Addie v. Career Academy of South Bend Inc et al
Filing
38
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 22 Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of Career Academy as to Mr. Addie's claims for age discrimination and retaliation. The Court also relinquishes supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims, which are dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly. Signed by Judge Jon E DeGuilio on 3/27/19. (mlc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
CHADWICK ADDIE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAREER ACADEMY OF SOUTH
BEND, INC., et al.
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No. 3:16-CV-513 JD
OPINION AND ORDER
Chadwick Addie lost his job as director of development for a charter school when it
eliminated his position. The school says it cut his position (along with other positions and costs)
to balance its budget. Mr. Addie claims that explanation was false. The real reasons, he claims,
were age discrimination and retaliation. He has not provided evidence from which a jury could
draw such an inference, though. The Court thus grants summary judgment.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Court must begin with a comment about a party’s obligations in responding to a
motion for summary judgment. Under Rule 56, a party must “cit[e] to particular parts of
materials in the record” in support of its arguments. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). That rule means
what it says. A party does not satisfy that requirement by attaching exhibits to a brief, or by
referring in general to large portions of the record; a party’s brief must cite to particular parts of
the record to support each fact on which it relies. Packer v. Trs. of Ind. Univ. Sch. of Med., 800
F.3d 843, 850 (7th Cir. 2015) (“It is not the court’s role or obligation to read an entire deposition
or affidavit in an effort to locate the particular testimony a party might be relying on; the court
ought to know what portion of a witness’s testimony the party is invoking so that it can focus its
attention on that testimony and assess whether it is admissible and actually supports the fact or
inference for which it is cited.”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) (“The court need consider only
the cited materials[.]”); Sommerfield v. City of Chi., 863 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2017) (noting
that Rule 56 “requires [a party] to identify the relevant facts,” and that the “judge rightly
declined to wade through the voluminous record to find evidence on a counseled plaintiff’s
behalf”).
Mr. Addie’s brief fails to meet that requirement in many instances. For example, the
following two paragraphs are representative of much of the factual section of his brief:
Addie, Fine, and Foster had specific duties, not just titles, that simply could not be
eliminated at an a[c]credited school in the State of Indiana. Schlottman gave these
duties to Braun, Cebra, Darwish, Davis, Hammel, Walker, and Manno.
Hammel, hired in October of 2014, was still teaching engineering classes in
February of 2015. Unlike Addie, Hammel had no license, experience, or
qualifications in Indiana to administrate CASB. CASB eventually made Hammel
Superintendent and paid him $78,000, which was more than what Addie made
when he was in charge of the school. (Px21; Px22; Px24; Px29; Pxs 35–47).
[DE 31 p. 12]. The first paragraph has no citations at all. The second paragraph is followed by a
string-cite that refers to a total of seventeen exhibits, which collectively span over 450 pages.
That does not suffice. The Court need not scour the record to determine which parts of those
materials support those assertions.
Elsewhere in the statement of facts, Mr. Addie offers entire paragraphs that consist of
nothing but citations, with no explanation of what purpose the materials are being cited for. For
example, one paragraph reads as follows:
(Px40: 14-15, 17, 18, 61, 68-75, 77, 79, 80-84, 86-89, 92-102, 105, 107-109, 111127, 132-138, 140, 142-144, 146-147 149-174-177, 189, 208, 212, 215, 224-225,
232-243, 249-281; Px43: 25, 30, 33-34, 36, 40-42, 50-51, 58-59, 61-62, 64, 66-93,
98-99, 101-112, 115-132, 135-138, 140-146, 151-165; Px44: 10, 20, 22, 24-25, 29,
35-51, 55-57, 60-74; Px41: 4-6, 9-16, 20-23, 30-36, 40-60, 68-73, 75, 86-91; Px42:
12, 17, 30-45, 49).
2
[DE 31 p. 14]. Without identifying the specific facts that Mr. Addie relies on in that mass of
exhibits, that is no better than simply attaching those exhibits to a brief. Also, many of the
deposition pages cited in that paragraph are not even part of the record. With that understanding,
the Court addresses the motion on the basis of the facts that have been properly presented.
Career Academy School Corporation operates charter schools in South Bend, Indiana. In
August 2011, it opened Career Academy of South Bend as a middle school with grades 7
through 9. Two years later, it expanded to a middle school with grades 6 through 8, and a high
school with grades 9 through 12. In 2015, it opened another charter school, Success Academy of
South Bend, with Kindergarten through 5th grade. Career Academy was founded by Lawrence
Garatoni. In addition to being the school’s founder and benefactor, Mr. Garatoni served as
president of its board of directors. Along with his wife and their foundation, Mr. Garatoni
contributed tens of millions of dollars towards purchasing and renovating their buildings and
funding their operating expenses. Over the years, Mr. Garatoni forgave many of the loans he
provided to the schools, but his goal was for the schools to become self-sufficient. The schools
received funding from the state for each student that enrolled, and Mr. Garatoni desired for those
revenues to at least cover the schools’ operating expenses. The schools ran at a loss in their early
years, though.
Chad Addie began his employment with Career Academy in 2011, when it was just
beginning. His position at that time was Educational Manager, which was similar to an assistant
principal position. Mr. Addie was 48 years old when he started. He had degrees in psychology
and counseling and human services. He had also earned a post-graduate degree in school
administration, and he had an Indiana building administrator license. In October 2013, Career
Academy’s principal resigned, and at Mr. Garatoni’s request, Mr. Addie stepped into that
3
position until it could be filled permanently. Mr. Garatoni also asked Mr. Addie to apply for the
position full time. Mr. Addie decided, though, that he preferred to focus on recruiting students
instead of assuming management over the school. He thus recommended a principal with whom
he had worked at a previous school, Paul Schlottman, who was offered and accepted the position.
Mr. Schlottman began in December 2013, at which time Mr. Addie returned to his previous
position. Mr. Schlottman was 46 years old at that time, and was about 3 years younger than Mr.
Addie.
In early 2014, Mr. Addie discussed with Mr. Schlottman that he wanted to focus on
school development, including public relations, fundraising, and recruiting new students. In mid2014, they created a new position for him, entitled Director of Development, in which those
functions became his focus, with a particular emphasis on student recruitment.1 Mr. Addie was
very successful in that aspect of his job. When he started with Career Academy, it had 160
students. Enrollment nearly doubled each year, and by the 2015–16 school year, Career
Academy’s enrollment exceeded 1,000 students, which was near its capacity. In support of that
expansion, Career Academy had also hired numerous new employees.
In September 2015, Career Academy’s finance committee met to review its budget for
the year. The committee included Mr. Garatoni, Mr. Schlottman, and others. By that time, the
school knew how many students had enrolled for the year. Since the state’s payments to the
school were based on the number of students, that meant that Career Academy also knew at that
point what its revenues would be for the year. Based on those figures, the budget summary
1
Mr. Addie also shared the assistant principal duties for several months beginning in late 2014
after the school’s assistant principal passed away. Mr. Addie did not apply for that position on a
full-time basis, and returned to his Director of Development position when a new assistant
principal was hired.
4
showed that Career Academy’s operating expenses would exceed its operating revenues by
approximately $240,000. Accordingly, Mr. Garatoni instructed Mr. Schlottman that the school
needed to reduce its expenses by that amount in order to break even. Mr. Garatoni told Mr.
Schlottman that he should consider a reduction in force that would least affect the teaching of the
students.
In response, Mr. Schlottman proposed a package of cuts that would reduce Career
Academy’s expenses by that amount. First, he proposed eliminating three positions: Mr. Addie’s
Director of Development position, a Director of Student Services position, and a teacher’s aide
position. Second, Mr. Schlottman proposed reducing his own salary by three percent and making
cuts to employee bonuses. Finally, he proposed other cost-cutting measures like changing the
school’s cell phone and internet provider. Mr. Schlottman and Mr. Garatoni believed that it was
appropriate to include Mr. Addie’s position in those cuts because he was not involved in
teaching, and because with enrollment near capacity, it was no longer necessary to devote so
many resources to student recruitment. Mr. Garatoni approved each of those cuts, which were
then implemented. After making those cuts, Career Academy’s projected operating revenues
equaled its operating expenses for the year.
Mr. Schlottman met with Mr. Addie in late September 2015 to inform him that his
position was being eliminated and that his employment would terminate at the end of the month.
Career Academy offered Mr. Addie a separation agreement, under which it would continue to
pay his salary until January 2016 in return for a release of all claims. Mr. Addie declined to sign
the agreement. Instead, he filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. After receiving a right-to-sue letter, he filed this suit. He asserts that
he was discharged because of his age and that Career Academy retaliated against him in
5
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. He also asserts claims under state law
for lost wages, breach of contract, and wrongful discharge. Discovery closed and Career
Academy filed a motion for summary judgment, which is now ripe.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper when the movant shows that there “is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). A “material” fact is one identified by the substantive law as affecting the outcome of the
suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A “genuine issue” exists with
respect to any material fact when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. Where a factual record taken as a whole could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial, and
summary judgment should be granted. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Servs. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)). In
determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, this Court must construe all facts in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable and justifiable
inferences in that party’s favor. Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008); King v.
Preferred Tech. Grp., 166 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 1999). However, the non-moving party cannot
simply rest on the allegations contained in its pleadings but must present sufficient evidence to
show the existence of each element of its case on which it will bear the burden at trial. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986); Robin v. Espo Eng’g Corp., 200 F.3d 1081, 1088
(7th Cir. 2000).
III. DISCUSSION
Mr. Addie asserts claims under federal and state law. The focus of his complaint is that
he was fired because of his age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. He
6
also claims that he was fired and suffered other adverse actions in retaliation for protected
activity, again in violation of that Act. Finally, he asserts several claims arising under state law.
Career Academy moves for summary judgment on all claims, and the Court considers each in
turn.
A.
Age Discrimination
Mr. Addie first claims that he was fired because of his age. The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act applies to employees who are at least 40 years old, and makes it unlawful for
an employer “to discharge any individual . . . because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(a)(1). To prevail, a plaintiff “must prove that, but for his age, the adverse action would not
have occurred.” Skiba v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 719 (7th Cir. 2018). It is undisputed
that Mr. Addie is protected by the ADEA—he was over 40 years old—and that he suffered an
adverse action when Career Academy terminated his employment. The question is therefore
whether Mr. Addie has offered evidence from which jury could conclude that he was fired
because of his age.
A plaintiff can meet that burden by offering any combination of evidence that permits an
inference of discrimination. Skiba, 884 F.3d at 719; Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760,
765 (7th Cir. 2016) (stating that the evidence “must be considered as a whole”). In evaluating
that evidence, courts consider all of the evidence in combination to determine “whether the
evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff’s [protected
characteristic] caused the discharge . . . .” Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765. A plaintiff can also rely on the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Under that approach, a plaintiff must offer
evidence that (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was meeting the defendant’s
legitimate expectations, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) similarly situated
employees outside the protected class were treated more favorably.” Skiba, 884 F.3d at 719;
7
Carson v. Lake Cty., Ind., 865 F.3d 526, 533 (7th Cir. 2017). If the plaintiff establishes this
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to “articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the adverse employment action[.]” Skiba, 884 F.3d at 719. A plaintiff can then defeat
summary judgment by offering evidence that the employer’s explanation is pretextual, meaning
it is a lie. Id. at 719–20; Riley v. Elkhart Cmty. Schs., 829 F.3d 886, 894 (7th Cir. 2016).
“‘However the plaintiff chooses to proceed, at the summary judgment stage the court must
consider all admissible evidence to decide whether a reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff
suffered an adverse action because of [his] age.’” Skiba, 884 F.3d at 720 (quoting Carson, 865
F.3d at 533); see also Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765.
Mr. Addie’s arguments touch on both avenues for proving discrimination claims. The
Court begins with the question of pretext, on which both parties focus. Career Academy asserts
that it eliminated Mr. Addie’s position for a facially neutral reason—to balance its budget. Once
the 2015 school year began and Career Academy knew how much funding it would receive for
the year, it discovered that its operating expenses exceeded its operating revenues by about
$240,000. Mr. Garatoni instructed Mr. Schlottman that the school needed to reduce its costs by
that amount to balance its budget. He further directed Mr. Schlottman to do so in a way that
would have the least effect on the teaching of the students. In response, Mr. Schlottman proposed
eliminating three positions, including Mr. Addie’s; reducing his own salary and lowering
employee bonuses schoolwide; and taking other cost-cutting measures. Mr. Garatoni approved
that plan, and as a result, the school balanced its budget for the year.
Mr. Addie argues that this explanation is pretextual, but no evidence supports that
argument. To begin with, there is no evidence that the reduction-in-force was itself pretextual.
Mr. Addie notes that Career Academy hired dozens of new employees in the preceding years,
8
which he argues shows that this was not a true reduction in force. Career Academy multiplied in
size over that time, though. According to Mr. Addie’s own numbers, Career Academy had 160
students in 2012; 280 in 2013; 523 in 2014; and 1,067 in 2015. [DE 31 p. 5–6]. Career Academy
naturally had to hire numerous new employees over that time to accommodate that growth.
But there is no dispute that, once it crunched the numbers at the beginning of the 2015
school year based on its actual enrollment, Career Academy faced a budget shortfall of
$240,000. Nor is there any dispute that Mr. Garatoni gave the direction to balance the budget;
that Mr. Schlottman put together a package of cuts that included eliminating three positions,
along with other costs; and that those cuts succeeded in balancing the budget.2 No juror could
find that the reduction-in-force was pretextual.
Nor is there evidence that the elimination of Mr. Addie’s position as part of those budget
cuts was pretextual. Mr. Garatoni directed that the cuts should have the least effect on teaching
students. In his position as Director of Development, Mr. Addie was not a teacher; his primary
roles involved fundraising, public relations, and recruiting new students. Mr. Addie argues that
he had some other administrative duties, too, but he does not attempt to identify any other
positions that could have been eliminated with less of an impact on teaching and as much of a
reduction in costs. See Petts v. Rockledge Furniture LLC, 534 F.3d 715, 724 (7th Cir. 2008) (“In
deciding which employee to let go, [an employer] could weigh the monetary savings of
eliminating one salary with the considerations of whom the [employer] needed more and who
could be replaced more easily.”). Instead, he notes that Career Academy hired over 60 new
2
Mr. Schlottman also reduced his own salary by three percent as part of those cuts. It would be
quite unusual for someone to construct a pretext that includes reducing their own salary.
9
employees under the age of 40 from 2014 to 2017. He sees this as a plan to first hire younger
employees and then later fire older employees under the pretext of a reduction in force.
Divorcing that number from its context deprives it of any significance, though. Without
also considering the number of older workers hired and the make-up of the qualified applicant
pool, the number of younger employees hired sheds no light on whether Career Academy was
engaging in discrimination. The same document upon which Mr. Addie relies shows that Career
Academy hired scores of employees over the age of 40, which refutes his suggestion that Career
Academy was only hiring younger employees. And again, without comparing the number of
younger employees hired to the percent of younger people in the pool of qualified applicants,
which Mr. Addie does not do, there is no reason to believe those younger employees were hired
as part of a pattern of discrimination. See Skiba, 884 F.3d at 723–24 (finding no evidence of
discrimination where the plaintiff offered “a table listing the names and ages” of younger
workers who were hired, but provided “no amplifying detail of the employees’ qualifications or
employment history”).
Mr. Addie also claims Career Academy’s explanation was pretextual because he was not
given the chance to bump other younger employees from their jobs. He offers no reason to infer
discrimination from that fact, though. No workers—younger or older—were ever given the
option to bump other employees. And the ADEA does not require employers to give preference
to older workers; it only bans discrimination against older workers. Mr. Addie may believe that it
would have been wiser or fairer to give him preference over other employees in light of his
experience, qualifications, or contributions to Career Academy. But he has not shown that failing
to give him “bumping rights” had anything to do with his age, and courts do not judge wisdom or
fairness of an employer’s practices. Ptasznik v. St. Joseph Hosp., 464 F.3d 691, 697 (7th Cir.
10
2006) (“Federal courts have authority to correct an adverse employment action only where the
employer’s decision is unlawful, and not merely when the adverse action is unwise or even
unfair. We do not sit as a super-personnel department with authority to review an employer’s
business decision . . . .”); Yindee v. CCH Inc., 458 F.3d 599, 602 (7th Cir. 2006) (“It is not
enough to demonstrate that the employer was mistaken, inconsiderate, short-fused, or otherwise
benighted; none of those possibilities violates federal law. Poor personnel management receives
its comeuppance in the market rather than the courts.”).
Mr. Addie also argues that, after his position was eliminated, his duties were absorbed by
younger, less qualified employees. If true, that could satisfy the similarly-situated element of the
McDonnell Douglas framework, and could also provide circumstantial evidence of
discrimination apart from that framework. See Petts v. Rockledge Furniture, LLC, 534 F.3d 715,
725 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that in “a mini-RIF [reduction in force] case, where the dismissed
employee’s duties are absorbed by another employee or employees rather than eliminated,” the
similarly-situated element “requires proof that the plaintiff’s duties were absorbed by employees
not in the protected class”). Mr. Addie’s brief asserts in multiple places that younger employees
absorbed his duties, but he never offers a citation to evidence to support that assertion. He does
not identify who those employees were or which of his duties they absorbed, either. This
argument thus fails for lack of support. In addition, Mr. Addie did not contest Career Academy’s
assertion that some of his duties—including fundraising and public relations—were absorbed by
an employee who was 44 years old. Thus, even assuming that other duties were absorbed by
younger employees, this comparison does not point to age as a reason for his discharge. Petts,
534 F.3d at 726 (holding that the plaintiff failed to show that similarly situated employees were
treated better than her in support of her sex discrimination claim, since “[e]ven if some of her
11
duties were absorbed by male employees, as she claims, some of them were absorbed by
women”).
Mr. Addie next objects that the separation agreement he was offered required him to
release any age discrimination claims in order to receive severance. However, he fails to show
how that has any connection to whether he was fired because of his age. The separation
agreement offered Mr. Addie about three-and-a-half months of pay, in return for which he would
have to release Career Academy “from any liability based on [his] employment with the School
or the termination of such employment.”3 [DE 34-7 (emphasis added)]. There is nothing
improper about that. Mr. Addie was not entitled to severance pay in the first place—Career
Academy was offering that pay as consideration for a release of claims—and Mr. Addie does not
suggest that Career Academy offered severance to any other employees without a full release of
liability. The separation agreement thus offers no support for a finding that he was discharged or
otherwise discriminated against because of his age.4
The remaining evidence Mr. Addie cites is insubstantial. Mr. Addie offers various facts to
the effect that he was a good employee, such as that he was previously chosen to serve as acting
lead administrator, he had recently received a raise and a bonus, and he was highly thought of by
parents, staff, and students. None of that speaks to why he was let go, though, or suggests that
that had anything to do with his age. And if anything, giving Mr. Addie a raise and a bonus only
3
The release also included a revocation period, as required by the Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act.
4
Mr. Addie argues that, in response to a separate charge brought by a different employee, the
EEOC found the separation agreement to be improper. The EEOC did not suggest that the
agreement was evidence of discrimination, though. The objection the EEOC has raised to
releases of employment claims is that they could tend to chill employees from filing charges or
participating in EEOC proceedings—it does not claim that such releases are discriminatory or
retaliatory. EEOC v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 809 F.3d 335, 341 (7th Cir. 2015).
12
months earlier, and appointing him acting lead administrator a couple years earlier, suggests that
his age was not held against him.5 Mr. Addie also notes that two full-time lead administrators
were paid more than he received while he was acting lead administrator. One of those individuals
was almost his same age, though, so age does not explain the disparity. Finally, Mr. Addie offers
some general assertions that Career Academy favored younger employees over older ones, or
was engaged in a plot to fire older employees instead of younger ones. But assertions at that high
a level of generality do not suffice at the summary judgment stage. Bordelon v. Bd. of Educ. of
the City of Chi., 811 F.3d 984, 991 (7th Cir. 2016) (declining to consider “sweeping
generalizations about the way the protected class was treated,” without “specific facts upon
which to conclude [the employer] treated older [employees] in a discriminatory manner”); Lucas
v. Chi. Transit Auth., 367 F.3d 714, 726 (7th Cir. 2004) (refusing to consider assertions that the
employer treated the protected group “more harshly” than others, without specific details to
support the assertions, as “conclusory statements, not grounded in specific facts, are not
sufficient to avoid summary judgment”).
Viewing all of this evidence collectively, see Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765, no jury could
reasonably conclude that Mr. Addie was fired because of his age. Mr. Addie has not rebutted
Career Academy’s stated reason for terminating his employment or otherwise offered evidence
suggesting that his age caused that decision. He cannot survive summary judgment under the
McDonnell Douglas framework, either. He has not shown that he was treated less favorably than
similarly situated younger workers or that his duties were absorbed by younger workers, nor has
5
Mr. Addie also asserts that Career Academy stated to the EEOC that he was fired because of
his performance, but he never cites particular evidence to support that assertion.
13
he offered evidence from which a jury could find that Career Academy’s explanation was a lie.
Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment on the age discrimination claim.
B.
Retaliation
Mr. Addie also claims that Career Academy terminated his employment in retaliation for
his protected activity. To establish a retaliation claim under the ADEA, a plaintiff must show that
(1) he engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse actions; and (3) there
is a causal connection between the two. Smith v. Lafayette Bank & Trust Co., 674 F.3d 655, 657
(7th Cir. 2012).
Mr. Addie first argues that he was fired in retaliation for comments he made to Mr.
Schlottman several months earlier about the school’s hiring practices. His brief does not provide
a specific citation to evidence of this alleged protected activity. From the citations in Career
Academy’s brief, though, it appears that this claim is based on the following testimony by Mr.
Addie: “I brought that concern to Mr. Schlottman beginning as early as late spring, June, that we
were making hires of inexperienced staff, young staff, saying why are we hiring all these people
when I don’t think we need them . . . .” [DE 36 p. 160].
Even assuming this somewhat ambiguous comment constituted protected activity, there is
no evidence connecting it to Mr. Addie’s discharge. Mr. Addie argues that the timing is
suspicious, but at least three months separated this activity from his discharge. And in the
interim, Career Academy gave Mr. Addie a pay raise and a bonus. Mr. Addie argues that the
timing makes sense because Career Academy needed him to continue recruiting students, so it
wouldn’t have fired him before the school year began. Even if so, the timing still doesn’t connect
the discharge to the comments he made months earlier, as the two events are not close enough in
time to suggest that one is connected to the other. In addition, suspicious timing alone is rarely
sufficient to support an inference of retaliation. Hutt v. AbbVie Prods., LLC, 757 F.3d 687, 693
14
(7th Cir. 2014) (“[M]ere temporal proximity is not enough to establish a genuine issue of
material fact.”); Mobley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 531 F.3d 539, 549 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that
suspicious timing would only create an inference of causation, if ever, for “matters occurring
within days, or at most, weeks of each other”). And as already discussed, Mr. Addie has not
undermined Career Academy’s explanation that it eliminated his position to balance its budget.
Mr. Addie also argues that he engaged in protected activity by refusing to sign the
separation agreement that would have waived his claims, and by filing an EEOC charge. He does
not identify any adverse actions that he suffered as a result of that activity, though. Both of those
actions occurred after he was discharged, so he could not have been discharged in retaliation for
that activity. He also asserts that after he refused to sign the separation agreement, Career
Academy offered him a second agreement that was even less advantageous. He never provides a
citation to evidence in support of that claim, though.6 And if he refused to sign even the first
separation agreement, he could not have been harmed by Career Academy offering a second, less
beneficial agreement. Finally, as already discussed, Mr. Addie was not entitled to severance in
the first place, so Career Academy was not retaliating by refusing to pay severance if Mr. Addie
declined to accept the separation agreement. CVS Pharmacy, 809 F.3d at 341 (holding that
conditioning benefits on an agreement to release claims does not constitute actionable
retaliation); Isbell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 418 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir. 2005) (“An employee who
refuses to sign a release will not be offered the same deal as a terminated employee who is
willing to sign the release.”). The other facts Mr. Addie offers are not properly supported by
6
Mr. Addie submitted two separation agreements in response to the motion for summary
judgment, but did not provide any foundation for either of those agreements, and one of them
states that it was offered to Sarah Fine, not Mr. Addie. [DE 34-6].
15
citations to the record and do not connect any protected activity to any adverse action anyway.
Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment as to this claim.
C.
State Claims
In addition to his federal claims, Mr. Addie brought claims under state law for lost wages,
breach of contract, and wrongful discharge. Having resolved the federal claims over which the
Court has original jurisdiction, the Court must decide whether to maintain supplemental
jurisdiction over the state claims. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, a district court “may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over state-law claims if the court “has dismissed all claims
over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). “Although the decision is
discretionary, ‘when all federal claims in a suit in federal court are dismissed before trial, the
presumption is that the court will relinquish federal jurisdiction over any supplemental state-law
claims.’” RWJ Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 672 F.3d 476, 479 (7th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Al’s Serv. Ctr. v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 599 F.3d 720, 727 (7th Cir. 2010)). “The
presumption is rebuttable, ‘but it should not be lightly abandoned, as it is based on a legitimate
and substantial concern with minimizing federal intrusion into areas of purely state law.’” Id.
(quoting Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1366 (7th Cir. 1996)).
Career Academy urges the Court grant summary judgment against the state claims even if
the federal claims have failed. It has not overcome the presumption in favor of relinquishing
supplemental jurisdiction, though. Mr. Addie’s state claims relate to his employment, but they do
not depend on his federal claims. Because those claims rely on principles of state law and are not
governed by the resolution of the federal claims, it is most appropriate to allow the state courts to
address those claims. Hansen v. Bd. of Tr. of Hamilton Se. Sch. Corp., 551 F.3d 599, 607 (7th
Cir. 2008) (“When all federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial, the principle of comity
encourages federal courts to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to § 1367(c)(3).”
16
(internal citations omitted)). The Court therefore relinquishes supplemental jurisdiction over the
state claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
For those reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment in favor of
Career Academy as to Mr. Addie’s claims for age discrimination and retaliation. The Court also
relinquishes supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims, which are dismissed without
prejudice. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: March 27, 2019
/s/ JON E. DEGUILIO
Judge
United States District Court
17
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?