Scruggs v. Miller et al

Filing 10

OPINION AND ORDER re 2 Pro Se Complaint GRANTING Pla leave to proceed on a claim against Sgt Miller and Sgt SinClair in their individual capacities as outlined in this Opinion and Order; GRANTING Pla leave to proceed against CO Washington and CO Pe terson in their individual capacities as outlined in this Opinion and Order; GRANTING Pla leave to proceed against Capt Earheart, Director Salery, Superintendent Seiver and Assistant Superintendent Payne in their individual capacities as outlined in this Opinion and Order; John Doe is DISMISSED as a Dft; any and all other claims contained in the Complaint are DISMISSED. The Clerk and the USMS are DIRECTED to issue and serve process on Sgt Miller, Sgt SinClair, CO Washington, CO Peterson, Capt Ea rheart, Director Salery, Superintendent Seiver, and Assistant Superintendent Payne at the Indiana Department of Correction with a copy of this Opinion and Order and the Complaint pursuant to 28 USC § 1915(d). Dfts are ORDERED to respond as outlined. Signed by Judge Philip P Simon on 3/19/2018. (Copy mailed as directed in Order) (lns)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER L. SCRUGGS,
Plaintiff,
v.
SGT. MILLER, et al.,
Defendants.

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CAUSE NO. 3:17-CV-467-PPS-MGG

OPINION AND ORDER
Christopher L. Scruggs, a pro se prisoner, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against nine officials at the Westville Correctional Facility (Westville). Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review a complaint filed by a prisoner and dismiss it if
the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b). The Court must bear in mind, however, that “[a] document
filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully
pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
Here, Scruggs alleges that on November 4, 2016, he observed Sgt. Miller handling
food in an unsanitary manner. Scruggs told Lt. Creasy, Capt. Earheart, and Director
Salery about Sgt. Miller’s actions, but nothing was done. Scruggs then began telling
visitors, filing grievances, and even went on a hunger strike to protest Sgt. Miller’s
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handling of food.
On November 14, 2016, Scruggs was taken into a hallway where Sgt. Miller and
Sgt. SinClair were waiting for him. When Scruggs entered the hallway, Sgt. Miller and
Sgt. SinClair told him that he “would learn to keep his mouth closed.” ECF 2 at 3. Miller
and SinClair then proceeded to attack Scruggs. During this time, C.O. Washington, C.O.
Peterson and an unidentified officer were present, watched the events unfold and did
nothing to stop the attack. Then, at the direction of Capt. Earheart, Complex Director
Salery, Superintendent Seiver, and Assistant Superintendent Payne, Scruggs was placed
into a filthy cell and denied his personal effects, in retaliation for him speaking about
Sgt. Miller’s actions. Scruggs sues Sgt. Miller, Sgt. SinClair, C.O. Washington, C.O.
Peterson, Capt. Earheart, Director Salery, Superintendent Seiver, Assistant
Superintendent Payne, and the unidentified officer for money damages.
To start, Scruggs sues Sgt. Miller and Sgt. SinClair for using excessive force when
they attacked him on November 14, 2016. Scruggs alleges that these officers assaulted
him simply because they were upset that he complained about Sgt. Miller’s handling of
food ten days earlier. The “core requirement” for an excessive force claim is that the
defendant “used force not in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, but
maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hendrickson v. Cooper, 589 F.3d 887, 890 (7th
Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). Several factors guide the inquiry of whether an
officer’s use of force was legitimate or malicious, including the need for an application
of force, the amount of force used, and the extent of the injury suffered by the prisoner.
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Id.
Here, giving Scruggs the inferences to which he is entitled at this stage, he alleges
a plausible claim that these defendants used force maliciously and sadistically to cause
him harm. Thus, Scruggs has alleged enough to proceed on this claim against Sgt. Miller
and Sgt. SinClair.
Next, Scruggs sues C.O. Washington C.O. Peterson and an unidentified officer
for failing to intervene in the sergeants’ use of excessive force. “Police officers who have
a realistic opportunity to step forward and prevent a fellow officer from violating a
plaintiff’s right through the use of excessive force but fail to do so” may be held liable.
Miller v. Smith, 220 F.3d 491, 495 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285
(7th Cir.1994). This is what has become known as a “failure to intervene” basis for a
constitutional violation under the Eighth Amendment, a principle that this circuit has
long recognized. Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 496, 505-506 (7th Cir. 2004); Crowder v. Lash,
687 F.2d 996, 1005 (7th Cir. 1982).
Giving Scruggs the inferences to which he is entitled at this stage, he alleges a
plausible claim that C.O. Washington and C.O. Peterson knew that the other officers
were engaging in excessive force, had an opportunity to prevent them from using more
force than was necessary under the circumstances, and nevertheless failed to intervene.
Although further factual development may show that these defendants acted
reasonably under the circumstances, or did not have a realistic opportunity to intervene,
Mr. Scruggs has alleged enough to proceed on this claim against C.O. Washington and
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C.O. Peterson. However, the unidentified officer must be dismissed because “it is
pointless to include lists of anonymous defendants in federal court; this type of
placeholder does not open the door to relation back under FED. R. CIV. P . 15, nor can it
otherwise help the plaintiff.” Wudtke v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 1997)
(citations omitted). If at some point in the future Scruggs can identify and name or
identify this defendant by some other means, then he can attempt to amend his
complaint at that time.
Finally, Scruggs sues Capt. Earheart, Director Salery, Superintendent Seiver and
Assistant Superintendent Payne, for ordering him to be placed into a filthy cell and
denied his personal effects in retaliation for him speaking about Sgt. Miller’s handling
of food.“To prevail on his First Amendment retaliation claim, [Scruggs] must show that
(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a
deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the
First Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in the Defendants’ decision to
take the retaliatory action.” Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012) (quotation
marks and citations omitted).
Here, Scruggs’s complaints about food safety conditions at the prison, if true,
could constitute protected speech. Based on the allegations contained in the complaint,
these defendants made the decision to place him in a filthy cell and deprive him of his
personal effects based on his protected speech. Though further fact finding may reveal
otherwise, Scruggs has adequately plead his retaliation claim.
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ACCORDINGLY:
(1) Scruggs is GRANTED leave to proceed on a claim against Sgt. Miller and Sgt.
SinClair in their individual capacities for compensatory and punitive damages for using
excessive force against him on November 14, 2016, under the Eighth Amendment;
(2) Scruggs is GRANTED leave to proceed against C.O. Washington and C.O.
Peterson in their individual capacities for monetary damages for failing to intervene in
Sgt. Miller and Sgt. SinClair’s use of excessive force on November 14, 2016, under the
Eighth Amendment;
(3) Scruggs is GRANTED leave to proceed against Capt. Earheart, Director
Salery, Superintendent Seiver and Assistant Superintendent Payne in their individual
capacities for compensatory and punitive damages for retaliating against him by having
him placed in an unsanitary cell and depriving him of his personal effects for his
complaining about the food safety conditions of the jail, in violation of the First
Amendment;
(4) John Doe is DISMISSED as a defendant;
(5) any and all other claims contained in the complaint are DISMISSED;
(6) the Clerk and the United States Marshals Service are DIRECTED to issue and
serve process on Sgt. Miller, Sgt. SinClair, C.O. Washington, C.O. Peterson, Capt.
Earheart, Director Salery, Superintendent Seiver, Assistant Superintendent Payne at the
Indiana Department of Correction with a copy of this order and the complaint (ECF 2),
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); and
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(7) Sgt. Miller, Sgt. SinClair, C.O. Washington, C.O. Peterson, Capt. Earheart,
Director Salery, Superintendent Seiver, Assistant Superintendent Payne are ORDERED
to respond, as provided for in the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE and N.D. IND.
L.R. 10.1, only to the claims for which the pro se plaintiff has been granted leave to
proceed in this screening order.
SO ORDERED on March 19, 2018.
_/s Philip P. Simon_____
JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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