Konrath v. Logansport Memorial Hospital
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER: This case is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A because it is frivolous. Signed by Judge Theresa L Springmann on 12/12/2016. (lhc)(cc: Plaintiff)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
GREGORY KONRATH,
Plaintiff,
v.
LOGANSPORT MEMORIAL
HOSPITAL,
Defendant.
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CAUSE NO.: 3:16-CV-804-TLS
OPINION AND ORDER
Gregory Konrath, a pro se prisoner, filed a complaint alleging that Logansport Memorial
Hospital denied him hospital and surgical privileges when he applied in 2013. He acknowledges
that Indiana has a two year statute of limitations, but argues that ever since he was diagnosed with
Type II Bipolar Disorder in 2001, he has been under a legal disability which tolls the statute of
limitations. “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Nevertheless, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the merits of a prisoner
complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
“A person who is under legal disabilities when the cause of action accrues may bring the
action within two (2) years after the disability is removed. Ind. Code § 34-11-6-1.” Whitlock v.
Steel Dynamics, Inc., 35 N.E.3d 265, 270 (Ind. Ct. App.), transfer denied, 37 N.E.3d 960 (Ind.
2015) (quotation marks and emphasis removed).
“Under legal disabilities” includes “persons less than eighteen (18) years of age,
mentally incompetent, or out of the United States.” Ind. Code § 1-1-4-5(24)
(emphasis added [in original]). “Mentally incompetent,” in turn, means “of
unsound mind.” I.C. § 1-1-4-5(12). “Of unsound mind” is not currently defined in
the Indiana Code. See Fager v. Hundt, 610 N.E.2d 246, 250 n.2 (Ind. 1993). The
Indiana Supreme Court noted that although the phrase “of unsound mind” was
previously defined, that statute was repealed in 1990 by P.L. 1-1990, Sec. 334. Id.
(citing the previous statute, Indiana Code section 34-1-67-1). Specifically, “of
unsound mind” was previously defined to include “idiots, noncompotes (non
compos mentis), lunatics and distracted persons.” Id. (emphasis added [in
original]). The phrase “distracted person” was construed to mean “a person who by
reason of his or her mental state is incapable of managing or procuring the
management of his or her ordinary affairs.” Id. (quoting Duwe v. Rodgers, 438
N.E.2d 759, 761 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982)); see also Collins, 323 N.E.2d at 269 (noting
that to be considered of unsound mind, the relevant proof “is whether the person
claiming the benefit of the extension statute is incapable of either understanding the
rights that he would otherwise be bound to know, or of managing his affairs, with
respect to the institution and maintenance of a claim for relief”).
Id.
Konrath describes himself as a very successful orthopedic surgeon who was employed by
Dukes Memorial Hospital at the time that Logansport Memorial Hospital denied him privileges. It
is unclear what limitations his Type II Bipolar Disorder placed on him, but it is clear that he was
not under a legal disability and was able to manage his own affairs. Therefore the statute of
limitations was not tolled and this claim is untimely.
The Plaintiff’s claim is frivolous. Some unsophisticated pro se filers might not understand
whether they were legally disabled. They might file a case like this out of ignorance. Konrath was
an orthopedic surgeon. He is a highly educated individual. This is one of 51 cases he has filed in
this court. Though not formally trained in the law, he includes cites to cases and statutes. He makes
reasoned legal arguments beyond parroting what he has read. He has demonstrated that he
understands the legal concepts he is presenting. Therefore this case will be dismissed because it is
frivolous.
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Though it is usually necessary “to give pro se litigants one opportunity to amend after
dismissing a complaint[,] that’s unnecessary where, as here, it is certain from the face of the
complaint that any amendment would be futile or otherwise unwarranted.” Carpenter v. PNC
Bank, Nat. Ass’n, No. 633 F. App’x 346, 348 (7th Cir. Feb. 3, 2016) (quotation marks omitted).
See Luevano v. Wal-Mart, 722 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2013); See also Hukic v. Aurora Loan Servs.,
588 F.3d 420, 432 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[C]ourts have broad discretion to deny leave to amend where
. . . the amendment would be futile.”).
For these reasons, this case is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A because it is
frivolous.
SO ORDERED on December 12, 2016.
s/ Theresa L. Springmann
THERESA L. SPRINGMANN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
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