Deck v. Griffin et al

Filing 31

OPINION AND ORDER: The Court GRANTS Rick Allen Deck leave to proceed against Officer Mosley in his individual capacity on an Eighth Amendment claim that Officer Mosley was deliberately indifferent to Deck's safety when he failed to intervene in an inmate altercation that occurred on December 29, 2016; DISMISSES all other claims; DISMISSES Governor Holcomb, Commissioner Carter, and Indiana Department of Correction; DIRECTS the clerk and the USMS, to issue and serve process on Officer M osley at the IDOC with a copy of this order and the complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); and (5) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that Officer Mosley respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claims for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order. Signed by Judge Philip P Simon on 10/10/2018. (Copy mailed as directed in Order) (lhc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
RICK ALLEN DECK,
Plaintiff,
v.

CAUSE NO.: 3:17-CV-716-PPS-MGG

INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Rick Allen Deck, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed an amended complaint
against Governor Eric Holcomb, Commissioner Robert Carter, Officer Brandon Mosley,
and the Indiana Department of Correction. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, I must review
the complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim,
or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a), (b). Courts apply the same standard under Section 1915A as when
addressing a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v.
Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006).
To survive dismissal, a complaint must state a claim for relief that is plausible on
its face. Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. at 603. Thus, a “plaintiff must do better than putting a few words on paper that, in

the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has happened to her
that might be redressed by the law.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th
Cir.2010) (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, “[a] document filed pro se is to be
liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
The amended complaint alleges essentially the same facts as his initial complaint.
On December 29, 2016, while Deck was housed at Miami Correctional Facility, he was
attacked by six inmates and suffered serious injuries. Deck alleges that Officer Mosley
watched, but he did not call a signal to stop the attack or otherwise help him. When an
inmate is attacked by another inmate, the Constitution is violated only if “deliberate
indifference by prison officials effectively condones the attack by allowing it to
happen.” Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630, 640 (7th Cir. 1996). And, “A prison guard, acting
alone, is not required to take the unreasonable risk of attempting to break up a fight
between two inmates when the circumstances make it clear that such action would put
her in significant jeopardy.” Shields v. Dart, 664 F.3d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 2011)(quoting
Guzman v. Sheahan, 495 F.3d 852, 858 (7th Cir. 2007) and Peate v. McCann, 294 F.3d 879,
883 (7th Cir. 2002)). Officer Mosley had no obligation to physically intervene in the
attack, but it can plausibly be inferred from the complaint that Officer Mosley took no
action whatsoever. Therefore, taking the inferences in the light most favorable to Deck,
he has stated a claim for failure to intervene.

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Additionally, the amended complaint names the Indiana Department of
Correction as a defendant, but the IDOC is a State agency and is immune from suit
pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir.
2001). There are three exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity: (1) suits directly
against the State based on a cause of action where Congress has abrogated the state’s
immunity from suit; (2) suits directly against the State if the State waived its sovereign
immunity; and (3) suits against a State official seeking prospective equitable relief for
ongoing violations of federal law. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Ill. Commerce
Comm’n, 183 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 1999). These exceptions do not apply here, so I
cannot permit Deck to pursue his claim against the IDOC.
The amended complaint also adds Governor Holcomb and Commissioner
Carter, but Deck does not allege that either Governor Holcomb or Commissioner Carter
were personally involved in the incident. Rather, Deck believes that, as supervisors,
they should be liable too. However, there is no general respondeat superior liability under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, and neither Governor Holcomb nor Commissioner Carter can be held
liable simply because the oversee operations at the prison or supervises other
correctional officers. See Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2009). Therefore, I
must dismiss Governor Holcomb and Commissioner Carter.

For these reasons, the court:

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(1) GRANTS Rick Allen Deck leave to proceed against Officer Mosley in his
individual capacity on an Eighth Amendment claim that Officer Mosley was
deliberately indifferent to Deck’s safety when he failed to intervene in an inmate
altercation that occurred on December 29, 2016;
(2) DISMISSES all other claims;
(3) DISMISSES Governor Holcomb, Commissioner Carter, and Indiana
Department of Correction;
(4) DIRECTS the clerk and the United States Marshals Service, to issue and serve
process on Officer Mosley at the Indiana Department of Correction with a copy of this
order and the complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); and
(5) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that Officer Mosley respond,
as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only
to the claims for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening
order.
SO ORDERED on October 10, 2018.
/s/ Philip P. Simon
PHILIP P. SIMON, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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