Boyd v. Commissioner Indiana Department Of Correction et al

Filing 4

OPINION AND ORDER, DISMISSING Commissioner Indiana Department Of Correction (Bruce Lemmon) and Director Religious and Volunteer Services Indiana Department of Correction (Chaplain Ungrodt). US Marshal directed to effect service of process on David Liebel, Sgt. Johnson, Sharon Hawk, ChaplainGreen, and Captain Lewis. See order for complete details. (cc: Boyd, US Marshal) Signed by Judge Robert L Miller, Jr on 7/11/16. (mlc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
SHAVON TYVELL BOYD,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER, INDIANA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
et al.
Defendants.

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CAUSE NO. 3:16-CV-288 RM

OPINION AND ORDER
Shavon Tyvell Boyd, a pro se prisoner, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Last
year, Mr. Boyd sued several individuals for violating his First Amendment and Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) rights. Boyd v. Commissioner,
Case No. 3:15-CV-82 (N.D. Ind. filed February 4, 2015). Mr. Boyd hadn’t exhausted his
administrative remedies and many of those claims were dismissed without prejudice. (Case
No. 3:15-CV-82, DE 61). He now brings those previously dismissed claims here and has
included an Eighth Amendment claim against Captain Lewis for depriving him of food for
five days. A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint,
however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers . . ..” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). This court must review
the complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
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1915A.
Mr. Boyd is an inmate at the Westville Correctional Facility. He alleges that he is a
practicing “Black Jew” who was raised to follow Hashem’s commandments, as outlined
in Leviticus and Deuteronomy of the Tanakh (Hebrew Bible). Mr. Boyd believes he will be
punished for not obeying Hashem’s commandments. These religious beliefs and practices
include showering before eating and after using the toilet, praying regularly, and
possessing religious material, including a prayer rug, prayer cap and Tanakh. He alleges
the defendants have prevented him from exercising these religious beliefs and practices.
Prisoners enjoy a right to exercise their religion under the First Amendment.
Vinning-El v. Evans, 657F.3d 591, 592-93 (7th Cir. 2011). This right is “subject to limits
appropriate to the nature of prison life.” Id. Restrictions that limit the exercise of religion
are allowed if they are reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives, including
security and economic concerns. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–91 (1987); Ortiz v.
Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 2009).
Inmates are entitled to broader religious protection under RLUIPA. Holt v. Hobbs,
135 S. Ct. 853 (2015). The statute provides in pertinent part:
No government shall impose . . . a substantial burden on the religious
exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . unless the
government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). A“substantial burden” on religious exercise is “one that necessarily

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bears direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility for rendering religious
exercise. . . effectively impracticable.” Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of
Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003). RLUIPA does not “elevate accommodation of
religious observances over an institution’s need to maintain order and safety . . . [and] an
accommodation must be measured so that it does not override other significant interests.”
Cutter v. Wilkinson , 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005). Courts must apply RLUIPA “with due
deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing
necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security and discipline,
consistent with consideration of costs and limited resources.” Id. at 723. RLUIPA can be
used to obtain injunctive relief, but it doesn’t provide a cause of action for money damages
against state prison officials. Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S.Ct. 1651 (2011).
First, although Mr. Boyd has named IDOC Commissioner Bruce Lemmon as a
defendant, there are no allegations in the complaint against him. The inclusion of Bruce
Lemmon as a defendant in this case seems to be an oversight. This case is essentially refiling claims that were dismissed without prejudice in Case No. 3:15-cv-082. None of those
dismissed claims were against Bruce Lemmon. In Case No. 3:15-cv-082, Mr. Boyd was
given leave to proceed on an injunctive relief claim against Bruce Lemmon, seeking kosher
meals containing kosher meats under RLUIPA. That claim was decided on the merits and
not re-filed here. In any event, there is no claim plausibly alleged against Commissioner
Lemmon and he will be dismissed.
Next, Mr. Boyd claims that David Liebel, the Religious Director for IDOC, violated
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his First Amendment and RLUIPA rights by directing chaplains to prevent him from
praying in the dorm and from bathing before consuming food and after using the
bathroom, as required by his religion. David Liebel has been sued in his official capacity
as the Director of Religious and Volunteer Services at the IDOC. Disallowing Mr. Boyd to
engage in prayer without a compelling governmental interest would violate the First
Amendment and RLUIPA, see Lindh v. Warden, Federal Correctional Institute, Terre
Haute, Ind., No. 2:09-CV-215, 2013 WL 139699 (S.D. Ind. January 11, 2013), and not
allowing him to engage in specific, meaningful acts of religious expression, such as
washing as required by his religion, can violate RLUIPA. Meyer v. Teslik, 411 F.Supp.2d
983, 989 (W.D. Wisc. 2006). Giving Mr. Boyd the inferences to which he is entitled at this
stage, he has stated a claim against David Liebel in his official capacity.
Next, Mr. Boyd claims Sgt. Johnson violated his First Amendment and RLUIPA
rights by destroying his sacred religious materials and for threatening to issue him a
conduct report if he is caught praying in the dorm. Sgt. Johnson has been sued in both her
official and individual capacities. Since the alleged actions could plausibly substantially
burden Mr. Boyd’s practice of his religion and his right to engage in specific acts of
meaningful religious expression, Mr. Boyd has pleaded a First Amendment and RLUIPA
claim against Sgt. Johnson. Because “public employees are responsible for their own
misdeeds,” Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009), Mr. Boyd has stated a claim
against Sgt. Johnson in her individual capacity. But an official capacity claim requires more.
“[A] suit against a[n] . . . official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official
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but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)
allows suits against municipalities based on a policy, practice, or custom. There is no
allegation that Sgt. Johnson was any sort of policymaker or was carrying out any policy.
Mr. Boyd can’t maintain an official capacity claim against Sgt. Johnson.
Next, Mr. Boyd claims Sharon Hawk, director of Therapeutic Community, violated
his First Amendment and RLUIPA rights by directing staff of Therapeutic Community not
to allow him to pray in the dorm and to prevent him from showering after using the
bathroom. Ms. Hawk is sued in both her official and individual capacities. According to
Mr. Boyd, Ms. Hawk did this because she didn’t want him to exercise his religion while
being a part of her program. These allegations are sufficient to establish both a First
Amendment and RLUIPA claim against Ms. Hawk in her individual capacity. See Lindh
v. Warden, 2013 WL 139699 at *11. And because she was solely in charge of Therapeutic
Community, a federally funded program designed to help offenders with drug addiction
problems and established its policies, Mr. Boyd has also stated a claim against her in her
official capacity.
Mr. Boyd claims Chaplains Ungrodt and Green violated his First Amendment and
RLUIPA rights by depriving him of the opportunity to shower before eating and after
using the restroom, the opportunity to pray in the dorm, and to possess religious material,
which has imposed a substantial burden on his ability to exercise his religion. Mr. Boyd is
already proceeding on these claims against Chaplain Ungrodt in Case No. 3:15-cv-82.
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Bringing the same claims against Chaplain Ungrodt in this case is duplicative and
unnecessary. The claims against Chaplain Ungrodt will be dismissed in this case so that
Mr. Boyd can continue to pursue them in Case No. 3:15-cv-82.
Chaplain Green has been sued in his official and individual capacities. Mr. Boyd
alleges Chaplain Green is discriminating against him because he does not believe “Black
Jews” are a true religion. Although further factual development might show otherwise, Mr.
Boyd has stated enough against Chaplain Green in his individual capacity to proceed past
the pleading stage. See Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 669-670 (7th Cir. 2009) (inmate stated
claim based on his allegation that prison denied him religious articles without adequate
penological justification). There are no allegations Chaplain Green was in charge of the
religious programing at the IDOC or that he established the prison’s religious policies.
Because of that, Mr. Boyd hasn’t stated a claim against Chaplain Green in his official
capacity.
Finally, Mr. Boyd claims Captain Lewis violated his Eighth Amendment rights by
denying him a kosher diet for five days in January 2016. Mr. Boyd alleges that Captain
Lewis did this because Mr. Boyd didn’t provide him with information about things that
were happening in the dorm. A violation of the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual
punishments clause consists of two elements: (1) objectively, whether the injury is
sufficiently serious to deprive the prisoner of the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities, and (2) subjectively, whether the prison official’s actual state of mind was one
of “deliberate indifference” to the deprivation. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
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The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials ensure that inmates receive adequate
food, clothing, and shelter. Id. at 832; see also Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1432 (7th
Cir. 1996) (prisoners have a right to nutritionally adequate diet). Giving Mr. Boyd the
benefit of the inferences to which he is entitled at the pleading stage, he has stated a claim
against Captain Lewis, who is alleged to have personal knowledge of his dietary needs and
to have ensured that he wasn’t provided an adequate diet in accordance with this
restriction, which resulted in injury to him.
For these reasons, the court:
(1) GRANTS Shavon Tyvell Boyd leave to proceed on a claim against David
Liebel in his official capacity for injunctive relief seeking the right to be permitted
to practice his religious beliefs and practices which include the ability to pray in the
dorm, wash three times a day before consuming food, and wash after using the
toilet pursuant to the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a);
(2) GRANTS Shavon Tyvell Boyd leave to proceed on a claim against Sgt.
Johnson in her individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for
substantially burdening the practice of his religion by denying him the right to
possess religious materials and to pray in the dorm in violation of the First
Amendment;
(3) GRANTS Shavon Tyvell Boyd leave to proceed on a claim against Sgt.
Johnson in her individual capacity for injunctive relief for substantially burdening
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the practice of his religion by denying him the right to possess religious materials
and to pray in the dorm in violation of the First Amendment and the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a);
(4) GRANTS Shavon Tyvell Boyd leave to proceed on a claim against Sharon
Hawk in both her official and individual capacities for compensatory and punitive
damages for substantially burdening the practice of his religion by denying him the
right to possess religious materials and to pray in the dorm pursuant to the First
Amendment;
(5) GRANTS Shavon Tyvell Boyd leave to proceed on a claim against Sharon
Hawk in both her official and individual capacities for injunctive relief seeking the
right to be permitted to practice his religious beliefs and practices which include the
ability to pray in the dorm, wash three times a day before consuming food, and
wash after using the toilet pursuant to the First Amendment and the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) ;
(6) GRANTS Shavon Tyvell Boyd leave to proceed on a claim against
Chaplain Green in his individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages
for substantially burdening the practice of his religion by denying him the
opportunity to shower before eating and after using the toilet, the opportunity to
pray in the dorm, and to possess religious material in violation of the First
Amendment;
(7) GRANTS Shavon Tyvell Boyd leave to proceed on a claim against
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Chaplain Green in his individual capacity for injunctive relief seeking the right to
be permitted to practice his religious beliefs and practices which include the ability
to pray in the dorm, wash three times a day before consuming food, wash after
using the toilet, and possess religious material, in violation of the First Amendment
and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc1(a);
(8) GRANTS Shavon Tyvell Boyd leave to proceed on a claim against Captain
Lewis in his individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for
denying him adequate nutrition in January 2016 in violation of the Eighth
Amendment;
(9) DISMISSES Bruce Lemmon and Chaplain Ungrodt from this case;
(10) DISMISSES all other claims;
(11) DIRECTS the U.S. Marshals Service, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to
effect service of process on David Liebel, Sgt. Johnson, Sharon Hawk, Chaplain
Green, and Captain Lewis; and
(12) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that David Liebel, Sgt.
Johnson, Sharon Hawk, Chaplain Green, and Captain Lewis respond, as provided
for in the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE and N.D. IND. L.R. 10.1, only to the
claim for which the pro se plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this
screening order.
SO ORDERED.
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ENTERED: July 11 , 2016.

/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr.
Judge
United States District Court

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