Jones v. M/A Mgmt Corp

Filing 193

OPINION AND ORDER: The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Runaway Bay's 113 Motion to Dismiss as follows: The Court DENIES the motion insofar as it seeks to dismiss Mr. Jones's claims of discrimination based on race under § 3 604(a), 3604(b) and 3617 of the Fair Housing Act. The Court GRANTS the motion insofar as it seeks to dismiss Mr. Jones's claims of discrimination based on religion under the Fair Housing Act. Signed by Judge Robert L Miller, Jr on 12/11/2017. (Copy mailed to pro se party)(jss)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
ROBERT LEE JONES, JR,
Plaintiff
v.
RUNAWAY BAY APARTMENTS
M/A MGMT. CORP.,
Defendant

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Cause No. 3:17-CV-210 RLM-MGG

OPINION AND ORDER
Robert Jones filed an amended complaint against Runaway Bay M/A
Mgmt Corp. alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.
Mr. Jones claims that Runaway Bay discriminatorily terminated his lease,
restricted him from accessing a clubhouse, didn’t conduct service and repairs
in his apartment, and retaliated against him for engaging in protected
activities. Runaway Bay’s motion to dismiss Mr. Jones’s amended complaint is
before the court. [Doc. No. 113]. For the following reasons, the court grants the
motion in part and denies it in part.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court construes
the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, accepts all
well-pleaded facts as true, and draws all inferences in the nonmoving party's

favor. Reynolds v. CB Sports Bar, Inc., 623 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 2010).
But FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is plausible if “the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Twombly and Iqbal
“require the plaintiff to ‘provid[e] some specific facts’ to support the legal claims
asserted in the compliant.” McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616
(7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Brooks, 578 F.3d at 581)). The plaintiff “must give
enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that
holds together.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010).

II. DISCUSSION
Mr. Jones filed his complaint without an attorney, so the court
“construe[s] it liberally, holding it to a less stringent standard than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir.
2015). The court construes Mr. Jones’s complaint as attempting to state Fair
Housing Act claims under § 3604(a) for discriminatory eviction, § 3604(b) for
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discriminatory provision of services or facilities, and § 3617 for retaliation.
Because of the straightforward nature of Fair Housing Act claims like those
alleged by Mr. Jones, the Twombly/Iqbal standard requires nothing more from
a complaint than “factual allegations identifying (1) who discriminated against
[the plaintiff]; (2) the type of discrimination that occurred; and (3) when the
discrimination took place.” McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 617
(7th Cir. 2011).
Runaway Bay argues that Mr. Jones’s complaint should be dismissed
because the allegations don’t meet the Twombly/Iqbal standard. It contends
that the complaint doesn’t state a Fair Housing Act claim and only contains
labels and conclusions alleging discrimination without any facts that plausibly
show that the defendant violated the Fair Housing Act. With respect to some of
Mr. Jones’s claims, the court agrees; with respect to others, the court
disagrees.

A. Section 3604(a)
Section 3604(a) of the Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful to “refuse to
sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the
sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any
person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). The court of appeals has construed the clause in 42
U.S.C. § 3604(a), “otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling,” broadly,
holding that the clause extends to the point of eviction, including constructive
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eviction. Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 776 (7th Cir. 2009) (arguing that to
do otherwise would allow a landlord “to rent to an African–American but then,
the day after he moves in, [to] change all the locks and put up signs that said,
‘No blacks allowed.’ That clearly could not be what Congress had in mind when
it sought to create ‘truly integrated and balanced living patterns.’”).
Mr. Jones, an African-American, alleges racial discrimination by
Runaway Bay caused his eviction or constructive eviction. For example, he
alleges Runaway Bay racially discriminated against him and his family by
restricting access to maintenance and clubhouse services, including through
force, exposing the family to racial segregation, and “openly showing differences
between white residents” and Mr. Jones. [Doc. No. 116 at ¶ 13]. He claims
these actions made him “vulnerable to violence [and] mistreatment,” caused
him fear and “intentionally forc[ed] [Mr. Jones] to move to avoid further
racism.” Id. He further alleges that Runaway Bay “terminated [his] lease
unlawfully, without legitimate grounds based off of discrimination giving whites
preferential treatment” and due to “race . . . discrimination by racist
stereotypes,” false accusations, and efforts to enforce “degrading racially
segregating standards.” Id. at ¶ 2, 5, 7. These allegations of constructive
eviction due to racial discrimination and a racially discriminatory eviction are
sufficient to state a claim under § 3604(a).

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B. Section 3604(b)
Section 3604(b) of the Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination “against
any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling,
or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of
race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. §
3604(b). Mr. Jones can state a § 3604(b) claim by alleging that Runaway Bay
“engage[d] in invidious discrimination when failing to provide maintenance
services or when limiting the use of [its] . . . facilities.” Mehta v. Beaconridge
Improvement Ass'n, 432 F. App'x 614, 617 (7th Cir. 2011).
The amended complaint alleges that Runaway Bay “engaged in racial
profiling, racial segregation[,] and race discrimination,” by “not conducting
service or requested major repairs.” [Doc. No. 116 at ¶ 2–3]. Mr. Jones claims
that when Runaway Bay maintenance workers entered his apartment to service
his refrigerator and furnace, the workers allegedly refused to remove dirty
gloves before working inside the refrigerator. An argument ensued and Mr.
Jones claims that the workers exhibited “threatening white supremacy
behaviors,” made “racist distinctions between races openly in [Mr. Jones’s]
home,” and left without making the required repairs to his appliances. Id. at ¶
4. Mr. Jones claims that Runaway Bay’s maintenance workers’ conduct was
racist, discriminatory, intimidating, and violated the lease.
The amended complaint further alleges that Runaway Bay “engaged in
racial profiling, racial segregation[,] and race discrimination,” by imposing
clubhouse use restrictions on the “African American [p]laintiff only.” [Doc. No.
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116 at ¶ 2]. He further alleges that Runaway Bay racially profiled him on
December 29, 2016, when they accused him of trespassing in the apartment
complex’s clubhouse and called on the Mishawaka Police Department to
remove him.
These allegations that Runaway Bay intentionally discriminated against
Mr. Jones based on race by denying him maintenance services and limiting his
use of the clubhouse facility are sufficient to state a claim under § 3604(b). See
Mehta v. Beaconridge Improvement Ass'n, 432 F. App'x 614, 617 (7th Cir.
2011).

C. Section 3617
To state a § 3617 claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate: “that (1) she is a
protected individual under the FHA, (2) she was engaged in the exercise or
enjoyment of her fair housing rights, (3) the defendants coerced, threatened,
intimidated, or interfered with the plaintiff on account of her protected activity
under the FHA, and (4) the defendants were motivated by an intent to
discriminate.” Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 783 (7th Cir. 2009). The
amended complaint alleges that Runaway Bay “retaliated against [Mr. Jones
based on] race and religion for engaging in [the] protected activities [of] making
maintenance requests” when it sent him a letter on December 29, 2016,
notifying him that it was terminating the lease and demanding he vacate his
apartment. [Doc. No. 116 at ¶ 7]. While this allegation alone doesn’t properly
allege discriminatory intent, the court must read the complaint as a whole, see
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Engel v. Buchan, 710 F.3d 698, 709 (7th Cir. 2013), and the court can
reasonably infer discriminatory intent based on race from the other allegations
contained in the amended complaint as discussed earlier. Accordingly, the
amended complaint states a retaliation claim under § 3617 based on race
discrimination.

D. Claims of Religious Discrimination
Mr. Jones, who tells the court he is a Christian, includes references to
his religion and conclusory allegations of religious discrimination throughout
the amended complaint in an attempt to state a claim for religious
discrimination under the Fair Housing Act, but he doesn’t allege facts that
would

allow

anyone

to

reasonably

infer

Runaway

Bay

intentionally

discriminated against Mr. Jones based on his religion. For example, the
amended complaint alleges that Runaway Bay notified Mr. Jones that his
“lease was being terminated based off of racist allegations of assault formed by
discrimination against [his] race and religio[us] performance in his own home.”
[Doc. No. 116 at ¶ 6]. The amended complaint’s conclusory allegations of
religious discrimination are insufficient to state a claim under the Fair Housing
Act. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 694 F.3d 873, 886 (7th Cir. 2012)
(conclusory allegations alone can’t state a claim under Iqbal). Accordingly, to
the extent Mr. Jones seeks to state a claim for religious discrimination under
the FHA, those claims must be dismissed.

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III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN
PART Runaway Bay’s motion to dismiss [Doc. No. 113] as follows:
1. The court DENIES the motion insofar as it seeks to dismiss Mr.
Jones’s claims of discrimination based on race under §§ 3604(a),
3604(b), and 3617 of the Fair Housing Act.
2. The court GRANTS the motion insofar as it seeks to dismiss Mr.
Jones’s claims of discrimination based on religion under the Fair
Housing Act.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED:

December 11, 2017
/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr.
Judge, United States District Court

cc:

R. Jones

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