Daniels v. Superintendent

Filing 21

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 1 PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Petitioner Ramar Daniels. Clerk DIRECTED to close this case. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 4/4/17. (Copy mailed to pro se party).(cer)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
RAMAR DANIELS,
Petitioner,
vs.
SUPERINTENDENT,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CAUSE NO. 3:16-CV-219

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a Petition under 28 U.S.C.
Paragraph 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a person in State
Custody Seeking Review of a Prison Disciplinary Sanction, filed by
Ramar Daniels, a pro se prisoner, on April 11, 2016. Here, Daniels
challenges a disciplinary determination made by a hearing officer
at the Westville Correctional Facility (“Westville”) under case
number WCC 16-01-0234. For the reasons set forth below, the court
DENIES the petition (DE 1). The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this
case.

BACKGROUND
On January 12, 2016, Lt. D. Moynihan prepared a conduct report
charging Daniels with Offense B-212 assault/battery. (DE 18-1.) The
conduct report stated:
On 1/12/16 at 5:39 pm offender Daniels, Ramar was seen
assaulting offender Harris, Shantae #248468 with closed
fists. This was seen via CCTV.
(Id.)

On January 14, 2016, Daniels was notified of the charge of
assault/battery and served with a copy of the conduct report and
the screening report. (DE 18-2.) The screening report reflects that
he pled not guilty and requested a lay advocate. He did not request
any physical evidence. He requested the person he assaulted as a
witness, but the screening officer apparently denied that request
because Daniels could not provide the name of the offender. (Id.)
On October 23, 2015, a disciplinary hearing took place and the
hearing

officer

and

found

Daniels

guilty

of

the

charge

of

assault/battery. (DE 18-4.) At the hearing, Daniels’s comment was,
“I believe this was fighting, not assault.” (Id.) Daniels appealed
to the Superintendent and Final Reviewing Authority, but those
appeals were denied. (DE 18-5; 18-6.)

DISCUSSION
When

prisoners

lose

earned

disciplinary hearing, they are

time

credits

in

a prison

entitled to certain protections

under the Due Process Clause: (1) advance written notice of the
charges; (2) an opportunity to be heard before an impartial
decision maker; (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present
documentary evidence in defense when consistent with institutional
safety and correctional goals; and (4) a written statement by a
fact

finder

of

evidence

relied

on

and

the

reasons

for

the

disciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563 (1974).

-2-

To satisfy due process, there must also be “some evidence” to
support the hearing officer’s decision. Superintendent, Mass. Corr.
Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).
Here, Daniels raises four claims in his petition: (1) there
was insufficient evidence to support the charge; (2) the video of
the altercation was not reviewed; (3) he was denied a witness
statement; and (4) he did not receive a copy of the conduct report
or screening report.
First, Daniels claims there was insufficient evidence to find
him

guilty

of

assault/battery.

In

reviewing

a

disciplinary

determination for sufficiency of the evidence, “courts are not
required

to

conduct

an

examination

of

the

entire

record,

independently assess witness credibility, or weigh the evidence,
but only determine whether the prison disciplinary board's decision
to revoke good time credits has some factual basis.” McPherson v.
McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999). “[T]he relevant
question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could
support

the

conclusion

reached

by

the

disciplinary

board.”

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985). The court will
overturn the hearing officer’s decision only if “no reasonable
adjudicator could have found [the prisoner] guilty of the offense
on the basis of the evidence presented.” Henderson v. United States
Parole Comm'n, 13 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1994). Additionally, a
hearing officer is permitted to rely on circumstantial evidence to

-3-

establish guilt. See Hamilton v. O’Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 345 (7th
Cir. 1992).
Offense B-212 assault/battery is defined as “committing a
battery/assault upon another person without a weapon or inflicting
bodily injury. (DE 18 at 10.) (Citing the Adult Disciplinary
Process for Offenses within the Indiana Department of Corrections).
In this case, it is clear that the record contains “some evidence”
to support the hearing officer’s determination that Daniels was
guilty of assault/battery. The conduct report is some evidence that
Daniels assaulted/battered another inmate. McPherson, 188 F.3d at
786 (7th Cir. 1999) (conduct report alone provided some evidence to
support disciplinary determination). The conduct report reveals
that Lt. Moynihan was watching CCTV (close circuit television) and
saw Daniels assaulting another offender with closed fists. In
addition, at the disciplinary hearing, Daniels effectively admits
to hitting the other offender by claiming that it was “fighting not
assault.” Perhaps he thinks that a battery has to be a one-way
activity and that it cannot be done by two people to each other. If
so, this is incorrect. Two people can batter each other at the same
time. Alternatively, perhaps he is arguing that he was acting in
self-defense. However,
inmates do not have a constitutional right to raise
self-defense as a defense in the context of prison
disciplinary proceedings. As such, the [DHB] was under no
constitutional obligation to allow [the] claim that he
was merely defending himself to serve as a complete
defense to the charge of assault.
-4-

Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 848 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation
omitted). Both the Conduct Report and his own statement show that
he battered the other inmate. Again, there is more than sufficient
evidence to have found him guilty of assault/battery.
Second, Daniels complains that the video mentioned in the
conduct report was never reviewed. A prisoner has a limited right
to call witnesses and present documentary evidence consistent with
correctional goals and safety, but he must request such evidence.
Sweeney v. Parke, 113 F.3d 716, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1997) (where
prisoner had opportunity to request witnesses when he was notified
of the disciplinary hearing and chose not to, prisoner’s limited
right to call witnesses was fulfilled and his due process rights
were not violated), overruled on other grounds by White v. Ind.
Parole Bd., 266 F.3d 759, 765-66 (7th Cir. 2001). Notably, Daniels
had the opportunity to request the video evidence be reviewed, but
he did not. The screening report reveals that Daniels did not
request any video evidence. (DE 18-2). Thus, the hearing officer
did not deny him the opportunity to present evidence. Piggie v.
McBride, 277 F.3d 922, 924-25 (7th Cir. 2002); Sweeney, 113 F.3d at
720. Nevertheless, as explained below, because Daniels admitted to
fighting with the other offender, reviewing the video of the
incident was unnecessary.
Next, Daniels claims he requested, but was denied, a witness
statement from the offender he battered. Apparently, the screening

-5-

officer denied the request because Daniels did not provide the name
of the other offender. This is curious, though, as the other
offender’s name is included in the conduct report. Nevertheless, a
prison disciplinary committee may deny witness or evidence requests
that threaten institutional goals or are irrelevant, repetitive, or
unnecessary. Piggie v. Cotton , 342 F.3d 660, 678 (7th Cir. 2003).
Daniels

does

not

explain

why

he

needs

the

other

offender’s

statement. It seems irrelevant in light of Daniels’ admission that
he

was

fighting

with

him.

Nevertheless,

a

hearing

officer’s

improper exclusion of evidence will be deemed harmless unless there
is some indication from the record that the evidence “might have
aided [the prisoner’s] defense.” Id. at 666. This is not the case
here. Again because Daniels effectively admitted to hitting the
other

offender,

the

statement

from

that

other

offender

was

irrelevant and Daniels’ due process rights could not have been
violated with respect to this evidence.
Finally, Daniels argues that he did not receive the conduct
report or screening report. The respondent points out that Daniels
did not present this claim to the Final Reviewing Authority. In
habeas corpus proceedings, the exhaustion requirement is contained
in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).
Indiana does not provide judicial review of
decisions by prison administrative bodies, so the
exhaustion requirement in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) is
satisfied by pursuing all administrative remedies. These
are, we held in Markham v. Clark, 978 F.2d 993 (7th Cir.
-6-

1992), the sort of “available State corrective process”
(§ 2254(b)(1)(B)(I)) that a prisoner must use. Indiana
offers two levels of administrative review: a prisoner
aggrieved by the decision of a disciplinary panel may
appeal first to the warden and then to a statewide body
called the Final Reviewing Authority. Moffat sought
review by both bodies, but his argument was limited to
the contention that the evidence did not support the
board’s decision. He did not complain to either the
warden or the Final Reviewing Authority about the board’s
sketchy explanation for its decision. O’Sullivan v.
Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1
(1999), holds that to exhaust a claim, and thus preserve
it for collateral review under § 2254, a prisoner must
present that legal theory to the state’s supreme court.
The Final Reviewing Authority is the administrative
equivalent to the state’s highest court, so the holding
of Boerckel implies that when administrative remedies
must be exhausted, a legal contention must be presented
to each administrative level.
Moffat v. Broyles, 288 F.3d 978, 981-82 (7th Cir. 2002).
Because Daniels did not present this ground to the Final
Reviewing Authority, it is procedurally defaulted. Procedural
default can be excused and the court can consider a claim that was
not properly raised if a petitioner can demonstrate cause and
prejudice. Weddington v. Zatecky, 721 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir.
2013). Here, however, Daniels fails to even attempt to demonstrate
either. Therefore, Daniels’ procedural default is not excused and
this ground is not a basis for habeas relief.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the court DENIES the petition
(DE 1). The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.
DATED: April 4, 2017

/s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United State District Court
-7-