Pittman v. Superintendent

Filing 11

OPINION AND ORDER The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case. Signed by Judge Jon E DeGuilio on 6/4/18. (Copy mailed to pro se party)(ksp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
RAYMOND HAROLD PITTMAN,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CAUSE NO. 3:17-CV-592-JD-MGG

OPINION AND ORDER
Raymond Harold Pittman, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed an amended habeas
corpus petition challenging a disciplinary hearing (ISO 17-05-26) where a Disciplinary
Hearing Officer (DHO) found him guilty of attempting to engage in an unauthorized
financial transaction in violation of Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC) Policies
B-220 and B-240 on May 17, 2017.1 ECF 4 at 1. As a result, he was sanctioned with the
loss of 45 days earned credit time and the imposition of a suspended sanction—the loss
of 30 days earned credit time—from disciplinary case ISO 17-02-18. ECF 4 at 1, ECF 9-5
at 1. The Respondent has filed the administrative record. Pittman has not filed a
traverse and the time to do so has passed. Thus this case is fully briefed.
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees prisoners certain procedural due
process rights in prison disciplinary hearings: (1) advance written notice of the charges;

1

Pittman was initially charged with attempting to conspire to traffic in violation of Indiana Department of
Correction Policies A-111 and A-113. ECF 9-1 at 1. However, at the disciplinary hearing, the DHO changed the
charge to attempting to engage in an unauthorized financial transaction. ECF 9-5 at 1.

(2) an opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision-maker; (3) an opportunity to
call witnesses and present documentary evidence in defense, when consistent with
institutional safety and correctional goals; and (4) a written statement by the fact-finder
of evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974). To satisfy due process, there must also be “some evidence” in the
record to support the guilty finding. Superintendent, Mass Corr Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445,
455 (1985).
As a threshold matter, the DHO had sufficient evidence to find Pittman guilty of
attempting to engage in an unauthorized financial transaction. In the context of a
prison disciplinary hearing, “the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in
the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.”
Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985). “In reviewing a decision for some
evidence, courts are not required to conduct an examination of the entire record,
independently assess witness credibility, or weigh the evidence, but only determine
whether the prison disciplinary board’s decision to revoke good time credits has some
factual basis.” McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks
omitted).
[T]he findings of a prison disciplinary board [need only] have the support
of some evidence in the record. This is a lenient standard, requiring no
more than a modicum of evidence. Even meager proof will suffice, so long
as the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the
disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary. Although
some evidence is not much, it still must point to the accused’s guilt. It is

2

not our province to assess the comparative weight of the evidence
underlying the disciplinary board’s decision.
Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks, citations,
parenthesis, and ellipsis omitted).
Here, Pittman was found guilty of violating IDOC offenses B-220 and B-240, for
attempting to engage in an unauthorized financial transaction. IDOC offense B-220,
prohibits inmates from “[e]ngaging in or possessing materials used for unauthorized
financial transactions. This includes, but is not limited to, the use or possession of
identifying information of credit cards, debit cards, or any other card used to complete a
financial transaction.” Indiana Department of Correction, Adult Disciplinary Process:
Appendix I. http://www.in.gov/idoc/files/02-04-101_APPENDIX_I-OFFENSES_
6-1-2015(1).pdf. IDOC offense B-240 prohibits inmates from “[a]ttempting to commit
any Class B offense; aiding, commanding, inducing, counseling, procuring or
conspiring with another person to commit any Class B offense.” Id.
The Conduct Report charged Pittman as follows:
On 5-5-2017, at approximately 8:30 a.m., while I was searching through
the offender’s out going mail, I came across an envelope that was
addressed from, offender Raymond Pittman, 100689, to a Shelly
Hernandez. Inside the envelope was a letter to Shelly, asking her to put a
sum of money on a 10 digit “My Cash” or “Pay-Pal” money card and then
she is to send him the 10 digits disguised as Joey’s phone number.
ECF 9-1 at 1.
In assessing the evidence, the DHO determined there was sufficient evidence in
the record to find Pittman guilty of violating offenses B-220 and B-240. A conduct
3

report alone can be enough to support a finding of guilt. McPherson, 188 F.3d at 786.
Such is the case here. Here, the reporting officer stated in the conduct report that
Pittman wrote a letter to a woman named Shelly and asked her to “put a sum of money
on a 10 digit ‘My Cash’ or ‘Pay-Pal’ money card and then she is to send him the 10
digits disguised as Joey’s phone number.” ECF 9-1 at 1. The conduct report clearly
documented Pittman’s attempt to engaged in an unauthorized financial transaction
because he asked Shelly to place money on an unauthorized 10-digit money card and
disguise it as a phone number so that prison officials would not know about the
transaction. Id. The court has reviewed Pittman’s letter and notes that the letter itself
supports the underlying facts of the charge as described in the conduct report. ECF 9-2
at 2-5. Therefore, there was “some evidence” for the DHO to find Pittman guilty of
attempting to engage in an unauthorized financial transaction.
Nevertheless, Pittman argues there were a number of violations of the prison’s
internal rules or IDOC policies, which entitle him to habeas corpus relief. ECF 4 at 2-3.
Specifically, Pittman asserts that the reporting officer did not timely complete the
conduct report, the reporting officer’s immediate supervisor did not timely sign the
conduct report, and the hearing continuance the DHO granted was not properly
recorded. Id. However, habeas corpus relief can only be granted for “violation[s] of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Failure to
follow policy is not a constitutional violation. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991)
(“state-law violations provide no basis for federal habeas relief”) and Keller v. Donahue,
4

271 F. App’x 531, 532 (7th Cir. 2008) (inmate’s claim that prison did not follow internal
policies had “no bearing on his right to due process”). Therefore, Pittman’s claims
regarding violations of prison rules or IDOC policy can not be remedied in a habeas
corpus petition.
Furthermore, Pittman asserts that his due process rights were violated because
he was not notified of the charge prior to his disciplinary hearing. ECF 4 at 3. Prisoners
are entitled to advance notice of the basis of the charges against them. Wolff, 418 U.S. at
563-64. This requirement is satisfied so long as the underlying basis of the charge was
adequate to give the prisoner notice of the allegations against him. Northern v. Hanks,
326 F.3d 909, 910 (7th Cir. 2003). This requirement was met. On May 12, 2017, five days
before the hearing, Pittman was notified of the attempting to conspire to traffic charge
when he signed both the conduct report and screening report. ECF 9-1 at 1, ECF 9-3 at
1. Although the DHO changed the charge to attempting to engage in an unauthorized
financial transaction at the disciplinary hearing, the new charge was supported by the
underlying facts in the conduct report. ECF 9-3 at 1. Because the facts contained in the
detailed conduct report gave Pittman all of the information he needed to defend against
a charge of attempting to engage in an unauthorized financial transaction, his due
process rights were not violated. Hanks, 326 F.3d at 911. Therefore, Pittman is not
entitled to habeas corpus relief on this ground either.
If Pittman wants to appeal this order, he does not need a certificate of
appealability because he is challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding. See Evans v.
5

Circuit Court, 569 F.3d 665, 666 (7th Cir. 2009). However, he may not proceed in forma
pauperis on appeal because pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) an appeal in this case
could not be taken in good faith.
For these reasons, Raymond Harold Pittman’s petition for writ of habeas corpus
is DENIED. The clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.
SO ORDERED on June 4, 2018
/s/ JON E. DEGUILIO
JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

6