Anderson v. Indiana Department of Correction et al

Filing 11

OPINION AND ORDER: The complaint is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A re 2 Pro Se Complaint. Signed by Judge Philip P Simon on 6/26/2017. ***Civil Case Terminated(Copy mailed to pro se party)(nae)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
NATHAN ANDERSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
INDIANA STATE PRISON, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Cause No. 3:17-CV-491

OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Nathan Anderson, a pro se prisoner, filed a complaint against six
defendants alleging they delayed providing him with medical treatment on June 10,
2013, while he was incarcerated at the Indiana State Prison. (DE 6.) Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A, I must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the
action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. However,
“[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
According to the complaint, on June 10, 2013, Anderson started bleeding
internally and urinating dark red blood. (DE 2 at 2.) He sought medical attention at that
time, but was not provided with any until Dr. Thompson arranged for Anderson to be
1

taken to St. Anthony Hospital the next day, on June 11, 2013. (Id. at 2-3.) Anderson
alleges the delay in treating his internal bleeding caused him injuries and likely was
attempting to allege violation of his Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care
pursuant to Section 1983. (See id. at 2-4.)
Unfortunately, it is too late for Anderson to assert such a claim. He signed his
complaint on May 31, 2017, nearly four years after his claim arose. (Id. at 5.) Although
the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, dismissal is appropriate where the
complaint makes clear that the claims are time barred. Cancer Found., Inc. v. Cerberus
Cap. Mgmt., LP, 559 F.3d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 2009). Indiana’s two-year limitations period
applies to section 1983 claims. Behavioral Inst., LLC v. Hobart Common Council, 406 F.3d
926, 929 (7th Cir. 2005). Therefore, Anderson’s federal claims are untimely.
Although it is usually necessary “to give pro se litigants one opportunity to
amend after dismissing a complaint[,] . . . that’s unnecessary where, as here, it is certain
from the face of the complaint that any amendment would be futile or otherwise
unwarranted.” Carpenter v. PNC Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 633 F. App’x. 346, 348 (7th Cir. 2016)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Luevano v. Wal-Mart, 722 F.3d
1014 (7th Cir. 2013) and Hukic v. Aurora Loan Servs., 588 F.3d 420, 432 (7th Cir. 2009)
(“[C]ourts have broad discretion to deny leave to amend where . . . the amendment
would be futile[.]”). Here, Anderson brought his federal claims nearly two years after
the statute of limitations expired, and no amendment could cure that defect.
Accordingly, the complaint is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,
2

SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: June 26, 2017.
s/ Philip P. Simon
JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

3