Bridges v. Allen County Sheriff Dept et al
OPINION AND ORDER: This case is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 2/9/2017. (lhc)(cc: Plaintiff)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
JOHN ARTHUR BRIDGES,
ALLEN COUNTY SHERIFF
DEPT., RICHARD W.
KARCHER, AND MR.
CAUSE NO. 3:17-CV-116
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a complaint filed by John
Arthur Bridges, Jr., a pro se prisoner, on February 6, 2017. For
the reasons set forth below, this case is DISMISSED pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A.
Bridges alleges that he was detained in the Allen County Jail
for more than 72 hours after his arrest without being brought
before a judge or magistrate. “A document filed pro se is to be
liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully
pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers . . ..”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007). Nevertheless, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a court
must review the complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous
or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. “In order to
state a claim under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 a plaintiff must allege:
(1) that defendants deprived him of a federal constitutional right;
and (2) that the defendants acted under color of state law.”
Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006). Here, it is
clear that all of the defendants were acting under color of State
law, but it is equally clear that none of them deprived him of a
federal constitutional right.
Bridges was arrested without a warrant on Tuesday, February
3, 2015. Bridges v. State, 55 N.E.3d 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)
(table). His probable cause hearing was held the next day on
Wednesday, February 4, 2015. State v. Bridges, 02D04-1502-MC-261
was charged with six criminal counts on the following Monday,
appeared before a judge at his initial hearing two days later on
Wednesday, February 11, 2015. Id.
Bridges argues that it violated his constitutional rights for
the defendants to have not brought him before a judge or magistrate
Our cases have established that “the Fourth
Amendment governs the period of confinement between
arrest without a warrant and the preliminary hearing at
which a determination of probable cause is made, while
due process regulates the period of confinement after
the initial determination of probable cause.” Here,
although officers arrested Holloway without a warrant,
there is no dispute that Holloway had a probable cause
determination within forty-eight hours of his arrest as
required by Gerstein v. Pugh. Thus, Holloway’s case
rests on whether the Sheriff violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. When a plaintiff
brings a § 1983 claim under the Due Process Clause, “the
question is whether an executive abuse of power shocks
Holloway v. Delaware Cty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1068–69 (7th
Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).
Here, Bridges had a probable cause hearing the day after he
was arrested so there is no Fourth Amendment violation. Though he
was not there, probable cause “traditionally has been decided by a
magistrate in a nonadversary proceeding on hearsay and written
testimony, and the Court has approved these informal modes of
proof.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120 (1975). Criminal
charges were filed against Bridges only six days after he was
arrested, and he had his initial hearing on the eighth day. In
Holloway, the court found that “nine days in jail without being
charged with a crime [did not] violate the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.” Holloway v. Delaware Cty. Sheriff, 700
F.3d 1063, 1068 (7th Cir. 2012). Therefore, there was no Fourteenth
Amendment violation based on the facts in this case.
Though it is usually necessary “to give pro se litigants one
unnecessary where, as here, it is certain from the face of the
Carpenter v. PNC Bank, Nat. Ass’n, No. 633 Fed.
Appx. 346, 348 (7th Cir. Feb. 3, 2016) (quotation marks omitted).
See Luevano v. Wal-Mart, 722 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2013) and Hukic
v. Aurora Loan Servs., 588 F.3d 420, 432 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[C]ourts
have broad discretion to deny leave to amend where . . . the
amendment would be futile.”).
For the reasons set forth above, this case is DISMISSED
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
DATED: February 9, 2017
/s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court
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