Scruggs v. Miller et al

Filing 21

AMENDED OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 19 Motion for Reconsideration; Plaintiff is granted leave to proceed on a claim against Stg. Miller, Stg. SinClair,C.O. Sternberg, and Lt. Creasy in their individual capacities for monetary damages for using excessi ve force against him on two occasions on November 23, 2015 and one occasion on an unspecified date; All other claims are DISMISSED; Nurse Cook is DISMISSED; US Marshal to effect service. (Opinion Amended to correct clerical error)(cc Scruggs, USM). Signed by Judge Jon E DeGuilio on 3/31/16. (mlc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER L. SCRUGGS,
Plaintiff,
v.
STG. MILLER, et al.,
Defendants.

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Cause No. 3:16-CV-050 JD

AMENDED OPINION AND ORDER
Christopher L. Scruggs, a pro se prisoner, moves for reconsideration (DE 19) of the
screening order issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. (DE 7.) Specifically, he argues that the
court erred in dismissing C.O. Sternberg.
As was outlined in the screening order, the court must review a prisoner complaint and
dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a), (b). To survive dismissal, a complaint must contain enough factual matter to state a
claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599,
602-03 (7th Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. at 603. Thus, “a plaintiff must do better than putting a few words on
paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has happened to
her that might be redressed by the law.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir.
2010) (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, the court must bear in mind that “[a] document filed

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pro se is to be liberally construed[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
The facts underlying the complaint were fully outlined in the prior order and will not be
repeated here, except as is relevant to the present motion. In short, Scruggs is an inmate at the
Westville Control Unit. On November 22, 2015, Scruggs threw water onto C.O. Sternberg as she
passed by his cell. C.O. Sternberg then called Stg. Miller and Stg. SinClair for assistance. When
Miller and SinClair arrived, Sternberg told them that the substance Scruggs threw on her burned.
C.O. Sternberg further instructed Miller and SinClair “to get” Scruggs. Miller and SinClair told
Scruggs that he “was a nigger and that [he] would see what niggers get, and that [Scruggs]
fucked up by putting whatever on a ‘white woman.’” (DE 2 at 3.) Subsequently, Miller and
SinClair, under the orders of Lt. Creasy, pepper sprayed him three times to get revenge for his
throwing water on C.O. Sternberg. (DE 3 at 3.)
As to C.O. Sternberg, the court has carefully reviewed the selected passages of the
complaint Scruggs points to in his motion. Although his allegations are somewhat thin, giving
the complaint liberal construction and affording him every inference, the court concludes that he
has stated enough to proceed further against C.O. Sternberg. The complaint can be read to allege
that C.O. Sternberg acted to induce Stg. Miller and Stg. SinClair into using excessive force on
Scruggs. (DE 2 at 3.) If true, C.O. Sternberg may have acted with deliberate indifference or
reckless disregard of Scruggs’ constitutional rights. See Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 496 (7th Cir.
2004) (noting that an official can be personally responsible if she “acts or fails to act” with
deliberate indifference). Further factual development may show that C.O. Sternberg did not act
in such a manner or for such reasons, or that she otherwise had no personal involvement in these
events. However, giving Scruggs the inferences to which is entitled at this stage, he has alleged

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enough to proceed further against this defendant. Therefore, the screening order will be amended
accordingly.
For these reasons, the court:
(1) GRANTS the motion for reconsideration (DE 19);
(2) GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed on a claim against Stg. Miller, Stg. SinClair,
C.O. Sternberg, and Lt. Creasy in their individual capacities for monetary damages for using
excessive force against him on two occasions on November 23, 2015 and one occasion on an
unspecified date;
(3) DISMISSES all other claims;
(4) DISMISSES Nurse Cook;
(5) DIRECTS the clerk to transmit the summons and USM-285 for C.O. Sternberg to the
United States Marshals Service along with a copy of the complaint (DE 2), the original screening
order (DE 7) and this order;
(6) DIRECTS the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service of process on C.O. Sternberg
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); and
(7) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that C.O. Sternberg respond, as
provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the
claims for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: March 31, 2016
/s/JON E. DEGUILIO
Judge
United States District Court

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