Eastman v. Biomet Orthopedics, LLC et al

Filing 56

OPINION AND ORDER denying 50 Motion to Remand. Signed by Judge Robert L Miller, Jr on 4/11/16. (jld) (cc: Eastman)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
DONALD WAYNE EASTMAN,
PLAINTIFF,
VS.

BIOMET, INC., ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS.

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CAUSE NO. 3:15-CV-585-RLM-CAN

OPINION and ORDER
Donald Eastman filed suit against Biomet in an earlier case in this MDL,
No. 3:14-cv-771. Mr. Eastman was represented by counsel in that proceeding,
and stipulated to the dismissal of his case with prejudice after the parties
reached a settlement. Mr. Eastman filed this second suit without counsel in the
Western District of Arkansas, alleging that Biomet breached the settlement
agreement by paying him only $25,000 instead of $200,000 without good cause
to reduce his award. Biomet moved to transfer Mr. Eastman’s second case to this
MDL as a tag-along action, and the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
transferred the case over Mr. Eastman’s objection.
Mr. Eastman moves for remand. Mr. Eastman argues that the Panel
exceeded its statutory authority in transferring his second case, because his
dispute with Biomet concerns only the amount of damages he is owed from his
first case – the parties both consider the original case settled, and the only issue
is whether Mr. Eastman is entitled to the default $200,000 figure contemplated

by the Master Settlement Agreement or the lower figure Biomet offered and Mr.
Eastman accepted. Mr. Eastman insists that damages determinations aren’t the
type of “pretrial proceedings” the Panel is empowered to consolidate, and asks
that I remand his case for a trial solely on damages.
I don’t have the power to remand the case to Arkansas immediately, as Mr.
Eastman wants. Once a case has been consolidated in an MDL, only the Panel
can remand it back to the transferor court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (providing
that once consolidated, actions “shall be remanded by the panel”) (emphasis
added). The best a transferee judge can do is recommend remand to the Panel.
See JPML Rule 10.1, 277 F.R.D. 480 (“Typically, the transferee judge
recommends remand of an action, or a part of it, to the transferor court at any
time by filing a suggestion of remand with the Panel.”). A transferee court’s
“suggestion of remand is typically given considerable weight.” U.S. ex rel. Hockett
v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 498 F. Supp. 2d 25, 36 (D.D.C. 2007), citing
In re Wilson, 451 F.3d 161 (3rd Cir. 2006); see also In re Holiday Magic Sec. &
Antitrust Litig., 433 F. Supp. 1125, 1126 (Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 1977) (“In
considering the question of remand, the Panel has consistently given great
weight to the transferee judge’s determination that remand of a particular action
at a particular time is appropriate because the transferee judge, after all,
supervises the day-to-day pretrial proceedings.”). I construe Mr. Eastman’s
motion for remand as a motion asking me to suggest remand to the Panel.

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As the party seeking remand, Mr. Eastman bear the burden of showing
that remand is warranted. See In re Maxim Integrated Products, Inc., MDL No.
2354, No. 12-244, 2015 WL 1757779, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2015) (noting that
“because pretrial proceedings have not concluded, [the movant] has the burden
to demonstrate good cause to secure remand of its case”); In re S. Cent. States
Bakery Products Antitrust Litig., 462 F. Supp. 388, 390 (Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit.
1978) (holding that the Panel “will remand an action or actions prior to the
completion of coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings only upon a
showing of good cause,” and declining to remand because movant “failed to make
any such showing.”).
In deciding whether to suggest remand to the Panel, a transferee court
applies the same standards for remand the Panel would apply. See In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1197 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
Generally, this means that the transferee court asks “whether the case will
benefit from further coordinated proceedings as part of the MDL.” In re Ins.
Brokerage Antitrust Litig., Civ. Nos. 04–5184, 05–5696, 2009 WL 530965, at *2
(D.N.J. March 3, 2009) (citing In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 128 F. Supp. at
1197). The purpose of pretrial consolidation or coordination is “for the
convenience of the parties and witnesses and [to] promote the just and efficient
conduct of such actions,” 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a); accordingly, “the decision of
whether to suggest remand should be guided in large part by whether one option

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is more likely to insure the maximum efficiency for all parties and the judiciary.”
United States ex rel. Hockett, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 38 (internal citations omitted).
A suggestion of remand wouldn’t be appropriate at this early point in the
case. While Mr. Eastman characterizes his case as solely a dispute about the
measure of damages he is owed, that doesn’t appear to be quite right; Mr.
Eastman executed a release of all his claims against Biomet as part of the
settlement of his first case, and Biomet takes the position that this case must be
dismissed entirely on that basis. Mr. Eastman insists that he modified the
original release to reserve his right to contest the settlement amount. Liability
under the Master Settlement Agreement – not just damages – is at issue, and
pretrial proceedings such as dispositive motions may still be necessary. Mr.
Eastman offers no reason to doubt the Panel’s conclusion that his case satisfies
the statutory criteria and “clearly falls within the MDL’s ambit.”
Continued consolidation serves the interests of judicial efficiency. Mr.
Eastman’s lawsuit depends entirely on the terms of the Master Settlement
Agreement; because I oversaw the settlement process and have already ruled on
similar enforcement disputes regarding the Master Settlement Agreement, I am
more familiar with the agreement and the basis for Mr. Eastman’s claims than
the transferor judge would be. Fairness and uniformity are also best served by
addressing Mr. Eastman’s complaint in this court. Other parties seeking to
interpret or enforce the terms of the Master Settlement Agreement have done so
within this MDL, and remanding Mr. Eastman’s case creates a risk that the
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transferor judge and I might give the same written agreement divergent
interpretations. As the Panel recognized in transferring Mr. Eastman’s case, it’s
important that “disputes

under

consistently and that

MDL

participate

in

the

all

settlement

the

settlement agreement

personal

injury

plaintiffs

are
who

decided
elect

to

agreement are treated similarly.” (internal

quotations omitted).
For these reasons, I DENY Mr. Eastman’s motion for remand (Doc. No. 50).
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: April 11, 2016

/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr.
Judge
United States District Court

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