Davis v. Sevier et al

Filing 10

OPINION AND ORDER: Court GRANTS 9 Motion for Reconsideration; VACATES 7 , 8 the opinion and order dismissing the case and the entry of judgment; DIRECTS the clerk to reopen this case; GRANTS Sonny Davis leave to proceed against Zhenay Newhouse , Crystal Cleary, Taylor Wall, and Warden Mark Sevier as outlined; DISMISSES John Schrader, Dave Leonard, and T Cambe; DISMISSES all other claims; DIRECTS the clerk and the USMS to issue and serve process on Warden Mark Sevier, Zhenay Newhouse, Cry stal Cleary, and Taylor Wall at the Indiana Department of Correction with a copy of this order and the 5 amended complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); and ORDERS Warden Mark Sevier, Zhenay Newhouse, Crystal Cleary, and Taylor Wall to respond only to the claims for which Sonny Davis has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order. Signed by Judge Philip P Simon on 3/26/2018. (Copy mailed to pro se party) (tc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
SONNY DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARK SEVIER, et al.,
Defendants.

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CAUSE NO. 3:17-CV-703 PPS

OPINION AND ORDER
Sonny Davis, a prisoner without a lawyer, has filed a motion to reconsider the
screening order dismissing this case because the complaint did not state a claim.
Considering the timing and the substance of the motion, I construe it as a motion to alter
or amend judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). See Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 493
(7th Cir. 2008). “A court may grant a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment if
the movant presents newly discovered evidence that was not available at the time of trial
or if the movant points to evidence in the record that clearly establishes a manifest error
of law or fact.” Matter of Prince, 85 F.3d 314 (7th Cir. 1996); Deutsch v. Burlington N. R.R. Co.,
983 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1993).
In the complaint, Davis alleged a First Amendment claim of interference with access
to the courts. He alleged that the petition for a writ of mandamus was correct on the merits
and denied only because he requested the wrong remedy. He further alleged that this
would not have happened if the defendants had allowed him more time for legal research.
Interference with access to the courts claims require the plaintiff to identify a potentially

meritorious claim. Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2006). Davis attached to his
complaint his petition for a writ of mandamus to the Indiana Supreme Court. In the
screening order, I construed the mandamus petition as a challenge the trial court’s
discretionary rulings, which are not appropriate grounds for mandamus relief under
Indiana law. See Belork v. Latimer, 54 N.E.3d 388, 395 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). I dismissed the
complaint on the basis that it did not state a claim.
Davis now argues that the petition for a writ of mandamus challenged the trial
court’s jurisdiction pursuant to Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure, which allows litigants to
request a special judge if the trial court does not rule on a post-conviction petition within
ninety days after taking it under advisement. Ind. R. Trial P. 53.1; 53.2. This procedure
requires the Chief Administrative Officer of the Indiana Office of Judicial Administration
to determine whether the ninety-day requirement is satisfied. Id. Further, the Indiana
Supreme Court has held that “[a]n original action is the appropriate procedure for
enforcing Trial Rule 53.1 when a court clerk erroneously fails to recognize that a ruling on
a motion has been delayed and the case should be withdrawn after the filing of a praecipe.”
State ex rel. Crain Heating Air Conditioning & Refrigeration, Inc. v. Clark Circuit Court, 921
N.E.2d 1281, 1284 (Ind. 2010).
Upon further review of the petition for a writ of mandamus, I find that the
complaint sufficiently alleges a potentially meritorious claim. Though the petition could
have been more focused, it refers to the applicable State court rules, complains of the
untimeliness of the trial court, and ultimately requests the appointment of a special judge.

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Moreover, based on the complaint, which includes the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision,
the petition was denied because Davis did not request an appropriate remedy. It is thus
plausible to infer that Davis might have requested the appropriate remedy (by challenging
the Chief Administrative Officer’s delay determination) if he had been allowed additional
time to conduct legal research.
Because I find that the complaint sufficiently alleges a potentially meritorious claim,
I will continue screening the complaint. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, I must review the
complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. “In order to state a
claim under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 a plaintiff must allege: (1) that defendants deprived him of
a federal constitutional right; and (2) that the defendants acted under color of state law.”
Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006).
Inmates have a First Amendment right of access to the courts, but there is no
“abstract free-standing right” to a law library for research or copying papers. Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). In other words, “the mere denial of access to a prison law
library or to other legal materials is not itself a violation of a prisoner’s rights; his right is
to access the courts,” and only if the defendants’ conduct prejudices a potentially
meritorious legal claim has the right been infringed. Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 968
(7th Cir. 2006). Thus, to state a claim, Davis must detail the connection between the denial
of access to legal materials and the resulting prejudice to a potentially meritorious legal
claim. Id.

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Davis alleges that Zhenay Newhouse, Crystal Cleary, and Taylor Wall, each law
library supervisors, refused to provide him with legal research materials, which prejudiced
his petition for a writ of mandamus by preventing him from conducting the necessary
research. He alleges that the law library computers were down from March 2017 to
November 2017, which also prevented him from conducting legal research, and that
Warden Sevier was notified of the downtime and Davis’ related grievances. According to
the complaint, the petition for a writ of mandamus was submitted on April 2, 2017, and
denied on May 5, 2017. It is thus plausible to infer that the computer downtime prejudiced
Davis by preventing him from conducting legal research. Therefore, the complaint states
a claim against Warden Sevier, Zhenay Newhouse, Crystal Cleary, and Taylor Wall.
Davis further alleges that T. Combe refused to provide his grievance appeals and
lied about the law library in response to another inmate’s grievance. These allegations are
vague and do not imply prejudice to Davis’ petition. Additionally, the complaint contains
no allegations against Dave Leonard. Finally, Davis alleges that he needed ten copies of the
court record according to the State court rules and that several defendants, including John
Schrader, denied him these copies. However, the Indiana Supreme Court’s order denying
the petition for a writ of mandamus expressly overlooked its procedural deficiencies,
indicating that the lack of copies did not prejudice Davis’s effort to obtain a writ. Therefore,
the complaint does not state a claim against these defendants.
Accordingly:
(1) the motion for reconsideration (ECF 9) is GRANTED;

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(2) the opinion and order dismissing this case and the entry of judgment (ECF 7, 8)
are VACATED;
(3) the clerk is DIRECTED to reopen this case;
(4) Sonny Davis is GRANTED leave to proceed on a claim against Zhenay
Newhouse, Crystal Cleary, and Taylor Wall for interfering with his right of access to the
courts in violation of the First Amendment by refusing to provide him with sufficient legal
research materials;
(5) Sonny Davis is GRANTED leave to proceed on a claim against Warden Mark
Sevier for interfering with his right of access to the courts in violation of the First
Amendment by refusing to address the lack of working computers in the law library;
(6) John Schrader, Dave Leonard, and T. Cambe are DISMISSED;
(7) all other claims are DISMISSED;
(8) the clerk and the United States Marshals Service are DIRECTED to issue and
serve process on Warden Mark Sevier, Zhenay Newhouse, Crystal Cleary, and Taylor Wall
at the Indiana Department of Correction with a copy of this order and the amended
complaint (ECF 5) as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); and
(9) Warden Mark Sevier, Zhenay Newhouse, Crystal Cleary, and Taylor Wall are
ORDERED, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), to respond, as provided by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10.1, only to the claims for which Sonny Davis
has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order.
SO ORDERED on March 26, 2018.

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/s/ Philip P. Simon
JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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