Taylor v. Superintendent
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER: The habeas corpus petition is GRANTED. The Respondent is ORDERED to file documentation by January 2, 2019, showing that the guilty finding in ISP 17-03-311 has been vacated and that any earned credit time or demotion in credit class that Taylor lost because of this guilty finding is restored. Signed by Judge Philip P Simon on 11/15/2018. (Copy mailed to pro se party) (tc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
MICHAEL TAYLOR,
Petitioner,
v.
CAUSE NO.: 3:17-CV-396-PPS-MGG
WARDEN,
Respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER
Michael Taylor, a pro se prisoner, is challenging the prison disciplinary hearing
where a Disciplinary Hearing Officer found him guilty of Possession of Unauthorized
Property Belonging to Another in violation of B-215 and docked him 30 days of earned
credit time. In his petition, Taylor raises a single ground for habeas relief: that the
hearing officer did not have sufficient evidence to find him guilty. Specifically, Taylor
says that there was no evidence that the television found in his possession was not his.
As a preliminary matter, Respondent argues that Taylor’s claim is procedurally
barred because he did not raise it during the underlying administrative appeal and thus
Taylor has not exhausted his administrative remedies. ECF 4 at 5. In doing so,
Respondent states that Taylor’s claim is that “if the DHO ‘would have ran the serial
number [of the TV] she would have clearly known it was mine.’” Id. But Taylor’s claim
is broader than whether or not the hearing officer should have run a serial number, and
in his administrative appeal he makes clear he is challenging a failure to support an
essential element of the offense: that he had possession of the property of another. ECF
4-8. As seen below, that is a sufficient basis by which to decide this case and
consequently I find Taylor has exhausted his administrative remedies.
In the context of a prison disciplinary hearing, “the relevant question is whether
there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the
disciplinary board.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985). “In reviewing a
decision for some evidence, courts are not required to conduct an examination of the
entire record, independently assess witness credibility, or weigh the evidence, but only
determine whether the prison disciplinary board’s decision to revoke good time credits
has some factual basis.” McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999)
(quotation marks omitted). As one might imagine, this is an exceedingly difficult
standard to meet. Here's how the Seventh Circuit once put it:
[T]he findings of a prison disciplinary board [need only] have the support
of some evidence in the record. This is a lenient standard, requiring no
more than a modicum of evidence. Even meager proof will suffice, so long
as the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the
disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary. Although
some evidence is not much, it still must point to the accused’s guilt. It is
not our province to assess the comparative weight of the evidence
underlying the disciplinary board’s decision.
Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks, citations,
parenthesis, and ellipsis omitted).
But, of course, “some” evidence is not the same as “no” evidence. So what does
the record reveal here? On March 21, 2017, Officer K. French wrote a Conduct Report:
On 3-21-17 at approx. 10:30 am I Officer French found a tv in offender
Taylor 894861 EE86 locker in recycling shop and the locker was secured
with a pad lock.
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ECF 4-1. The report also indicates, “Photo sent to DHB and screening, evidence in
shakedown.” Id. Taylor was then charged and ultimately found guilty of violating
IDOC offense B-215, which is defined as, “Unauthorized possession, destruction,
alteration, damage to, or theft of State property or property belonging to another.”
Adult Disciplinary Process, Appendix I. http://www.in.gov/idoc/files/02-04101_APPENDIX_I-OFFENSES_6-1-2015(1).pdf.; ECF 1-1 at 9.
A disciplinary hearing was held, and according to the Report of Disciplinary
Hearing, Taylor pleaded guilty to the offense. ECF 4-5. Typically, this would be the end
of the matter. Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 940 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that the court
“need look no further than one key piece of evidence: [his] confession.”). But I have
serious doubts about the validity of this purported guilty plea. To start, Taylor’s
comments at the hearing proclaim his innocence. ECF 4-5. He stated that “it was my
TV.” Id. There is simply no way to reconcile Taylor pleading guilty to B-215 while also
maintaining that the television was his. Additionally, the disciplinary hearing report
reveals that the hearing officer did not base her decision on his guilty plea. ECF 4-5.
Instead, she found Taylor guilty based on the staff reports and a photograph of the
television. Id. Because the hearing officer did not rely on Taylor’s purported guilty plea
as a basis for her decision, neither will I.
The conduct report is not sufficient evidence to find Taylor guilty of violating
offense B-215. It is certainly true that a conduct report alone can be enough to support a
finding of guilt. McPherson, 188 F.3d at 786. But it is not in this case. While the conduct
report indicates that Taylor was in possession of a television, it fails to specify that the
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television belonged to someone other than Taylor. This is critical because to convict
Taylor of B-215, it must be shown that the property belongs to “another.” At most, the
conduct report established that Taylor possessed a television. Because the conduct
report does not provide evidence that the television belonged to “another,” which is
required by the definition, it is insufficient to support a finding of guilt.
There was a photograph of the television admitted at the administrative hearing.
But it doesn’t tell us anything about who owned the television. The photograph of the
television reveals that there is no name tag or personal identifier on it. ECF 4-7. In other
words, it has no evidentiary value. What’s more, there was evidence to the contrary. At
the hearing, Taylor stated that it was his television but he simply “took [his] name off
it.” ECF 4-5. The hearing officer did not believe Taylor because she did not find any
credible evidence documenting that the TV belonged to him. ECF 4-6. It is unclear what
documentary evidence the hearing officer was looking for but, regardless, the absence
of evidence documenting that the television belonged to Taylor is not “some evidence”
that it belonged to someone else.
Upon review of the administrative record, there is simply no evidence in the file
to establish that the television belonged to anyone other than Taylor. For the “some
evidence” standard to have any meaning, the respondent has to point to something -anything -- to support the finding of guilt. They have failed to do so here. Because there
are no facts or evidence presented by the respondent that the television belonged to
“another,” the “some evidence” standard is not met. Thus, Taylor is entitled to habeas
corpus relief.
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Accordingly, the habeas corpus petition is GRANTED. The Respondent is
ORDERED to file documentation by January 2, 2019, showing that the guilty finding in
ISP 17-03-311 has been vacated and that any earned credit time or demotion in credit
class that Taylor lost because of this guilty finding is restored.
SO ORDERED on November 15, 2018.
/s/ Philip P. Simon
PHILIP P. SIMON, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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