Pratt v. Indiana Dept Corrections et al
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER: DENIES 13 Motion for Entry of Default as to all Defendants; GRANTS DeParris Pratt leave to proceed against Deputy Wikins in his individual capacity for using excessive force by punching Mr. Pratt while he was handcuffed on Marc h 5, 2017; DISMISSES all other claims; DISMISSES all other Defendants; DIRECTS the clerk and the US Marshals Service to issue and serve process on Deputy Wikins at the St. Joseph County Jail as required by 28:1915(d); and ORDERS, pursuant to 42:1997 e(g)(2), that Deputy Wikins respond, as provided for in the Fed.R.Civ.P. and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claim for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order. Signed by Judge Robert L Miller, Jr on 12/18/2017. (cc: USMS)(lhc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
DePARRIS PRATT,
Plaintiff,
v.
JULIE LAWSON, et al.,
Defendants.
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CAUSE NO. 3:17-CV-436 RLM
OPINION AND ORDER
DeParris Pratt, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed an amended complaint
naming eleven defendants. “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed,
and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Nevertheless, the court must review prisoner complaints pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A.
Mr. Pratt was a pre-trial detainee housed at the St. Joseph County Jail.
Before his arrest, Mr. Pratt was in an automobile accident that caused “foot
drop” and impacted his ability to walk. According to Mr. Pratt, Warden Lawson
was made aware of this injury in October of 2016. In light of this disability, Mr.
Pratt believes that he should have been housed in a lower level housing unit.
But, “the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons . . ..” Rhodes v.
Chapman,
452
U.S.
337,
349
(1981).
Conditions
that
merely
cause
inconveniences and discomfort or make confinement unpleasant do not rise to
the level of Constitutional violations. Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d 105, 108-109
(7th Cir. 1971).
Conditions of confinement must be severe to support an Eighth
Amendment claim;1 “the prison officials’ act or omission must
result in the denial of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities.’” Farmer [v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)]
(quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). See also,
Lunsford v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1574, 1579 (7th Cir. 1994) (the
Eighth Amendment only protects prisoners from conditions that
“exceed contemporary bounds of decency of a mature, civilized
society.”); Jackson [v. Duckworth,] 955 F.2d [21,] 22 [(7th Cir.
1992)].
Morissette v. Peters, 45 F.3d 1119, 1123 (7th Cir. 1995) (parallel citations
omitted). Although residing on an upper floor might have been inconvenient or
unpleasant for Mr. Pratt, he hasn’t alleged facts demonstrating that it denied
him the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. He has also not alleged
that any doctor or other medical professional said he needed to be housed on
the lower level, and there are no other facts alleged from which it can be
plausibly inferred that Warden Lawson was deliberately indifferent to his
needs.
Several months after Warden Lawson was made aware of Mr. Pratt’s
disability, Mr. Pratt slipped in a puddle that formed outside his cell, fell, and
became unconscious. Mr. Pratt has sued four maintenance workers for failing
to place a sign in the area warning that the floor was wet, but this doesn’t state
1
Mr. Pratt was a pre-trial detainee when these events occurred. “Although the Eighth Amendment applies
only to convicted persons, pretrial detainees . . . are entitled to the same basic protections under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. Accordingly, [courts] apply the same legal standards to
deliberate indifference claims brought under either the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment.” Minix v.
Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 831 (7th Cir. 2010). See also Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., 828 F.3d 541, 554 n. 31 (7th
Cir. 2016) (clarifying that Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. __, __; 135 S.Ct. 2466 (2015) didn’t change the
applicability of the Eighth Amendment standard to pre-trial detainee deliberate indifference claims).
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a claim, either. He can’t recover on the basis of a mere slip and fall.“[S]lippery
surfaces and shower floors in prison, without more, cannot constitute a
hazardous condition of confinement.” Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 410-411
(7th Cir. 2014).
Mr. Pratt also sues Nurse Becky because she didn’t immediately call for
an ambulance upon learning that Mr. Pratt had fallen and was unconscious,
and he sues Nurse Nacy because, when he was unconscious, she improperly
administered smelling salts by covering his mouth and pouring something
down his nose. In medical cases, the Constitution is violated only when a
defendant was deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s serious medical needs.
Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997). For a medical
professional to be held liable for deliberate indifference to a serious medical
need, he or she must make a decision that represents “such a substantial
departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on
such a judgment.” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008). An
inmate who has received some form of treatment for a medical condition must
show that the treatment was “so blatantly inappropriate as to evidence
intentional mistreatment likely to seriously aggravate his condition.” Id. Mr.
Pratt received medical care from Nurse Nacy immediately after he fell, and
Nurse Becky called for an ambulance about an hour and a half after Mr. Pratt
fell. It cannot be plausibly inferred from the facts in the complaint that either
Nurse Becky or Nurse Nacy were indifferent to Mr. Pratt’s medical needs.
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After he was conscious, Nurse Becky allowed Mr. Pratt to be carried
down the stairs. Sgt. Omstead, Deputy Wikins, and Lt. Holveot participated in
the attempt to carry Mr. Pratt. After only a few steps, they dropped him. Mr.
Pratt sues Nurse Becky, Sgt. Omstead, Deputy Wikins, and Lt. Holveot for their
role in carrying and dropping him, but he hasn’t alleged facts that would show
that any of these individuals were deliberately indifferent to his needs.
“[C]onduct is deliberately indifferent when the official has acted in an
intentional or criminally reckless manner, i.e., the defendant must have known
that the plaintiff was at serious risk of being harmed and decided not to do
anything to prevent that harm from occurring even though he could have easily
done so.” Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (quotation
marks, brackets, and citation omitted). Mere negligence “does not violate the
Constitution, and it is not enough that he or she should have known of a risk.”
Pierson v. Hartley, 391 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
Deliberate indifference requires a showing that the defendant “actually knew of
a substantial risk of serious harm and consciously disregarded it nonetheless.”
Id. It isn’t enough to show that a defendant merely failed to act reasonably.
Gibbs v. Franklin, 49 F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1995). Even incompetence
doesn’t state a claim of deliberate indifference. Walker v. Peters, 233 F.3d 494
(7th Cir. 2000). At most, Mr. Pratt has alleged incompetence, and his
allegations against Nurse Becky, Sgt. Omstead, Deputy Wikins, and Lt. Holveot
for their role in carrying and dropping him don’t state a claim.
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Mr. Pratt also alleges that, at some point during the encounter, Lt.
Holveot and Deputy Wikins made racist remarks toward him. It would be hard
to envision a permissible reason for making racist remarks when dealing with
an inmate with a medical issue, but mere verbal harassment doesn’t state a
claim under the federal Constitution. See DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 612
(7th Cir. 2000) (rude language or verbal harassment by prison staff “while
unprofessional and deplorable, does not violate the Constitution.”).
Mr. Pratt also alleges that Deputy Wikins punched him in the chest with
a closed fist while he was handcuffed and unable to talk or move. Prison
guards can’t use excessive force against pre-trial detainees for the purpose of
punishment. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. __, __; 135 S.Ct. 2466
(2015) (holding that “a pretrial detainee must show only that the force
purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.”).
Taking Mr. Pratt’s allegations as true and giving him the inferences to which he
is entitled at this stage of the proceedings, he has alleged a plausible excessive
force claim against Deputy Wikins.
Once at the hospital, Mr. Pratt was diagnosed with a concussion and
given muscle relaxants and pain medication, but Mr. Pratt didn’t get those
medications upon his return to the jail. He doesn’t say which defendant is
responsible for him not receiving his medications, or how long the medications
were withheld. He lists several medications that he is taking now, but it isn’t
clear if those are the same medications that were withheld when he returned to
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the jail. This allegation is too vague to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
He also sues unidentified members of the St. Joseph County Jail Staff.
This type of unnamed defendant must be dismissed because “it is pointless to
include lists of anonymous defendants in federal court; this type of placeholder
does not open the door to relation back under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, nor can it
otherwise help the plaintiff.” Wudtke v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir.
1997) (citations omitted).
Lastly, Mr. Pratt filed a motion seeking entry of default against the
defendants because they haven’t filed an answer. Under 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(g)(2), the defendants didn’t have to file an answer until ordered to do so
after the court has screened the case as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because no defendant has been served with Mr. Pratt’s complaint, no
defendant is in default and the motion for entry of default must be denied.
For these reasons, the court:
(1) DENIES the Motion for Entry of Default (ECF 13);
(2) GRANTS DeParris Pratt leave to proceed against Deputy Wikins
in his individual capacity for using excessive force by punching Mr. Pratt
while he was handcuffed on March 5, 2017;
(3) DISMISSES all other claims;
(4) DISMISSES Warden Julie Lawson, Nurse Becky, Nurse Nacy,
Sgt. Omstead, Lt. Holveot, Maintenance Worker Erine, Maintenance
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Worker Joe, Maintenance Worker Mark, Maintenance Worker Alfonso,
and the St. Joseph County Jail Staff;
(5) DIRECTS the clerk and the United States Marshals Service to
issue and serve process on Deputy Wikins with a copy of this order and
the amended complaint (ECF 6) at the St. Joseph County Jail as required
by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); and
(6) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that Deputy
Wikins respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claim for which the plaintiff has
been granted leave to proceed in this screening order.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: December 18, 2017
/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr.
Judge
United States District Court
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