Daniels v. Superintendent

Filing 11

OPINION AND ORDER: GRANTING 9 MOTION to Dismiss Petition as Moot by Respondent Superintendent and the petition 1 is DISMISSED as moot. The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 8/18/2016. (lhc)(cc: Daniels)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
RAMAR DANIELS,

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Petitioner,
vs.
SUPERINTENDENT,
Respondent.

CAUSE NO. 3:16-CV-219

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the: (1) 28 U.S.C. § 2254
Habeas Corpus Petition by a State Prisoner Challenging a Prison
Disciplinary Proceeding, filed by Ramar Daniels, a pro se prisoner,
on April 11, 2016; and (2) Motion to Dismiss, filed by the
respondent on July 25, 2016. For the reasons set forth below, the
motion to dismiss (DE 9) is GRANTED and the petition (DE 1) is
DISMISSED as moot. The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.

BACKGROUND
On

January

Disciplinary

15,

2016,

Hearing

Body

in

case

(“DHB”)

number
at

WCC

Westville

16-01-0234,

a

Correctional

Facility found Daniels guilty of assault/battery. Ramar Daniels
filed this habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254
challenging the resulting sanctions: loss of phone privileges, 180
days of segregation, and a demotion from credit class 1 to credit
class 2, which was suspended for six months. (DE 1 at 6.)

DISCUSSION
The respondent moves to dismiss, stating that the sanctions
imposed by the hearing officer did not actually lengthen the
duration of the Petitioner’s confinement. To date, Daniels has not
responded to this motion.
It is true that a prison disciplinary action can only be
challenged in a federal habeas corpus proceeding where it lengthens
the duration of confinement. Hadley v. Holmes, 341 F.3d 661, 664
(7th Cir. 2003). According to the Respondent’s submissions, the
suspended sanction of being demoted in credit class was never
imposed and, because six months have passed, cannot now be imposed.
(DE 10-1.) Thus, neither the loss of phone privileges, 180 days in
segregation, nor the suspended demotion in credit class lengthened
the duration of Daniels’ confinement. Because the finding of guilt
Daniels

complains

of

did

not

lengthen

the

duration

of

his

confinement, his claims are not cognizable in a § 2254 action.
“Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise
that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court
shall dismiss the action.” Forbes v. Trigg, 976 F.2d 308, 312 (7th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 950 (1993). A case becomes moot
when “it no longer present[s] a case or controversy under Article
III, § 2, of the Constitution.” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7
(1998). Notably, this Petitioner suffers no collateral harm from
the finding of guilt in the disciplinary action that forms the

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basis of this cause of action because demotion in credit class was
never imposed and cannot now be imposed. There is no longer any
risk that the Petitioner will serve additional time as a result of
the finding of guilt in the disciplinary action he challenges.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the motion to dismiss (DE 9)
is GRANTED and the petition (DE 1) is DISMISSED as moot. The Clerk
is DIRECTED to close this case.
DATED: August 18, 2016

/s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United State District Court

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