Martin v. Superintendent

Filing 11

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTS Kevin Martin leave to proceed on an individual capacity claim for compensatory and punitive damages against Sgt. Case-Worker Sender for failing to protect him in violation of the Eighth Amendment; DISMISSES all other claims; DISMISSES Correctional Officer Angela McDonald, Sgt. D. Draper, Sgt. Fizer, Officer Jones, and Superintendent terminated; DIRECTS the clerk and the United States Marshals Service to Issue and serve process on Sgt. Case-Worker Sender with a copy of th is order and the amended complaint; and ORDERS, that Sgt. Case-Worker Sender respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D.Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claim for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order. Signed by Senior Judge James T Moody on 9/19/2016. cc: K. Martin, Sgt. Case-Worker Sender)(lpw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
KEVIN MARTIN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SUPERINTENDENT, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 3:16 CV 357

OPINION AND ORDER
Kevin Martin, a pro se prisoner, filed an amended complaint alleging that
correctional officers did not protect him from an attack by a fellow inmate on April 13,
2016. “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint,
however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks
and citations omitted). Nevertheless, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must
review the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. “In order to state a claim under §
1983 a plaintiff must allege: (1) that defendants deprived him of a federal constitutional
right; and (2) that the defendants acted under color of state law.” Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d
667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006).
Martin alleges that Sgt. Case-Worker Sender provided confidential information to
an unknown inmate about an internal affairs investigation. He alleges that Sgt. Case-

Worker Sender knew that providing this information would cause the unknown inmate
to attack Martin. When an inmate is attacked by another inmate, the Constitution is
violated only if “deliberate indifference by prison officials effectively condones the attack
by allowing it to happen.” Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630, 640 (7th Cir. 1996). The defendant
“must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Here, Martin has stated a claim against Sgt. Case-Worker Sender
because he alleges that the Sergeant knew that telling the unknown inmate that Martin
was involved in an investigation about trafficking in the prison would motivate the
inmate to attack Martin.
Martin is also suing Correctional Officer Angela McDonald and Sgt. D. Draper. He
alleges that they too knew that he was involved in the internal affairs investigation of
trafficking. However, he does not allege that either of them encouraged the attack by
telling the unknown inmate about the investigation. He is suing Sgt. Fizer and Officer
Jones. He alleges that he asked them and Sgt. D. Draper to be moved to a different cell
before he was attacked. However, he has not plausibly alleged facts from which it can be
inferred that any of these other four officers were deliberately indifferent to his risk of
being attacked. “Prisons are dangerous places. Housing the most aggressive among us,
they place violent people in close quarters.” McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 345 (7th
Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630, 640 (7th Cir. 1996).

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This is why general requests for help and expressions of fear are insufficient to alert
guards to the need for action. Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633, 639–40 (7th Cir. 2008).
Klebanowski testified during his deposition that he told officers
twice on September 8 that he was afraid for his life and he wanted to be
transferred off the tier. Those statements, and the officers’ knowledge of the
first beating, are the only pieces of evidence in the record that can assist
Klebanowski in his attempt to show that the officers were aware of any risk
to him. We have previously held that statements like those made by
Klebanowski are insufficient to alert officers to a specific threat. Butera, 285
F.3d at 606 (deeming insufficient to establish deliberate indifference
statements by a prisoner that he was “having problems in the block” and
“needed to be removed”). In Butera, we deemed the inmate’s statements
insufficient to give notice to the officers because they did not provide the
identities of those who threatened the inmate, nor state what the threats
were.
Id.
The facts of this case make clear our reason for requiring more than
general allegations of fear or the need to be removed. By Klebanowski’s
own testimony, the officers knew only that he had been involved in an
altercation with three other inmates, and that he wanted a transfer because
he feared for his life. He did not tell them that he had actually been
threatened with future violence, nor that the attack on September 8 was
inflicted by gang members because of his non-gang status. Without these
additional facts to rely on, there was nothing leading the officers to believe
that Klebanowski himself was not speculating regarding the threat he faced
out of fear based on the first attack he suffered. This lack of specificity falls
below the required notice an officer must have for liability to attach for
deliberate indifference.
Id. at 639–40 (footnote omitted). Here, Martin has not alleged that he told any of these
four defendants that he had been specifically threatened. He has not alleged that he told
them who would attack him. All he has alleged is that he was afraid because other
inmates knew that he was talking to internal affairs. Like Klebanowski, Martin’s lack of

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specificity prevents him from stating a claim against these four defendants and they will
be dismissed.
Finally, Martin named the Superintendent as a defendant in the caption of the
complaint. However, he did not list the Superintendent as a defendant on page 2 nor
make any allegations about the Superintendent in the body of the complaint. Therefore
the Superintendent will also be dismissed.
For these reasons, the court:
(1) GRANTS Kevin Martin leave to proceed on an individual capacity claim for
compensatory and punitive damages against Sgt. Case-Worker Sender for failing to
protect him in violation of the Eighth Amendment by telling an unknown inmate that
Martin was involved in an investigation about trafficking in the prison knowing that
would motivate the inmate to attack Martin on April 13, 2016;
(2) DISMISSES all other claims;
(3) DISMISSES Correctional Officer Angela McDonald, Sgt. D. Draper, Sgt. Fizer,
Officer Jones, and Superintendent;
(4) DIRECTS the clerk and the United States Marshals Service to issue and serve
process on Sgt. Case-Worker Sender with a copy of this order and the amended complaint
(DE # 9) as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); and
(5) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that Sgt. Case-Worker Sender
respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-

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1(b), only to the claim for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this
screening order.
SO ORDERED.
Date: September 19, 2016

s/ James T. Moody
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JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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