Neurology and Pain Management Associates P.C. v. Bunin et al

Filing 158

OPINION AND ORDER: The court DENIES the motion to reconsider the summary judgment ruling 151 as outlined. Signed by Judge Damon R Leichty on 2/8/2024. (mrm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
NEUROLOGY AND PAIN MANAGEMENT
ASSOCIATES, P.C., d/b/a Vanguard Eldercare
Medical Group,
Plaintiff,
v.

CAUSE NO. 3:17-CV-35 DRL

ANTHONY BUNIN and BIO-BEHAVIORAL
CARE SOLUTIONS, LLC,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Neurology and Pain Management Associates, P.C. (d/b/a Vanguard Eldercare Medical Group)
and Steven Posar (together, Vanguard) ask the court to dismiss Bio-Behavioral Care Solutions, LLC’s
promissory estoppel counterclaim against Vanguard and same claim against Mr. Posar (a third-party
defendat) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), or alternatively to reconsider the court’s second
summary judgment ruling (via the former presider). The court denies the motion.
Rule 12(c) allows a party to file a motion for judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are
closed but early enough not to delay trial. A motion under Rule 12(c) must be treated as a motion for
summary judgment under Rule 56 if matters outside the pleadings are presented to the court. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(d). Vanguard’s motion relies on the court’s second summary judgment ruling. This motion thus
falls outside Rule 12(c) and even Rule 56, and instead fits neatly in Rule 54(b) as a motion to reconsider.1
“[A]ny order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or
the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or
parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all

BCS argues that this motion is untimely, as summary judgment motions were due by March 23, 2020 [93]. But
this is a motion to reconsider a summary judgment ruling that does not fall under that deadline.
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the parties’ rights and liabilities.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). A motion to reconsider is appropriate when the
court patently misunderstands a party, or makes a decision outside the adversarial issues presented by the
parties, or makes an error of apprehension, not of reasoning, or addresses a controlling or significant
change in the law or facts since the submission of the issue to the court. Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester
Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990). “Such problems rarely arise and the motion to
reconsider should be equally rare.” Id. These motions “serve a limited function: to correct manifest errors
of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Nokes, 263 F.R.D.
518, 526 (N.D. Ind. 2009). “Reconsideration is not an appropriate forum for rehashing previously
rejected arguments or arguing matters that could have been heard during the pendency of the previous
motion.” Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 247, 249 (7th Cir. 2004).
Vanguard asks the court to reconsider its ruling that BCS’s promissory estoppel claim survives.2
Vanguard argues that because the court held that the restrictive covenant at issue violated Indiana public
policy (and thus dismissed a breach of contract claim based on that covenant), the court must dismiss the
promissory estoppel claim that Vanguard argues is based on that same covenant because equitable
principles such as estoppel cannot be invoked to enforce an agreement that is void as a matter of public
policy. See Millet v. Aetna Tr. & Sav. Co., 122 N.E. 344, 346-47 (Ind. Ct. App. 1919) (a contract “void as
against public policy” cannot “be rendered valid by invoking the doctrine of estoppel”). Vanguard didn’t
make this argument before, so the court could not have misapprehended it. Nor is reconsideration the
time to make new arguments that could have been presented before. The court will not address
reconsideration on a seriatim basis. The court also will not revisit a statute of frauds issue that the prior
presider addressed soundly in waiver.

Of note, this ruling was the second time the court (through a prior presider) held that the promissory estoppel
claim survived summary judgment [see also 112 at 36-38].

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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the court DENIES the motion to reconsider the summary judgment ruling [151].
SO ORDERED.
February 8, 2024

s/ Damon R. Leichty
Judge, United States District Court

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