Cooley v. Superintendent

Filing 14

OPINION AND ORDER: DENYING 1 PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The clerk DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly. Signed by Judge Robert L Miller, Jr on 9/5/2017. (Copy mailed to pro se party)(lhc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
OTTO COOLEY,
Petitioner,
v.
SUPERINTENDENT,
Respondent.

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CAUSE NO. 3:17-CV-61-RLM-MGG

OPINION AND ORDER
Otto Cooley, a pro se prisoner, filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the
prison disciplinary hearing (WCC 16-04-711) in which a disciplinary hearing
officer found him guilty of trafficking in violation of Indiana Department of
Correction policy A-113. He was sanctioned with the loss of 120 days earned
credit time and was demoted from Credit Class 1 to Credit Class 2. Mr. Cooley
presents three grounds that he believes entitle him to habeas corpus relief.
In Ground One, Mr. Cooley argues that the hearing officer didn’t have
sufficient evidence to find him guilty. In the disciplinary context, “the relevant
question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the
conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S.
445, 455-56 (1985). “In reviewing a decision for some evidence, courts are not
required to conduct an examination of the entire record, independently assess
witness credibility, or weigh the evidence, but only determine whether the prison
disciplinary board’s decision to revoke good time credits has some factual basis.”

McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks
omitted).
[T]he findings of a prison disciplinary board [need only] have the
support of some evidence in the record. This is a lenient standard,
requiring no more than a modicum of evidence. Even meager proof
will suffice, so long as the record is not so devoid of evidence that the
findings of the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise
arbitrary. Although some evidence is not much, it still must point to
the accused’s guilt. It is not our province to assess the comparative
weight of the evidence underlying the disciplinary board’s decision.
Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks, citations,
parenthesis, and ellipsis omitted).
Mr. Cooley was charged with violating IDOC A-113. This policy prohibits
inmates from “[e]ngaging in trafficking (as defined in IC 35-44.1-3-5) with anyone
who is not an offender residing in the same facility.” Indiana Department of
Correction,

Adult

Disciplinary

Process:

Appendix

I.

http://www.in.gov/idoc/files/02-04-101_APPENDIX_I-OFFENSES_6-1-2015(1)
.pdf. Indiana law defines “trafficking” as:
(b) A person who, without the prior authorization of the person
in charge of a penal facility or juvenile facility, knowingly or
intentionally:
(1) delivers, or carries into the penal facility or juvenile
facility with intent to deliver, an article to an inmate or child of
the facility;
(2) carries, or receives with intent to carry out of the
penal facility or juvenile facility, an article from an inmate or
child of the facility; or
(3) delivers, or carries to a worksite with the intent to
deliver, alcoholic beverages to an inmate or child of a jail work
crew or community work crew…
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Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-5 (West). The conduct report charged Mr. Cooley as follows:
On 3/3/2016, this Investigator discovered that Offender Otto
Cooley 153711 was engaging in trafficking with a person who is not
an offender residing at the same facility, with the help of a civilian.
For additional information refer to Report of Investigation.
ECF 8-1 (emphasis in original). The Report of Investigation was filed under seal
to safeguard the security of the facility and to protect the identity of the offenders
named in the report.
The hearing officer had sufficient evidence to find Mr. Cooley guilty. During
the disciplinary hearing, Mr. Cooley admitted that he knew that money was being
sent to his wife, and that he received this money from his wife. While he argues
that he shouldn’t have been found guilty because he wasn’t the person that sent
the money, an offender can be guilty of violating A-113 if he received contraband,
or was otherwise engaged in a trafficking scheme. The evidence in the confidential
investigation file supports a finding that Mr. Cooley was involved in a trafficking
scheme. While the evidence in the investigation file does not identify any “smoking
gun” linking Mr. Cooley to contraband that was brought into, or out of, the prison,
there need not be direct evidence supporting a disciplinary finding. The hearing
officer could find Mr. Cooley guilty based on circumstantial evidence alone. See
Brenneman v. Knight, 297 F. App’x 534, 536 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding prisoner
guilty based on circumstantial evidence). Further, “[t]he Federal Constitution does
not require evidence that logically precludes any conclusion but the one reached

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by the disciplinary board.” Sup’t v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 457. To uphold the hearing
officer’s finding, there need only be “some evidence” — and a mere “modicum” of
evidence will suffice. Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d at 652. The information
provided in the confidential investigation file meets this standard. The hearing
officer had sufficient evidence to find Mr. Cooley guilty. Ground One is not a basis
for habeas corpus relief.
In Ground Two, Mr. Cooley argues that he was denied access to the
evidence that the hearing officer reviewed. He claims that after he received his
charges, but before his disciplinary hearing, he was transferred to a different
facility. He claims that because he was at a different facility, he couldn’t collect
witness statements in his defense. While prisoners have the right to present
documentary evidence in their defense, the facility’s security and administrative
needs significantly curtail that right. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566–67
(1974). Prison administrators are granted great deference in determining whether
allowing an offender access to evidence would pose an undue risk to the facility.
Prison administrators are also granted broad discretion in limiting the offender’s
ability to access witnesses or evidence based on the practical, administrative
needs of the facility. “Prison officials must have the necessary discretion to keep
the hearing within reasonable limits and to refuse to call witnesses that may
create a risk of reprisal or undermine authority, as well as to limit access to other
inmates to collect statements or to compile other documentary evidence.” Id. at
566. It wasn’t unreasonable for the hearing officer to deny Mr. Cooley’s request to
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collect witness statements from offenders who were incarcerated at a different
facility. Such a request would impose an onerous security and administrative
burden; a burden the facility was under no constitutional obligation to accept.
Further, Mr. Cooley doesn’t identify what evidence the witnesses could have
provided. See Miller v. Duckworth, 963 F.2d 1002, 1005 (7th Cir. 1992) (inmates
only have a right to present relevant, exculpatory evidence in their defense). Mr.
Cooley doesn’t explain how these witnesses would be relevant and exculpatory.
Ground Two is not a basis for habeas corpus relief.
Mr. Cooley’s final argument is that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief
based on delays between: (1) the date of the offense and his screening; and (2) his
screening and the disciplinary hearing. Mr. Cooley had no right to a “speedy”
screening or disciplinary hearing. “Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of
a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such
proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 556. Mr. Cooley was
entitled only to the due process procedures identified in Wolff, which includes only
one procedural protection relating to the timing of a prisoner’s disciplinary
hearing. This procedural protection requires that the prisoner receive at least 24hours’ advance notice of the charges before his disciplinary hearing. That
requirement was satisfied in this case, so Ground Three is not a basis for habeas
corpus relief.

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The court DENIES the habeas corpus petition (ECF 1). The clerk shall enter
judgment accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: September 5, 2017.

/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr.
Judge
United States District Court

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