Stanton v. Indiana Dept. of Corrections et al

Filing 15

OPINION AND ORDER re 10 , GRANTS Stanton leave to proceed against Dalyrmple in his individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for denying him adequate mental health treatment from January 18, 2016 through July 20, 2016, in violation of the Eighth Amendment; DISMISSES all other claims, including those against Bruce Lemmon, Jack Hendrix, Mark Severe, Andrew Pazera, T. Cambe, Corizon Health, and the John Doe psychiatrist;DIRECTS the Clerk of Court and the United States Marshals Se rvice, to issue and serve process, along with a copy of the amended complaint and this order, on Dalyrmple; ORDERS Dalyrmple to respond only to the claims for which Stanton has been granted leave to proceed in this order, DIRECTS Stanton to initiate any discovery to identify the unknown psychiatrist on or before August 14, 2017; and GRANTS Stanton leave until October 16, 2017, to file a second amendedcomplaint, naming the unknown psychiatrist as a defendant and presenting any and all claims that he is asserting against him. Signed by Judge Philip P Simon on 6/21/2017. (Copy mailed as directed in Order)(lpw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER A. STANTON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.

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Cause No. 3:16-cv-743

OPINION AND ORDER
When Christopher A. Stanton, a pro se prisoner, filed this lawsuit, he initially
alleged that the defendants failed to properly treat his mental illness and housed him in
an open dorm, even though he knew it was a trigger for his mental health disorders,
which caused him to attack a guard on April 19, 2016. (DE 1.) He further alleged that as
a result of the attack, he was disciplined and lost earned credit time. (Id.) I dismissed the
original complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, explaining that Stanton’s claims for
damages were not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 until and unless the disciplinary
punishment against him is overturned. (DE 4; see generally Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S.
641, 643 (1997).) I granted Stanton leave to amend his complaint, if the disciplinary
punishment was overturned or if Stanton could allege claims not intertwined with his
disciplinary punishment. (DE 4.)
Stanton has now filed an amended complaint that brings claims not intertwined

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with his disciplinary punishment. (DE 10.) I must review the merits of a prisoner
complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Because Stanton is proceeding without the
benefit of counsel, I will construe the amended complaint liberally and hold it “to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Claims Against Mental Health Providers
The Eighth Amendment entitles inmates to adequate medical care. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment, a
prisoner must show that (1) his medical need was objectively serious and (2) the
defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that medical need. Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). A medical need is “serious” if it is one that a physician has
diagnosed as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay person
would easily recognize the need for a doctor’s attention. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645,
653 (7th Cir. 2005). On the second prong, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant
“acted in an intentional or criminally reckless manner, i.e., the defendant must have
known that the plaintiff was at serious risk of being harmed and decided not to do
anything to prevent that harm from occurring even though he could have easily done
so.” Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks,
citations, and brackets omitted). The medical professional must have made “a decision
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that represents such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment,
practice, or standards, as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not
base the decision on such a judgment.” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Although inmates are not entitled to a
specific form of treatment, medical staff cannot simply continue with a course of
treatment they know is ineffective. Greeno, 414 F.3d at 654–55. In addition, delaying
treatment can constitute deliberate indifference when it prolongs pain. Arnett v. Webster,
658 F.3d 742, 753 (7th Cir. 2011); Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 779 (7th Cir. 2008).
The amended complaint alleges that Stanton he was diagnosed with and treated
for depression, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), polysubstance dependence, and
antisocial personality disorder prior to arriving at Westville Correctional Facility on
October 28, 2015. (DE 10 at 6.) At Westville, he was housed in an open dorm setting,
which caused him to experience thoughts of violence and suicide. (Id. at 7.) On January
18, 2016, he allegedly notified mental health provider Charles Dalyrmple and an
unidentified psychiatrist of his mental health history and asked to be placed in
segregation due to PTSD complications. (Id.) He says these providers failed to give him
his previously prescribed medications or any mental health treatment to deal with his
problems and did not classify him as requiring segregation. (Id. at 4–5, 8–9.) In fact, he
claims that he was denied mental health treatment until he left on July 20, 2016. (Id. at
10.) On this basis, he alleges Eighth Amendment claims against Dalyrmple and the
unnamed psychiatrist and seeks compensatory damages.
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Stanton has sufficiently pleaded an Eighth Amendment claim against Dalyrmple.
See Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997). Although further factual
development may show that Dalyrmple was justified in his actions, it is too early to tell
at this point. Giving Stanton the inferences to which he is entitled at the pleading stage,
Stanton has alleged enough to proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim.
Stanton may not, however, proceed on his claims against the unidentified
psychiatrist. “[I]t is pointless to include lists of anonymous defendants in federal court;
this type of placeholder does not open the door to relation back under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15,
nor can it otherwise help the plaintiff.” Wudtke v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir.
1997) (citations omitted). Thus, I will dismiss the unidentified psychiatrist defendant
without prejudice. After counsel for Dalyrmple has appeared in this case, Stanton may
initiate discovery directed at Dalyrmple for the purpose of identifying the unknown
psychiatrist who allegedly denied Stanton adequate mental health treatment. Notably,
all discovery requests and responses must be filed with the court. N.D. Ind. L.R. 262(a)(2)(A). If Stanton can identify that defendant later, he may move to add him/her as
a defendant.
Other Claims Related to Medical Care
Stanton alleges constitutional claims against IDOC Commissioner Bruce
Lemmon and Westville Superintendent Mark Severe for the deficient mental health
treatment he received from Dalyrmple and the unnamed psychiatrist. (DE 10 at 4.)
However, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
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means that these defendants cannot be liable simply because they oversaw operations at
the prison or supervised correctional officers or staff. Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592,
594 (7th Cir. 2009). Stanton also alleges that Lemmon and Severe failed to adequately
train Westville’s mental health providers. “An allegation of a ‘failure to train’ is
available only in limited circumstances.” Cornfield v. Consol. High School Dist. No. 230,
991 F.2d 1316, 1327 (7th Cir. 1993). Such a claim requires that “the policymakers had
acquiesced in a pattern of constitutional violations.” Id. Here, the complaint neither
mentions prior instances where mental health providers refused to provide adequate
treatment, nor alleges any facts about why or how the training or supervision Lemmon
and Severe provided was inadequate. Rather, it merely concludes that the training
provided was inadequate. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it
has not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679
(2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). For these reasons, Stanton’s claims against
Lemmon and Severe must be dismissed.
Stanton also sues Corizon, the private company that provides medical care at the
prison, apparently on grounds the company employs the mental health providers that
denied Stanton treatment. Again, though, there is no general respondeat superior liability
under Section 1983. Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001); see also
Johnson v. Dossey, 515 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir. 2008). In addition, although private
companies performing state functions may be held liable under Monell if there was an
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unconstitutional practice or policy, Stanton does not include any allegations from which
it can be plausibly inferred that Corizon had such a practice or policy. See Rice v. Corr.
Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 675 (7th Cir. 2012); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New
York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Instead, the gist of Stanton’s claim is that medical staff failed
to give proper care to him for his mental health needs. Accordingly, Stanton has not
plausibly alleged a claim against Corizon.
Claims Related to Classification
Stanton sues Jack Hendrix, the director of classification at Westville, and Andrew
Pazera, a classification officer at Westville, for not allowing him to be placed in
segregation due to his mental health needs. (DE 10 at 4, 7–8.) The Eighth Amendment
requires that prison officials ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, and
shelter. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. However, “[a] layperson’s failure to tell the medical staff
how to do its job cannot be called deliberate indifference[.]” Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d
592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009). “If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts[,] a nonmedical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in
capable hands.” Greeno v. Daley , 414 F.3d 645, 656 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Spruill v.
Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3rd Cir. 2004)).
Stanton, of course, was under the care of at least two mental health care
providers at Westville, and neither diagnosed him with having a mental health
condition that required him to be placed in segregation. As a result, the non-medical
defendants were not deliberately indifferent when they did not place him in segregation
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merely because he demanded it. They were entitled to rely on the mental health
providers’ opinions and recommendations. Therefore, Stanton’s claims against Hendrix
and Pazera must be dismissed.
Claim Related to the Grievance Process
Stanton sues T. Cambe for denying him access to the grievance process at
Westville, although it’s not clear what actions Cambe took. (DE 10 at 5.) What is clear is
that, although a prisoner will not be required to administratively exhaust when he is
denied access to the grievance process, “inadequacies of the grievance procedure itself .
. . cannot form the basis for a constitutional claim.” See Kervin v. Barnes, 787 F.3d 833,
835 (7th Cir. 2015). As a result, Stanton’s claim(s) against Cambe will be dismissed.
Conclusion
For these reasons, the court:
(1) GRANTS Stanton leave to proceed against Dalyrmple in his individual
capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for denying him adequate mental
health treatment from January 18, 2016 through July 20, 2016, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment;
(2) DISMISSES all other claims, including those against Bruce Lemmon, Jack
Hendrix, Mark Severe, Andrew Pazera, T. Cambe, Corizon Health, and the John Doe
psychiatrist;
(3) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court and the United States Marshals Service,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to issue and serve process, along with a copy of the
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amended complaint (DE 10) and this order, on Dalyrmple;
(4) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), ORDERS Dalyrmple to respond only to
the claims for which Stanton has been granted leave to proceed in this order, as
provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 10-1(b);
(5) DIRECTS Stanton to initiate any discovery to identify the unknown
psychiatrist on or before August 14, 2017; and
(6) GRANTS Stanton leave until October 16, 2017, to file a second amended
complaint, naming the unknown psychiatrist as a defendant and presenting any and all
claims that he is asserting against him.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: June 21, 2017.
s/ Philip P. Simon
JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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