Bell v. Fort Wayne Police Department et al
Filing
76
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 62 MOTION for Summary Judgment and Designation of Evidence in favor of Martin Grooms because he has qualified immunity. The clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly. Signed by Judge Jon E DeGuilio on 8/1/2019. (Copy mailed to pro se party by certified mail 7019 0700 0000 3512 4566)(bas)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
MARIO D. BELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAUSE NO.: 3:16-CV-254-JD
MARTIN GROOMS,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Mario D. Bell, a prisoner without a lawyer, is proceeding in this case “against
Detective Martin Grooms in his individual capacity for compensatory and punitive
damages for using excessive force against him with his taser on November 23, 2014, in
violation of the Fourth Amendment . . ..” ECF 17 at 6. Detective Grooms filed a motion
for summary judgment which is now fully briefed. ECF 62, 71, and 72.
Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Not every dispute between the parties makes
summary judgment inappropriate; “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment.” Id. To determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists,
the court must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party
and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355,
358 (7th Cir. 2010). However, a party opposing a properly supported summary
judgment motion may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading, but
rather must “marshal and present the court with the evidence she contends will prove
her case.” Goodman v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). Summary
judgment “is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit . . ..” Springer v. Durfiinger, 518
F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2008).
As a result of the events related to his interactions with Detective Martin Grooms
on November 23, 2014, Bell was charged and convicted of several crimes: “Level 4
felony possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon (“SVF”), Level 6 felony resisting
law enforcement, Level 6 felony theft, Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement,
and Class B misdemeanor marijuana possession. A jury found Bell guilty as charged.”
Bell v. State, 57 N.E.3d 895, *1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (table).
“In Evans v. Poskon, 603 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 2010), [the Seventh Circuit] addressed
the ability of a plaintiff to proceed on a § 1983 excessive force claim where that plaintiff
had been convicted of resisting arrest, and held that the plaintiff can only proceed to the
extent that the facts underlying the excessive force claim are not inconsistent with the
essential facts supporting the conviction.” Helman v. Duhaime, 742 F.3d 760, 762 (7th Cir.
2014). Therefore before reviewing the facts presented by the parties, the court must
examine the facts as determined by the State criminal court.
At approximately 5:00 p.m. on November 23, 2014, Detective
Greenlee was on patrol when he noticed a car in front of him without its
headlights on. Because visibility was poor, Detective Greenlee decided to
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stop the car and, to that end, activated his lights. Detective Greenlee first
engaged Bell, who was the only person in the car, through the passengerside window and noticed that Bell’s hands were shaking. Detective
Greenlee also noticed that Bell was attempting to hurry the traffic stop
along. Detective Greenlee identified Bell and determined that the car was
not registered in Bell’s name. As it happened, Bell had borrowed the car
from Charlene Woods, his sister. Detective Grooms soon arrived to assist
Detective Greenlee.
Detectives Grooms and Greenlee consulted with each other, reapproached the car, and had Bell exit it. Detective Greenlee told Bell to
speak with Detective Grooms, and, when Detective Grooms put his hand
on Bell’s shoulder and said, “I need you to stand right here,” Bell ran. The
detectives pursued, with Detective Grooms catching up to Bell as he
hopped a fence. Detective Grooms fired his taser and administered a fivesecond charge to Bell, who was initially incapacitated but soon attempted
to rise. By this time, Detective Greenlee had arrived and Detective Grooms
tased Bell again so that Detective Greenlee would have time to climb over
the fence.
Bell v. State, 57 N.E.3d 895, *1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (table) (brackets, citations, and
quotation marks omitted).
Though the parties do not include every one of those facts in their filings, as
explained in Helman, Bell cannot dispute those facts. See ECF 62 and 71. In addition to
those facts only a few other undisputed facts are necessary to resolve this case. After
Detective Greenlee returned to his police car with Bell’s license and registration, he
“saw on the local computer Spillman system that Bell was a suspect in several
investigations involving pursuits, party armed calls, assaulting officers, and a
shooting.” Detective Greenlee Declaration at ¶ 8, ECF 62-1 at 2. Bell acknowledges his
“prior criminal history shown by the Spillman system . . . showed that [he] was
suspected in several investigations.” Bell’s Memorandum of Law, ECF 71 at 2. “Prior to
[Detective Greenlee] returning to Bell’s vehicle, [he] made Detective Martin Grooms
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aware of Bell’s prior history . . ..” Detective Greenlee Declaration at ¶ 9, ECF 62-1 at 2.
Bell acknowledges that “Detective Grooms approached [him] to conduct an outer
clothing pat down for officer safety due to [his] having prior weapon involvement.
Bell’s Memorandum of Law, ECF 71 at 6. Finally, “[b]oth Detective Grooms and
[Detective Greenlee] were wearing full police uniforms and [after Bell took off running,
they] called for Bell to stop. Bell refused to stop.” Detective Greenlee Declaration at ¶
11, ECF 62-1 at 2. Bell acknowledges that when “Detective Grooms placed one hand on
[his] shoulder [he] took off.” Bell’s Memorandum of Law, ECF 71 at 6. Bell does not
deny the officers called for him to stop. He acknowledges “Bell refused to stop.” Id.
Detective Grooms argues he has qualified immunity because a reasonable officer
at the time would not have known it was a violation of the Fourth Amendment to use a
taser under these circumstances. “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects
government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).” Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quotation marks and citations omitted). The United
States Supreme Court recently reiterated the standard in qualified immunity cases:
Under our cases, the clearly established right must be defined with
specificity. This Court has repeatedly told courts not to define clearly
established law at a high level of generality. That is particularly important
in excessive force cases, as we have explained: Specificity is especially
important in the Fourth Amendment context, where the Court has
recognized that it is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how
the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual
situation the officer confronts. Use of excessive force is an area of the law
in which the result depends very much on the facts of each case, and thus
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police officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless existing precedent
squarely governs the specific facts at issue. It does not suffice for a court
simply to state that an officer may not use unreasonable and excessive
force, deny qualified immunity, and then remit the case for a trial on the
question of reasonableness. An officer cannot be said to have violated a
clearly established right unless the right’s contours were sufficiently
definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have
understood that he was violating it.
City of Escondido, Cal. v. Emmons, 586 U.S. ___, ___; 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2019) (quotation
marks, ellipsis, citations, and brackets omitted).
Here, Bell was lawfully stopped for driving without his headlights on in a
vehicle that was not registered to him. Bell was a suspect in several incidents involving
weapons. When Detective Grooms tried to verify that Bell did not have weapons on
him, Bell ran. By doing so, Bell committed a Class A misdemeanor in violation Indiana
Code 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3) which provides that:
A person who knowingly or intentionally . . . flees from a law
enforcement officer after the officer has, by visible or audible means,
including operation of the law enforcement officer’s siren or emergency
lights, identified himself or herself and ordered the person to stop . . .
commits resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor . . ..”
Id. (effective July 1, 2014, to June 30, 2016).
The only question here is whether it was clearly established that using a taser to
stop a suspect from fleeing in such a circumstance was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. “A claim that an officer employed excessive force in arresting a person is
evaluated under the Fourth Amendment’s objective-reasonableness standard.” Abbott v.
Sangamon Cty., Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 724 (7th Cir. 2013). The question in Fourth Amendment
excessive use of force cases is “whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’
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in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their
underlying intent or motivation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). “The test of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or
mechanical application,” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979), the question is
“whether the totality of the circumstances” justifies the officers’ actions. Graham at 396.
“Factors relevant to the reasonableness inquiry include ‘the severity of the crime at
issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or
others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight.’” Williams v. Brooks, 809 F.3d 936, 944 (7th Cir. 2016) quoting Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 396 (1989). “The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the
fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments – in
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving – about the amount of
force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Horton v. Pobjecky, 883 F.3d 941, 950 (7th
Cir. 2018) quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97.
The Seventh Circuit has found that tasers are generally nonlethal and “the use of
a taser, like the use of pepper spray or pain-compliance techniques, generally does not
constitute as much force as so-called impact weapons, such as baton launchers and
beanbag projectiles. The use of a taser, therefore, falls somewhere in the middle of the
nonlethal-force spectrum.” Abbott v. Sangamon Cty., Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 726 (7th Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted).
Bell was ultimately convicted of three felonies, but at the time Detective Grooms
used his taser, all he knew was Bell had committed a misdemeanor. “[C]ourts generally
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hold that it is unreasonable for officers to deploy a taser against a misdemeanant who is
not actively resisting arrest.” Id. at 730. See also Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 478–79
(7th Cir. 2009) (denying qualified immunity to officers who applied a Taser to a pretrial
detainee lying prone on a bed, weakened, and docile in response to his refusal of an
order to get out of bed); Brooks v. City of Aurora, Ill., 653 F.3d 478, 487 (7th Cir. 2011)
(noting prior cases establishing the illegality using pepper spray on an arrestee who
was handcuffed and offering no physical resistance); Sallenger v. Oakes, 473 F.3d 731,
741–42 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that a significant factor in denying qualified immunity
was the fact that force was applied after the arrestee was handcuffed).
Here however, Bell was not handcuffed. He was actively resisting by running
away and jumping a fence. Detective Grooms knew Bell was a suspect in several cases
involving weapons. It was unknown if he had a weapon at the time because he had
refused a pat down search by running. Detective Grooms chased him and ordered him
to stop. He did not use his taser until after Bell jumped a fence which made continued
pursuit more difficult.
Bell has not identified any caselaw finding a Fourth Amendment violation when
a taser is used under similar circumstances. It is unclear whether Bell understood he
needed to so. Nevertheless, the court has researched the cases of the United States
Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit, the district courts in Indiana, and the Indiana
appellate courts. No cases were found which held these facts would constitute a Fourth
Amendment violation. As such, the court must conclude that a reasonable officer in
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November 2014 would not have known that it was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment to use a taser under the circumstances of this case.
For these reasons, the motion for summary judgment (ECF 62) is GRANTED in
favor of Martin Grooms because he has qualified immunity. The clerk is DIRECTED to
enter judgment accordingly.
SO ORDERED on July 31, 2019
/s/ JON E. DEGUILIO
JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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