Clark v. IDOC et al

Filing 55

OPINION AND ORDER: The Court GRANTS 39 Motion for Summary Judgment in relation to Mr. Clark's request for injunctive relief that MCF recognize his religion and assign him to a single-person cell. The Court DENIES the Motion for Summary Judgm ent in relation to Mr. Clark's request for injunctive relief that MCF allow him to keep in his cell an eighteen-volume Srimad Bhagavatam, allow him to build an altar in his cell, allow him to be present when his cell is searched so as to ensure that his altar is not profaned, and serve him only uncooked vegetarian meals without eggs, garlic, or onions. The parties are further ORDERED to appear for a telephonic status conference to discuss setting a trial date and other matters. A date and time for that hearing will be set by separate order. Signed by Judge Philip P Simon on 03/09/2020. (Copy mailed to pro se party) (jat)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
JUSTIN S. CLARK,
Plaintiff,
v.

CAUSE NO. 3:17-CV-626-PPS-MGG

INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTION COMMISSIONER,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Justin Clark is incarcerated at the Miami Correctional Facility (“MCF”).
In this lawsuit—he’s representing himself—he alleges that the Defendant, Indiana
Department of Correction (“IDOC”), is unduly burdening the practice of his
Vaishnavite Hindu religion in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (“RLUIPA” or “the Act”). He is requesting that MCF recognize his religion;
allow him to keep an eighteen-volume Srimad Bhagavatam in his cell; serve him only
uncooked vegetarian meals without eggs, garlic, or onions; allow him to build an altar
in his cell; assign him to a single-person cell; and allow him to be present when his cell
is searched so as to ensure that his altar is not profaned. (ECF 1.) Defendant filed a
motion for summary judgment (ECF 39) on all of Mr. Clark’s claims, which I now grant
in part and deny in part.

Discussion
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying”
the evidence that “demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Substantive law determines which facts
are material; that is, which facts might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “A party
asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by
. . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or “showing that the materials
cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse
party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must view all facts in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The court will
not “make credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, or decide which inferences to
draw from the facts; these are jobs for a factfinder.” Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770
(7th Cir. 2003). Summary judgment is not a substitute for a trial on the merits or a
vehicle for resolving factual disputes. Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920
(7th Cir. 1994). Instead, the court’s sole task in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment is “to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material

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dispute of fact that requires a trial.” Payne, 337 F.3d at 770. If a reasonable factfinder
could find in favor of the nonmoving party, summary judgment may not be granted. Id.
As noted above, Mr. Clark is seeking injunctive relief under RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc et seq. Among other things, the Act protects prisoners from the government
imposing significant burdens upon their exercise of religion unless such imposition is
the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. Here’s the
language of the Act:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious
exercise of a person . . . confined to an institution . . . even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government
demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person-(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).
“The term ‘religious exercise’ includes any exercise of religion, whether or not
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A), but
“a prisoner’s request for an accommodation must be sincerely based on a religious
belief and not some other motivation.” Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S.Ct. 853, 862 (2015). While I
defer to day-to-day judgments of prison officials, “RLUIPA does not permit the
unquestioning deference required to accept the Department’s assessment.” Holt, 135
S.Ct. at 858.
In reviewing Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, I am tasked with
determining if there are any genuine issues of material fact regarding: 1) the sincerity of
Mr. Clark’s religious beliefs; 2) whether MCF is substantially burdening his religious
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exercise; 3)whether the burdens are imposed to further a compelling governmental
interest; and 4) whether the imposed burdens are the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest. If there are no genuine issues of
material fact, I then go on to decide whether the defendant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
In this lawsuit, Mr. Clark is seeking an injunction with six parts: that MCF be
ordered to: 1) recognize his religion; 2) assign him to a single-person cell; 3) allow him
to keep in his cell an eighteen-volume Srimad Bhagavatam; 4) allow him to build an
altar in his cell; 5) allow him to be present when his cell is searched so as to ensure that
his altar is not profaned; and 6) serve him only uncooked vegetarian meals without
eggs, garlic, or onions.
I will take up each of these issues in turn below, but in summary, Mr. Clark has
not produced any evidence on the first two issues, so summary judgment will be
granted on those claims. But genuine issues of material fact prevent the entry of
summary judgment on the remainder of his requests for injunctive relief.
I’ll start with the claim that Mr. Clark wants MCF to officially recognize his
religion in brochures. In particular, he wants his Vaishnavite Hindu religion to be listed
in the prison literature as one of the religions practiced by inmates at MCF. Yet, Mr.
Clark has failed to show that such omission places a substantial burden on him. In other
words, it is unclear how such an omission “seriously violates [his] religious beliefs.”
Holt, 135 S.Ct. at 862 (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2757
(2014)). Without such evidence it’s difficult to conceive how an omission of Vaishnavite
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Hindu religion from the prison’s literature substantially burdens Mr. Clark’s religious
practices. Therefore, I will grant summary judgment for Defendant on this issue.
Mr. Clark asks next that he be assigned a one-person cell. The problem with this
request is that he has presented no evidence telling me why such an arrangement is
needed for his religious exercise. That is, he hasn’t pointed to any evidence that
establishes that having a cellmate substantially burdens his exercise of religion and,
without crossing this threshold, Mr. Clark cannot prevail on his RLUIPA claim. A
single-occupancy cell may be more enjoyable and peaceful and might have other
benefits; but nothing in the briefs or the accompanying materials suggests that having a
cellmate significantly burdens Mr. Clark’s exercise of religion. Furthermore, MCF does
not have one-person cells. (ECF 39-1, ¶ 23.) Defendant submits that housing Mr. Clark
by himself is impossible due lack of prison space; in addition, such arrangement would
cause other inmates to complain of discrimination. (Id. at ¶25–26.) Therefore, I will enter
summary judgment in Defendant’s favor on this issue.
I’ll move now to the issues where questions of fact remain. For starters, except
for Mr. Clark’s desire for a specific diet, Defendant concedes that Mr. Clark’s religious
beliefs are sincere, or at the very least there are questions of fact about the sincerity of
his beliefs that he must possess the Srimad Bhagavatam in his cell, erect an altar and be
present during searches. (See ECF 52 at 2.) See also Howard v. United States, 864 F. Supp.
1019, 1024 (D. Colo. 1994) (“The determination of whether an individual is sincere in his
beliefs is a factual one.”); Shaheed-Muhammad v. Dipaolo, 393 F. Supp. 2d 80, 90 (D. Mass.

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2005) (“I question any court’s ability to determine the sincerity of a plaintiff’s beliefs on
a cold record.”).
Furthermore, there’s no dispute that MCF’s policies are substantially burdening
Mr. Clark’s religious exercise in these areas. Likewise, there’s no disagreement that
Defendant’s policies at issue are aimed at furthering compelling governmental interests:
Mr. Clark readily acknowledges that he is “at a high risk prison and a high risk
[himself]” (ECF 51 at 6) and agrees that Defendant has legitimate concerns as to how his
proposed religious exercise may affect the safety and security at the prison.
Therefore, as to the remaining matters in question, Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment boils down to whether there are genuine issues of material fact as
to whether the substantial burdens placed upon Mr. Clark’s religious exercise are the
least restrictive means of furthering the safety and security at the prison. The focus is
not on whether the Defendant is using the least restrictive means in furthering a
broadly formulated interest. Instead, RLUIPA “contemplates a more focused inquiry
and requires the Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest test is
satisfied through application of the challenged law to the person––the particular
claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.” Holt, 135 S.
Ct. at 863 (quotation marks and citations omitted). Defendant bears the burden of
showing that it is employing the least restrictive means to achieve its legitimate
governmental goals. Id.
Concerning the eighteen volumes of the Srimad Bhagavatam, MCF prohibits
inmates from having more than ten books in their cells at a time or any hardbound
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books. Defendant claims this policy aims to reduce the potential places for hiding
contraband, including weapons. Furthermore, it says hardbound books may be used as
weapons. Defendant is particularly concerned with Mr. Clark having eighteen
hardbound volumes of Srimad Bhagavatam because of his disciplinary issues at the
prison. Defendant points out that, from February 2017 through February 2019, Mr.
Clark has been disciplined by prison officials twice for possession of a deadly weapon;
twice for battering another offender; once for possession of a controlled substance; and
once for fleeing or physically resisting staff. (See ECF 39 at 1–2.)
Defendant’s concerns are legitimate and, as noted above, uncontested. However,
Defendant fails to explain how the prohibition against the number and the types of
books in Mr. Clark’s case is the least restrictive means for achieving prison safety and
security. For example, Defendant does not explain why it settled on the maximum of
ten books as opposed to eleven, or twelve, or even eighteen. Moreover, Defendant
ignores Mr. Clark’s claim that the IDOC’s overall policy allows up to twenty books per
prisoner, and, assuming that’s true, it does not explain why eight fewer books are
allowed at MCF. Furthermore, MCF’s policy does not differentiate between ten books at
100 pages each and ten books at 500 pages each, thus undermining some of the
premises for the policy to begin with.
In addition, Mr. Clark has agreed to remove the hard covers from the Srimad
Bhagavatam volumes to allay concerns about the books being used as weapons. (ECF 51
at 4.) Defendant nevertheless claims that Mr. Clark is determined to keep the hard
covers on the books (ECF 52 at 3). Such inconsistencies cannot be resolved at this
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juncture of the proceedings. In short, there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether prohibiting possession of Srimad Bhagavatam is the least restrictive means of
addressing the prison’s legitimate security concerns.
I’ll next address Mr. Clark’s request that he be allowed to maintain an altar in his
cell. According to Defendant, prisoners may have altars in their cells but the altars may
not contain items outside of MCF’s approved list. (ECF 39-1, ¶ 28.) In addition, any altar
is subject to being searched by the prison employees with or without the offender being
present. (Id., ¶¶30 ,32.)
Mr. Clark wants to erect an altar in his cell which would include non-stone and
non-metal sculptures of his deities and various vessels, as well as pictures of persons
central to his religion. Although Defendant acknowledges repeatedly that Mr. Clark is
seeking non-stone and non-metal sculptures for his altar, it curiously continues to dwell
on MCF’s prohibition against “stone or glass figurines” as “related to legitimate safety
and security concerns.” (ECF 52 at 7 (emphasis added).) Defendant has not explained
how MCF’s prohibition against Mr. Clark erecting an altar according to his design is the
least restrictive means employed by the prison to ensure the safety and security at the
prison. Summary judgment must therefore be denied on this issue.
With the motion for summary judgment being denied on this issue, it’s too early
to discuss the scope of the searches the prison officials can carry out with respect to the
altar until the factfinder has resolved whether Mr. Clark may have the altar in the first
place. Therefore, the search issue will be decided later, if still applicable.

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Lastly, I will address the dietary requests Mr. Clark has sought. Mr. Clark wants
to be served only uncooked vegetarian meals without eggs, garlic, or onions. In its reply
brief, Defendant insists that “[Mr.] Clark concedes that he does not intend to stick to his
requested diet” (ECF 52 at 6) and cites generally to Mr. Clark’s response brief in
support. Defendant then declares that Mr. Clark “acknowledges that he regularly
orders and eats commissary items that are not vegetarian in nature and certainly
contain eggs, garlic and onions.” (Id.) For this more focused proposition Defendant
refers me to pages 1–2 of Mr. Clark’s response brief. Yet, neither the two cited pages nor
any other portion of his brief betray any sense that Mr. Clark’s desire for uncooked
vegetarian diet is an obvious sham. Rather, he readily confesses that he has, in the past,
“ordered food which contradicts [his] religious preference for uncooked vegetarian
meals without eggs, onions, and garlic” (ECF 51 at 2) and confesses to be a “sinner” in
that regard (Id. at 3). But apart from occasional lapses, there’s no indication that Mr.
Clark regularly eats prohibited foods.
It is true that “[e]vidence of nonobservance is relevant on the question of
sincerity.” Reed v. Faulkner, 842 F.2d 960, 963 (7th Cir. 1988). However, it remains
fundamentally a factual question that I cannot answer at summary judgment. Id. In
sum, whether Mr. Clark uses his religion more as a weapon than as a sincere devotion
will need to be decided at a trial.
Finally, Defendant has failed to show that MCF’s refusal to accommodate him
has a legitimate purpose or that such refusal is the least restrictive means to achieve that

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purpose. Accordingly, I will deny Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on this
issue.
Conclusion
The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment in relation to
Mr. Clark’s request for injunctive relief that MCF:
•

recognize his religion; and

•

assign him to a single-person cell.
The Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for summary judgment in relation to Mr.

Clark’s request for injunctive relief that MCF:
•

allow him to keep in his cell an eighteen-volume Srimad Bhagavatam;

•

allow him to build an altar in his cell;

•

allow him to be present when his cell is searched so as to ensure that his altar is
not profaned; and

•

serve him only uncooked vegetarian meals without eggs, garlic, or onions.
The parties are further ORDERED to appear for a telephonic status conference to

discuss setting a trial date and other matters. A date and time for that hearing will be
set by separate order.
SO ORDERED on March 9, 2020.
s/ Philip P Simon
PHILIP P. SIMON, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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