The Seventh Circuit addressed a similar
claim in Brown v. Varan, 322 F. App’x 453 (7th Cir. 2009), where the plaintiff alleged that she
was unlawfully evicted despite the presence of an eviction order. Because the plaintiff did not
challenge the eviction order itself, but contended that the order did not actually authorize the
defendant’s actions, the court held that the claim was not barred under the Rooker–Feldman
doctrine. Id. at 454. Likewise, in Dempsey v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 272 F. App’x 499
(7th Cir. 2008), the plaintiff challenged the sale of his property pursuant to a state foreclosure
judgment, and also claimed that the defendant executed the writ of assistance in an unreasonable
manner. The court held that the former claim was barred under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine as
a challenge of the state judgment. Id. at 502. However, it adjudicated the claim relating to the
execution of the writ of assistance on its merits, and dismissed that claim with prejudice. Id. at
503. Consistent with those cases, the Court finds that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine does not bar
Mr. Holt’s claim to the extent he challenges the manner in which the defendants executed the
writ of assistance and took possession of the property, so the Court may consider that claim on
Failure to State a Claim
The defendants finally move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. In
reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under
Rule 12(b)(6), the Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
accepts the factual allegations as true, and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.
Reynolds v. CB Sports Bar, Inc., 623 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 2010). A complaint must contain
a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2). That statement must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim for relief that is plausible on its face, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), and raise
a right to relief above the speculative level. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). The Court liberally construes pleadings by pro se plaintiffs. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007).
As just discussed, the only claim over which this Court has jurisdiction contests the
manner in which the writ of assistance was executed. However, Altisource has already been
dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, so the Court need not consider whether this claim
would state a claim against that defendant. In addition, the complaint contains no allegations
suggesting that BSI Financial had any involvement in this aspect of Mr. Holt’s claims. The
complaint alleges only that BSI Financial was a mortgage servicer, but its involvement in that
capacity would have ceased once the mortgage was foreclosed and the property was sold at
auction. BSI Financial did not purchase the property, and the complaint does not allege that it
had any involvement in taking possession of the property, so BSI Financial’s motion to dismiss
is granted as to this claim.
That leaves the claim against Christiana Trust. Mr. Holt first appears to assert that
Christiana Trust wrongfully seized the property because it executed the writ of assistance even
though he had notified it that he “was disputing the foreclosure.” However, Mr. Holt had already
lost that dispute: the state court entered a judgment of foreclosure, the property was sold at a
Sheriff’s auction in August 2015 and a deed to the property was granted to Christiana Trust, and
the state court granted a writ of assistance on November 16, 2015. That order stated that
Christiana Trust “is entitled to the immediate possession of the real estate,” and it directed the
Sheriff to enter the property and remove any persons or personal property. [DE 51-8 (emphasis
added)]. Once the property was sold at auction, Mr. Holt no longer owned it, and when he
refused to leave, the court granted a writ of assistance directing the Sheriff to remove him from
the property. Two weeks later, after Mr. Holt admits he had received the order, he had still not
moved out, so his personal property was removed from the property pursuant to the writ, which
granted Christiana Trust “immediate possession” of the property. As the Seventh Circuit held in
dismissing a similar claim in Dempsey, “the sheriff has the ‘right and duty’ to execute the writ
[of assistance] immediately upon receiving it,” so a party cannot complain that the writ was
executed without delay. Dempsey, 272 F. App’x at 503 (quoting 7 C.J.S. Writ of Assistance
§ 14) (noting also that the plaintiff “could have avoided his trouble by moving out voluntarily
and promptly when Chase obtained title to the property as opposed to forcing Chase to utilize the
sheriff’s department to enforce the court’s decision”).
Mr. Holt also notes that his attorney had filed an emergency motion to stay the writ, but
the filing of such a motion would not have suspended the effectiveness of the writ of assistance,
see Ind. Tr. R. 62, so Christiana Trust was entitled to take possession of the property
notwithstanding Mr. Holt’s continuing attempts to escape the state court’s judgment. Mr. Holt
further alleges that an attorney for Christiana Trust told his attorney that they would wait for the
state court to rule on the motion before executing the writ. But he does not allege that he
detrimentally relied on that statement—that he would have moved his belongings out of the
property before the writ was actually executed (only hours later) absent that statement—as would
be required to sustain a claim on that basis. To the contrary, he indicates that he intended to
remain at the property at least until the state court ruled on the motion to stay [DE 59 ¶ 14], even
though he had already been ordered to leave weeks earlier. The complaint also indicates that Mr.
Holt’s attorney did not even file the motion to stay or contact Christiana Trust’s attorney until the
same day the writ of assistance was executed, [DE 31 ¶¶ 14–18], and the complaint offers no
suggestion that the belongings would have been removed that day but for the alleged statement.
Nor did Mr. Holt have any basis to expect that the writ of assistance would not have already been
executed in the preceding weeks, before his attorney even requested a delay. Therefore, Mr. Holt
cannot complain about the timing of the execution of the writ—Christiana Trust was entitled to
immediate possession of the property even if Mr. Holt refused to accept the writ’s issuance and
continued trying to delay its execution—so his claim is dismissed to that extent.
Finally, Mr. Holt’s complaint notes that some of his belongings were lost or damaged in
the process of removing them from the property and storing them. However, he does not allege
that Christiana Trust was the party that actually performed the lockout and removed the
belongings. Rather, he alleges that “Altisource” hired another party, “C and S Roofing,” to
remove the belongings and place them in a storage facility. In Indiana, a party “generally cannot
be held liable for the negligence of an independent contractor.” Sword v. NKC Hospitals, Inc.,
714 N.E.2d 142, 148 (Ind. 1999); Selby v. N. Ind. Public Serv. Co., 851 N.E.2d 333, 337 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2006) (“As a long-standing general rule, a principal is not liable for the negligence of an
independent contractor whom he employs.”). Thus, even if Mr. Holt’s belongings were lost or
damaged due to somebody’s negligence, he does not identify a basis upon which Christiana
Trust could be held liable for that negligence. Therefore, this aspect of Mr. Holt’s claim fails to
state a claim for which relief can be granted against Christiana Trust as well, so its motion to
dismiss is also granted in that respect.
In sum, all of the claims in this action have been dismissed, either for lack of personal or
subject matter jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim. The Court does not believe that granting
Mr. Holt leave to file another amended complaint is warranted, either. Mr. Holt has already filed
one amended complaint (after multiple extensions of time and missed deadlines), after the Court
identified the deficiencies in his initial complaint. [DE 25]. He also offered additional factual
support for his claims in his response to the motions to dismiss. However, the main emphasis of
his amended complaint is an attack on the state court’s judgment of foreclosure, which this Court
lacks jurisdiction to address, and that problem could not be cured in an amended pleading. As to
the narrow claim over which this Court does have jurisdiction, Mr. Holt has given no reason to
believe that he could state a claim against any of the existing defendants if permitted to file
another amended complaint. If Mr. Holt wishes to pursue a claim for the loss or damage of his
belongings, he would likely need to do so against different parties, but that could be done in
another proceeding, and because the sole basis for jurisdiction in this case is diversity, it is
possible that Mr. Holt could not join those parties as defendants in this case. Accordingly, the
Court will direct the Clerk to enter judgment and close this case.
For those reasons, the Court GRANTS each of the defendants’ motions to dismiss. [DE
39, 50, 57]. The claims against Altisource are dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The
remaining claims are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction to the extent they seek to
review or modify the judgment in the state court foreclosure proceeding, and for failure to state a
claim to the extent they contest the manner in which the writ of assistance was executed, as
explained above. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in accordance with this order.
ENTERED: August 10, 2017
/s/ JON E. DEGUILIO
United States District Court
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