Troutman v. Miami Correctional Facility et al

Filing 16

OPINION AND ORDER Accordingly: Plaintiff's motions to reconsider 11 , 15 are GRANTED in part. Plaintiff Troutman is GRANTED leave to proceed against Sandy Roark in her individual capacity for monetary damages for firing him in retaliation fo r filing administrative grievances, in violation of the First Amendment. Troutman's motions to reconsider 11 , 15 are DENIED in part, with respect to his retaliation claims against Kathy Griffin, Craig Grage, Sgt. Brenda Bowman, and Amy Clark. The Clerk of Court and the US Marshals Service are DIRECTED to issue and serve process on Sandy Roark with a copy of this order, the screening order 9 and the complaint 1 . Sandy Roark is ORDERED to respond only to the claim for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order. Signed by Judge Philip P Simon on 10/24/2017. (Copy mailed as directed in Order)(lpw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
MICHAEL TROUTMAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MIAMI CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,
et al.,
Defendants.

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Cause No. 3:17CV409-PPS/MGG

OPINION AND ORDER
Michael Troutman, a pro se prisoner, moves for reconsideration (ECF 11, 15) of the
screening order issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. ECF 9. Specifically, he argues that
his First Amendment retaliation claims against Defendants Griffin, Grage, Roark, Bowman,
and Clark should not have been dismissed. The facts underlying the complaint were fully
outlined in the prior order and will not be repeated here, except as relevant to the present
motion.
As outlined in the screening order, I must review a prisoner complaint and dismiss
it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b). To survive dismissal, a complaint must contain enough factual
matter to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of
Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

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pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 603. Thus, “a plaintiff must do better
than putting a few words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might
suggest that something has happened to her that might be redressed by the law.” Swanson
v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, I
must bear in mind that “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed[.]” Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
Troutman first asks that I reconsider the dismissal of his retaliation claims against
Defendants Griffin, Grage, and Roark. In his complaint, Troutman claims that Defendants
Griffin, Grage, and Hawk (the facility Superintendent and Assistant Superintendents)
colluded with Defendants Roark and Short (supervisors of the prison employment
program, PEN) to fire him from his prison job in retaliation for grievances he filed
regarding his access to Friday prayer service. While he was granted leave to proceed with
his claims against Defendants Hawk and Short, he was denied leave to proceed against
Defendants Griffin, Grage, and Roark because he had not made any factual allegation that
these defendants were aware of the retaliatory plan prior to its enactment. Rather, he
claimed that he complained to these defendants after he was terminated. In his present
motion, Troutman asks that I reconsider this ruling, pointing to specific sections in his
complaint, which he believes identifies a plausible retaliation claim:
Plaintiff upon information and belief strongly believes Hawk set off a series
of events on April 08, 2016 that resulted in a chain reaction, culminating in
Plaintiff’s termination from PEN. Upon further information and belief,
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Plaintiff believes that e-mails exist from Hawk to PEN’s Roark and Short on
or around April 08, 2016, ordering them to fire Plaintiff. Plaintiff also believes
that e-mails from exist (sic) from Roark and Short among themselves
discussing the particulars of the scheme to illegally terminate Plaintiff on or
around April 08, 2016. Plaintiff also believes that e-mails from exist (sic) from
Roark and Short responding back to Griffin, Hawk and Grage on or around
April 08, 2016.
ECF 5 at 26. Troutman’s complaint also alleges:
MCF, Griffin, Grage and Hawk colluded with PEN, Roark and Short to
terminate Plaintiff from his PEN job in retaliation for filing grievances and
complaints concerning the routine cancellation of his Friday Prayer, and the
total ban on his attending Friday Prayer implemented against him shortly
thereafter. MCF, Griffin, Grage, Hawk, PEN, Roark and Short knew the
termination would put the kibosh on Plaintiff’s goal of reaching minimum
wage. When Hawk’s response of April 08, 2016 to Plaintiff’s grievance to
resign his job and that she would make that happen, and the negative job
evaluation and reclassification a few hours later are viewed in isolation; they
appear to be procedurally correct. However, when viewed together, the
chronology of events presents a very colorable claim of textbook retaliation.
It is undeniable that a series of chain events took place on April 08, 2016.
Commencing with Hawk’s response to Plaintiff’s grievance earlier in the day
and culminating in his firing a few hours later the same day. Plaintiff also
notes that there is a systematic and long-standing pattern, practice and
custom dating back to the early 2000’s, long before Plaintiff’s arrival at MCF
and PEN using negative job evaluation to terminate Muslims when they
complained about being able to attend Friday Prayer.
ECF 5 at 30.
Troutman also filed new documentary evidence indicating that Roark was involved
in his termination. He filed a document from his employment record that contained the
following notation: “4/8/16 Info from S.R. + S. Hawk - offender very unhappy with
working and not attending religious services. Per discussion w/ S. Roark reclass to idle.
Offender can look for a job that will not conflict with religious services.” ECF 15-5. With

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this new evidence, Troutman has plausibly claimed that Roark was involved in his
termination, and he may now proceed with his retaliation claim against Roark.
Respectfully, however, I do not find anything in the complaint, or motion to
reconsider, that changes my conclusion regarding Troutman’s retaliation claim against
Griffin or Grage. Troutman’s allegation that he believes these defendants participated in
email communications “discussing the particulars of the scheme to illegally terminate
Plaintiff” is simply speculation; it is not plausible without additional factual allegations.
If Troutman later discovers evidence that lends credence to this claim, he may seek to
amend his complaint to add these parties.1 However, unlike Defendants Hawk, Short, and
now Roark, Troutman has not made a plausible claim that Defendants Griffin or Grage
(officials responsible for supervising operations within the prison) were personally
involved in his termination. Rather, his claims against Griffin and Grage rely entirely on
legal conclusions, not factual allegations. While legal conclusions can provide a complaint’s
framework, these conclusions must be accompanied by well-pleaded factual allegations in
order to move the claims from conceivable to plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680
(2009). “[C]ourts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotation and citation
omitted). Troutman’s allegations against Griffin and Grage do not satisfy this standard.
Thus, his request that I reconsider the dismissal of these defendants is denied.

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While Troutman must be mindful that his opportunity to add these defendants
to his complaint is subject to a two-year limitations period, this limitations period
does not expire until April 2018, at the earliest.

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Next, Troutman claims that I should not have dismissed his retaliation claims
against Grievance Specialist Bowman and Classification Supervisor Clark. He claims that
Defendants Bowman and Clark retaliated against him for filing administrative grievances.
Troutman argues that the following sections of his complaint sufficiently state a retaliation
claim against Defendants Bowman and Clark:
The same day [April 8, 2016], Plaintiff obtained a formal grievance from his
counselor and submitted it to Sgt. Bowman, MCF Grievance Specialist.
Plaintiff submitted a written inquiry to Bowman on May 10, 2016 and May
26, 2016 because Bowman had not responded to his formal grievance against
Hawk, nor issued him a receipt or informed him that an extension of time
had been granted. On May 26, 2016, Plaintiff also requested grievance appeal
forms from Bowman so he could move to the next step. Bowman never
responded concerning the missing formal grievance against defendant Hawk
... At all times relevant to this complaint, Sgt. Bowman has actively colluded
and conspired with defendant Hawk to protect MCF and Hawk, to conceal,
obstruct any meaningful investigation into Plaintiff’s allegations and coverup the retaliation against Plaintiff.
ECF 5 at 37-38.
Moreover, Sgt. Bowman has repeatedly revealed that she is overtly biased
and partial by stating that she is a correctional sergeant first. This means that
Bowman will do whatever she has to do to protect the MCF administration,
IDOC and PEN and render grievance decisions that further that protection.
Moreover, Bowman has knowingly and intentionally altered, destroyed and
falsified documents as part of the administrative cover-up.... Defendant
Bowman has actively conspired with MCF, IDOC, PEN and named
defendants to maintain the cover-up.
ECF 5 at 39.
On April 18, 2016 Plaintiff also wrote to defendant Amy Clark, MCF
Classification Supervisor and explained the foregoing to her and requested
a waiver to seek another job and further investigations. Plaintiff related to
Clark that Hawk had retaliated against him for filing grievances and
complaints concerning his Friday Prayer. Like the rest of MCF administration
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and the IDOC, Clark recklessly disregarded the material facts and refused to
recognize the causal link between defendant Sharon Hawk’s grievance
response of April 08, 2016 and Plaintiff’s termination later the same day.
Clark’s focus was solely on the outcome of the negative job evaluation. See
Plaintiff’s Documents at page(s) 80-81. At no point has PEN nor MCF
argued that Plaintiff did not perform his job adequately, or caused disruption
to production schedules or caused disruption to other workers. Nor did the
negative job evaluation or the reclassification indicate Plaintiff did not
perform his job adequately or caused disruption to production schedules or
caused disruption to other workers. Clark conspired with Hawk, Bowman,
Griffin, Grage, PEN, and Roark and Short to retaliate against Plaintiff and
remove him from his PEN prison job because he filed grievances. Clark also
did her part to maintain the cover-up by refusing to investigate. The
suspicious timing of Plaintiff’s firing should have been reason enough to
investigate Plaintiff’s claims of retaliation, racial and religious discrimination
further.
ECF 5 at 41 (emphasis in original).
In his allegations, Troutman does not identify any retaliatory action that would deter
an inmate of ordinary firmness from pursing his First Amendment right to file prison
grievances in the future. See West v. Grams, 607 Fed. Appx. 561, 565 (7th Cir. 2015). He
merely argues that defendants Bowman and Clark did not believe the claims in his
grievances, and as a consequence, they inadequately responded and investigated the
claims. It is not plausible that a prisoner of ordinary firmness would be deterred from filing
prison grievances because his grievances were not answered to his satisfaction;
undoubtedly, most grievants are not entirely satisfied by the responses to their complaints.
Based on what I have before me, no claim of unconstitutional retaliation is sufficiently pled
against Bowman or Clark.
ACCORDINGLY:

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(1) Plaintiff’s motions to reconsider (ECF 11, 15) are GRANTED in part.
(2) Plaintiff Troutman is GRANTED leave to proceed against Sandy Roark in her
individual capacity for monetary damages for firing him in retaliation for filing
administrative grievances, in violation of the First Amendment.
(3) Troutman’s motions to reconsider (ECF 11, 15) are DENIED in part, with respect
to his retaliation claims against Kathy Griffin, Craig Grage, Sgt. Brenda Bowman, and Amy
Clark.
(4) The Clerk of Court and the United States Marshals Service are DIRECTED to
issue and serve process on Sandy Roark with a copy of this order, the screening order (ECF
9) and the complaint (ECF 1) as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
(5) Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), Sandy Roark is ORDERED to respond only
to the claim for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening
order, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 10-1(b).
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: October 24, 2017.
/s/ Philip P. Simon
Judge
United States District Court

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