Lloyd v. Fries

Filing 15

OPINION AND ORDER re 13 Amended Complaint. The Court GRANTS Frank L. Lloyd leave to proceed against Sheriff Fries in his official capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for implementing a policy and procedure in violation of the Fourtee nth Amendment which required inmates to share hair clippers without a way to sterilize them between uses which resulted in Frank L. Lloyd contracting Hepatitis C; DISMISSES all other claims; DIRECTS the clerk and the United States Marshals Service to issue and serve process on Sheriff Fries with a copy of this order and the amended complaint (ECF 13) as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); and ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), Sheriff Fries to respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claim for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order. Signed by Judge William C Lee on 4/11/2017. (Copy mailed as directed in Order)(rmc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
FRANK L. LLOYD,
Plaintiff,
v.
SHERIFF FRIES,
Defendant.

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CAUSE NO. 3:16-CV-218 WL

OPINION AND ORDER
Frank L. Lloyd, a pro se prisoner, filed an amended complaint alleging that he contracted
Hepatitis C while he was housed in the Allen County Jail as a pre-trial detainee because Sheriff
Fries implemented a policy and procedure which required inmates to share hair clippers without a
way to sterilize them between uses. “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a
pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and
citations omitted). However, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the merits of
a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
such relief. “In order to state a claim under § 1983 a plaintiff must allege: (1) that defendants
deprived him of a federal constitutional right; and (2) that the defendants acted under color of state
law.” Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006).
“In evaluating the constitutionality of conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention . . . the
proper inquiry is whether those conditions amount to punishment of the detainee.” Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). “[I]n the absence of an expressed intent to punish, a pretrial detainee

can nevertheless prevail by showing that the actions are not ‘rationally related to a legitimate
nonpunitive governmental purpose’ or that the actions ‘appear excessive in relation to that
purpose.’” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. __, __; 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015) (quoting Bell).
Pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), a sheriff in
his official capacity can be held liable for monetary damages. See Thomas v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s
Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 305 (7th Cir. 2010). Giving Lloyd the benefit of the inferences to which he
is entitled at the pleading stage of this proceeding, this complaint states a claim and Frank L. Lloyd
will be granted leave to proceed against Sheriff Fries in his official capacity
For these reasons, the court:
(1) GRANTS Frank L. Lloyd leave to proceed against Sheriff Fries in his official capacity
for compensatory and punitive damages for implementing a policy and procedure in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment which required inmates to share hair clippers without a way to sterilize
them between uses which resulted in Frank L. Lloyd contracting Hepatitis C;
(2) DISMISSES all other claims;
(3) DIRECTS the clerk and the United States Marshals Service to issue and serve process
on Sheriff Fries with a copy of this order and the amended complaint (ECF 13) as required by 28
U.S.C. § 1915(d); and
(4) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), Sheriff Fries to respond, as provided
for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claim for which
the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: April 11, 2017

s/William C. Lee
William C. Lee, Judge
United States District Court
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