Reed v. Superintendent

Filing 10

OPINION AND ORDER: The petition (DE 9 ) is DENIED pursuant to Habeas Corpus Rule 4 and the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (DE 7 ) is DENIED as MOOT. The clerk is DIRECTED to close this case. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 11/21/2016. (lhc)(cc: Reed)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
TONY REED,
Petitioner,
vs.
SUPERINTENDENT,
Respondent.

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CAUSE NO. 3:16-CV-621 RL

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Petition under 28
U.S.C. Paragraph 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed by Tony
Reed, a pro se prisoner, on October 1, 2016 (DE #9).

For the

reasons set forth below, the petition (DE #9) is DENIED pursuant to
Habeas Corpus Rule 4 and the motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis (DE #7) is DENIED as MOOT.

The clerk is DIRECTED to close

this case.

BACKGROUND
In the petition, Reed is challenging the prison disciplinary
hearing (WCC 16-03-0227) where he was found guilty on March 28,
2016, of possessing a deadly weapon in violation of A-106 by the
Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO).

Reed was sanctioned with the

loss of 60 days earned credit time.
The Conduct Report charges, “On 3/10/2016 at approximately
5:40

am,

during

an

E

Squad

shakedown
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I,

Sgt.

M.

Dombrowski

conducted a search of Offender Reed, Tony 902503 and his property.
As I searched Offender Reed, Tony, I observed Offender Reed, Tony
remove a small package containing two razor blades from his oral
cavity.

While searching Offender Reed’s property box, I found an

unauthorized lock.” (DE #9-1 at 3.)

DISCUSSION
When

prisoners

lose

earned

time

credits

in

a

prison

disciplinary hearing, they are entitled to certain protections
under the Due Process Clause: (1) advance written notice of the
charges; (2) an opportunity to be heard before an impartial
decision maker; (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present
documentary evidence in defense when consistent with institutional
safety and correctional goals; and (4) a written statement by a
fact

finder

of

evidence

relied

on

and

the

reasons

for

the

disciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563 (1974).
To satisfy due process, there must also be “some evidence” to
support the hearing officer’s decision.

Superintendent, Mass.

Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).
Reed argues that there was insufficient evidence to have found
him guilty because he used the razors to cut hair.

He also

complains that the report mentioned him possessing both a lock and
a razor, but he was only found guilty of possessing the razor.

In

evaluating whether there is adequate evidence to support the

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findings of a prison disciplinary hearing, “the relevant question
is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support
the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.”
v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985).

Superintendent

Even a conduct report alone

can provide evidence sufficient to support the finding of guilt.
McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999).
In reviewing a decision for some evidence,
courts are not required to conduct an
examination
of
the
entire
record,
independently assess witness credibility, or
weigh the evidence, but only determine whether
the prison disciplinary board’s decision to
revoke good time credits has some factual
basis.
Hill, 472 U.S. at 457 (quotations marks and citation omitted).
[T]he findings of a prison disciplinary board
[need only] have the support of some evidence
in the record. This is a lenient standard,
requiring no more than a modicum of evidence.
Even meager proof will suffice, so long as the
record is not so devoid of evidence that the
findings of the disciplinary board were
without support or otherwise arbitrary.
Although some evidence is not much, it still
must point to the accused’s guilt. It is not
our province to assess the comparative weight
of the evidence underlying the disciplinary
board’s decision.
Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000) (quotation
marks, citations,

parenthesis, and ellipsis omitted).

Here, there was sufficient evidence to find Reed guilty of
possessing a dangerous weapon.

Though he argues that the razors

were merely going to used to cut hair, the hearing officer was not
required to accept his version of events.
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It was not unreasonable

for the hearing officer to have concluded that it could have been
used as a weapon.

Surely, a disposable razor - like many common

items - can be fashioned into a weapon by a creative inmate, but
that does not mean that every inmate with a disposable razor is
guilty of possession of a dangerous weapon.
merely

a

disposable

razor.

Here,

Without more, it is

though,

Reed

altered

the

disposable razor by removing the razor blades and then hiding them
in his mouth in an attempt to avoid their detection.

The DHO heard

Reed’s arguments, weighed the facts, and found against him.
is no indication that the decision was arbitrary.

There

“The Federal

Constitution does not require evidence that logically precludes any
conclusion

but

the

one

reached

by

the

disciplinary

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985).

board.”

It is not for

this court to re-weigh the evidence.
Reed’s complaint about the conduct report fares no better.
The purpose of a conduct report is to inform the inmate of the
charge against him.

Wolff requires advance notice of sufficient

facts to inform the accused of the behavior with which he is
charged. 418 U.S. at 570. Here, the conduct report identifies the
offense as “Possession of a Deadly Weapon.”
identified as “A-106".

The offense code is

The conduct report contained a description

of the weapons found in the area.

(DE #9-1 at 3.)

This clearly

notified Reed that he was charged with possession of a deadly
weapon.

It does not matter that he was only found guilty of

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possessing one deadly weapon and not two.
Because the factual basis of the investigation
report gave [him] all the information he
needed to defend against the . . . charge, the
reviewing authority's modification did not
deprive [him] of his due process rights.
Northern v. Hanks, 326 F.3d 909, 911 (7th Cir. 2003).

Thus, this

is not a basis for habeas relief.
As

a

pauperis.

final

matter,

(DE #7.)

Reed

has

moved

to

proceed

in

forma

Upon review of the financial records, the

filing fee has been paid in full.

As such, there is no need for

Reed to proceed in forma pauperis.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the petition (DE #9) is
DENIED pursuant to Habeas Corpus Rule 4 and the motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis (DE #7) is DENIED as MOOT. The clerk is
DIRECTED to close this case.

DATED: November 21, 2016

/s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court

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