Bell v. Fort Wayne Police Department et al

Filing 17

OPINION AND ORDER: GRANTS Mario D. Bell leave to proceed against Detective Martin Grooms in his individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for using excessive force against him with his taser on November 23, 2014, in violation of th e Fourth Amendment; DISMISSES all other claims; DISMISSES Fort Wayne Police Department, John Greenlee, John D. Drummer, George Nicklow, Robert Hollo, and Thomas L. Strausberger; DIRECTS the clerk and the USMS to issue and serve process on Detectiv e Martin Grooms with a copy of this order and the amended complaint 10 as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); and ORDERS that Detective Martin Grooms respond only to the claim for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order. Signed by Senior Judge James T Moody on 3/23/2017. (Copy mailed to pro se party and USM)(lhc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
MARIO D. BELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
FORT WAYNE POLICE
DEPARTMENT, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 3:16 CV 254

OPINION AND ORDER
Mario D. Bell, a pro se prisoner, filed an amended complaint (DE # 10) alleging that
six Fort Wayne Police Officers used excessive force while arresting him on November 23,
2014. “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers . . . .” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nevertheless, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A, this court must review the complaint and dismiss it if the action is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief. “In order to state a claim under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 a
plaintiff must allege: (1) that defendants deprived him of a federal constitutional right;
and (2) that the defendants acted under color of state law.” Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667,
670 (7th Cir. 2006).
“A claim that an officer employed excessive force in arresting a person is evaluated
under the Fourth Amendment’s objective-reasonableness standard.” Abbott v. Sangamon

Cty., Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 724 (7th Cir. 2013). The question in Fourth Amendment excessive
use of force cases is “whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of
the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent
or motivation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). “The test of reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical
application,” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979), the question is “whether the totality
of the circumstances” justifies the officers’ actions. Graham at 396.
As a result of this arrest, Bell was convicted of Resisting Law Enforcement and
being a Serious Violent Felon in Possession of a Firearm. Bell v. State, 57 N.E.3d 895 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2016) (table). “In Evans v. Poskon, 603 F.3d 362 (7th Cir.2010), [the Seventh
Circuit] addressed the ability of a plaintiff to proceed on a § 1983 excessive force claim
where that plaintiff had been convicted of resisting arrest, and held that the plaintiff can
only proceed to the extent that the facts underlying the excessive force claim are not
inconsistent with the essential facts supporting the conviction.” Helman v. Duhaime, 742
F.3d 760, 762 (7th Cir. 2014). Here is how the State Court described these events:
At approximately 5:00 p.m. on November 23, 2014, Detective
Greenlee was on patrol when he noticed a car in front of him without its
headlights on. Because visibility was poor, Detective Greenlee decided to
stop the car and, to that end, activated his lights. Detective Greenlee first
engaged Bell, who was the only person in the car, through the passengerside window and noticed that Bell’s hands were shaking. Detective
Greenlee also noticed that Bell was attempting to hurry the traffic stop
along. Detective Greenlee identified Bell and determined that the car was
not registered in Bell’s name. As it happened, Bell had borrowed the car
from Charlene Woods, his sister. Detective Grooms soon arrived to assist
Detective Greenlee.
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Detectives Grooms and Greenlee consulted with each other, reapproached the car, and had Bell exit it. Detective Greenlee told Bell to
speak with Detective Grooms, and, when Detective Grooms put his hand
on Bell’s shoulder and said, “I need you to stand right here,” Bell ran. The
detectives pursued, with Detective Grooms catching up to Bell as he
hopped a fence. Detective Grooms fired his taser and administered a fivesecond charge to Bell, who was initially incapacitated but soon attempted
to rise. By this time, Detective Greenlee had arrived and Detective Grooms
tased Bell again so that Detective Greenlee would have time to climb over
the fence. At this point, Detective Grooms thought that Bell might be
suffering a seizure, and Detective Greenlee observed that Bell didn’t look
like a person who he’d tased before. Detective Greenlee handcuffed Bell in
the front out of concerns for Bell’s safety, and Detective Grooms called for
immediate medical assistance.
Detective Greenlee rolled Bell onto his side, and, approximately
forty-five seconds later, Bell started to regain consciousness. By this time,
additional back-up had arrived. Although he was told repeatedly to stay
down, Bell used both of his hands to push up from the ground, despite
being pushed down by three police officers. Bell was thrashing violently
and forcibly resisting the officers efforts to keep him on the ground and
handcuff him behind his back.
Eventually, six officers joined in the attempt to subdue Bell, using
various techniques to gain Bell’s compliance. Detective Grooms delivered
three knee strikes to Bell’s thigh, which resulted in some temporary
compliance. Officer John Drummer kicked Bell in the face after Bell grabbed
his ankles and attempted to grab his gun. Eventually, the officers were able
to force Bell’s arms behind his back and handcuff him.
Bell v. State, 57 N.E.3d 895, *1-2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (table) (brackets citations and
quotation marks omitted).
In the complaint, Bell does not dispute that he ran from the officers, but argues
that it was an unreasonable and excessive use of force for Detective Grooms to have used
his taser to stop him. “Factors relevant to the reasonableness inquiry include ‘the severity
of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest
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by flight.’” Williams v. Brooks, 809 F.3d 936, 944 (7th Cir. 2016) quoting Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
Here, the officers stopped Bell for driving without his headlights on. There is no
indication that they had probable cause to believe that he had committed any other
offense when he decided to run away from them. Neither is there any indication that by
running away from them he posed an immediate threat to their safety or anyone else.
Nor is there any indication that he was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade
arrest by running because he was not under arrest and there is no indication that the
officers were trying to arrest him. Based on these facts, Bell has plausibly alleged that
Detective Grooms used excessive force by tasing him.
Bell also alleges that all six defendants used excessive force against him after he
was handcuffed and on the ground. He alleges that he did not fight back and was only
struggling to breathe. However, these allegations contradict the facts necessary to
support his conviction for Resisting Law Enforcement and he “can only proceed to the
extent that the facts underlying the excessive force claim are not inconsistent with the
essential facts supporting the conviction.” Helman v. Duhaime, 742 F.3d 760, 762 (7th Cir.
2014). Therefore the court must accept that for the purposes of this lawsuit he violently
and forcibly resisted the police. He kicked, pushed, wrestled, and fought with them. He
grabbed at them and attempted to gain control of a gun during the struggle. It is in light
of his actions during the fight that it must be determined whether he has plausibly alleged
that the defendant officers were objectively unreasonable when they held him down,
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punched him in the groin, struck him in the knee, tased him three more times, and kicked
him in the head to prevent him from grabbing a gun.
It is an objective inquiry, the dispositive question being whether, in light of
the facts and circumstances that confronted the officer (and not 20/20
hindsight), the officer behaved in an objectively reasonable manner,
irrespective of the officer’s underlying intent or motivation. In answering
this question, we remain cognizant of the fact that police officers are often
forced to make split-second judgments – in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving – about the amount of force that is
necessary in a particular situation. As a result, we give considerable leeway
to law enforcement officers’ assessments about the appropriate use of force
in dangerous situations.
Abbott v. Sangamon Cty., Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 724–25 (7th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks and
citations omitted). Here, where Bell was continuing to fight and trying to gain control of
a gun, he has not plausibly alleged that the defendants’ uses of force against him were
objectively unreasonable. They were fighting to prevent him from getting a gun with
which he could have killed them. His attempts to gain access to deadly force demonstrate
that their use of non-lethal force to stop him was not unreasonable. Therefore these claims
will be dismissed.
Finally, Bell alleges that the Fort Wayne Police Department failed to train or
supervise Detective Grooms. “An allegation of a ‘failure to train’ is available only in
limited circumstances.” Cornfield v. Consolidated High School Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316,
1327 (7th Cir. 1993). This is not such a case. A failure to train claim requires that “the
policymakers had acquiesced in a pattern of constitutional violations.” Id. Here, the
complaint makes no mention of any prior instances where Detective Grooms, or any
other Fort Wayne Police Officer, improperly used his taser. Neither does it provide any
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facts about why or how the Department’s training or supervision was inadequate. Rather,
it merely makes the conclusory allegation that they were inadequate. “[A] plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels
and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[W]here the well-pleaded
facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged – but it has not shown – that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[I]n considering
the plaintiff’s factual allegations, courts should not accept as adequate abstract recitations
of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements.” Brooks v. Ross, 578
F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Therefore the failure to train claim will be dismissed.
For these reasons, the court:
(1) GRANTS Mario D. Bell leave to proceed against Detective Martin Grooms in
his individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for using excessive force
against him with his taser on November 23, 2014, in violation of the Fourth Amendment;
(2) DISMISSES all other claims;
(3) DISMISSES Fort Wayne Police Department, John Greenlee, John D. Drummer,
George Nicklow, Robert Hollo, and Thomas L. Strausberger;
(4) DIRECTS the clerk and the United States Marshals Service to issue and serve
process on Detective Martin Grooms with a copy of this order and the amended
complaint (DE # 10) as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); and
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(5) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that Detective Martin Grooms
respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 101(b), only to the claim for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this
screening order.
SO ORDERED.
Date: March 23, 2017
s/James T. Moody
JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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