Smith v. Indiana Department of Correction et al

Filing 8

OPINION AND ORDER re 1 Pro Se Complaint, the Court: (1) GRANTS VirgilJustin Smith, leave to proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim forcompensatory damages against Andrew K. Manning, LMHC, in hisindividual capacity for denying Smith mental health tre atment bychanging Smiths Mental Status Classification on March 6, 2016, toindicate that Smith was Free of mental illness which caused Smithto attempt suicide on April 9, 2016; (2) DISMISSES all otherclaims; (3) DISMISSES Indiana Department of Correct ion, CorizonMedical Services, Bruce Lemmon, Ron Neal, Reinaldo Matias PHD, andJennifer Harmon-Nary PsyD; (4) DIRECTS the Clerk and the UnitedStates Marshals Service to issue and serve process on Andrew K.Manning, LMHC, with a copy of this order and the complaint and (5) ORDERS, that Andrew K. Manning, LMHC, respond only to the claim for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano. (Copy mailed as directed in Order)(lpw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
VIRGIL JUSTIN SMITH,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTION, et al.,
Defendants.

CAUSE NO. 3:17-CV-77

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the complaint filed by
Virgil Justin Smith, a pro se prisoner, on January 26, 2017. For
the reasons set forth below, the Court: (1) GRANTS Virgil Justin
Smith,

leave

to

proceed

on

an

Eighth

Amendment

claim

for

compensatory damages against Andrew K. Manning, LMHC, in his
individual capacity for denying Smith mental health treatment by
changing Smith’s Mental Status Classification on March 6, 2016, to
indicate that Smith was “Free of mental illness” which caused Smith
to attempt suicide on April 9, 2016; (2) DISMISSES all other
claims; (3) DISMISSES Indiana Department of Correction, Corizon
Medical Services, Bruce Lemmon, Ron Neal, Reinaldo Matias PHD, and
Jennifer Harmon-Nary PsyD; (4) DIRECTS the Clerk and the United
States Marshals Service to issue and serve process on Andrew K.
Manning, LMHC, with a copy of this order and the complaint as
required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); and (5) ORDERS, pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that Andrew K. Manning, LMHC, respond, as
provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind.
L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claim for which the plaintiff has been
granted leave to proceed in this screening order.

DISCUSSION
Smith is suing seven defendants for failing to provide him
with

mental

health

Administrative

treatment

Restrictive

while

Status

he

Housing

was

housed

(ARSH)

unit

in

the

at

the

Indiana State Prison. “A document filed pro se is to be liberally
construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded,
must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(quotation marks and citations omitted). Nevertheless, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the merits of a prisoner
complaint.
Smith alleges that on March 6, 2016, he told Andrew K.
Manning, LMHC (Licensed Mental Health Counselor), that he was going
to kill himself because he was in ARSH. In response, he alleges
that Manning changed his Mental Status Classification to indicate
that Smith was “Free of mental illness” (ECF 1-1 at 7) and thereby
deprived

Smith

of

mental

health

treatment

which

would

have

prevented Smith from attempting suicide on April 9, 2016. “For a
medical professional to be liable for deliberate indifference to

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an inmate’s medical needs, he must make a decision that represents
such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment,
practice,

or

standards,

as

to

demonstrate

that

the

person

responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.”
Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008) (quotation
marks and citations omitted). Here, Smith has stated a claim
against Manning in his individual capacity for a violation of the
Eighth Amendment.
Smith is also suing Jennifer A. Harmon-Nary, Psy.D., who
provided him with mental health treatment when he was in ARSH in
2015 – more than a year before he attempted suicide. On that
occasion, Smith was released from ARSH on March 27, 2015. He
contends that she should have provided him with mental health
treatment when he returned on November 13, 2015. However he has
not alleged any facts from which it can be plausibly inferred that
she knew he had returned to ARSH, that he still needed mental
health treatment, or that he suffered any injury as a result of
her not providing treatment. Rather, it is his allegation that
Manning stopped his mental health treatment when he changed his
Mental Status Classification on March 6, 2016. Therefore this
complaint does not state a claim against Dr. Harmon-Nary.
Smith alleges that Dr. Reinaldo Matias should have provided
mental health treatment after Dr. Harmon-Nary left her employment
at the Indiana State Prison. However, for the same reasons that

3

Smith did not state a claim against Dr. Harmon-Nary, he has not
stated a claim against Dr. Matias either.
Smith

alleges

that

Corizon

Medical

Services

(a

private

corporation which provides medical services at the prison) had a
duty to provide him with mental health services because he had
told its employees he wanted to kill himself. “Private corporations
acting under color of state law may, like municipalities, be held
liable for injuries resulting from their policies and practices.”
Hahn v. Walsh, 762 F.3d 617, 640 (7th Cir. 2014), quoting Rice ex
rel. Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 675 (7th Cir.2012).
However, Smith has not plausibly alleged that he was injured as a
result of a policy or practice of Corizon. Rather he has alleged
that a Corizon employee – Manning – changed his Mental Status
Classification and thereby cancelled his mental health treatment
with deliberate indifference and outside the scope of professional
judgment, practice, or standards. As such, he has not stated a
claim against Corizon.
Smith

alleges

that

Commissioner

Bruce

Lemmon

and

Superintendent Ron Neal were aware of his mental illness and
obligated to provide him with treatment. First, Smith has not
plausibly alleged facts from which it can be reasonably inferred
that these high ranking officials had personal knowledge of his
medical condition. Nevertheless, even if they did, Smith was under
the care of medical personnel and “[a] layperson’s failure to tell

4

the medical staff how to do its job cannot be called deliberate
indifference . . ..” Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 596 (7th
Cir. 2009). Therefore this complaint does not state a claim against
Commissioner Lemmon or Superintendent Neal.
Finally, Smith listed the Indiana Department of Correction
(IDOC) as a defendant in the caption of his complaint. But in the
body, he did not allege any facts showing that it could be liable
to him. Moreover, even if he had named the IDOC in the body of the
complaint, it would have been dismissed pursuant to the Eleventh
Amendment. See Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir.
2001).

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court: (1) GRANTS Virgil
Justin Smith, leave to proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim for
compensatory damages against Andrew K. Manning, LMHC, in his
individual capacity for denying Smith mental health treatment by
changing Smith’s Mental Status Classification on March 6, 2016, to
indicate that Smith was “Free of mental illness” which caused Smith
to attempt suicide on April 9, 2016; (2) DISMISSES all other
claims; (3) DISMISSES Indiana Department of Correction, Corizon
Medical Services, Bruce Lemmon, Ron Neal, Reinaldo Matias PHD, and
Jennifer Harmon-Nary PsyD; (4) DIRECTS the Clerk and the United
States Marshals Service to issue and serve process on Andrew K.

5

Manning, LMHC, with a copy of this order and the complaint as
required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); and (5) ORDERS, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that Andrew K. Manning, LMHC, respond, as
provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind.
L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claim for which the plaintiff has been
granted leave to proceed in this screening order.
DATED: April 18, 2017

/s/Rudy Lozano, Judge
United States District Court

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