Kuykendoll v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 28

OPINION AND ORDER: The court AFFIRMS the Commissioner's decision. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly. Signed by Judge Robert L Miller, Jr on 3/28/19. (dk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
BRYAN K. KUYKENDOLL,
PLAINTIFF
VS.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
DEFENDANT

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CAUSE NO. 3:17-CV-766 RLM-MGG

OPINION AND ORDER
Bryan K. Kuykendoll seeks judicial review of a final decision by the
Commissioner of Social Security denying his applications for disability insurance
benefits and supplemental security income under Title II of the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 423 and 1382 et seq. The court has jurisdiction over this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). For the reasons that follow, court denies Mr.
Kuykendoll’s request to reverse the Administrative Law Judge’s decision or
remand this action for further proceedings, and affirms the ALJ’s denial of
benefits.

I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Kuykendoll alleged that his disability began on March 1, 2011. Mr.
Kuykendoll’s

2014

applications

for

disability

insurance

benefits

and

supplemental security income were denied in February 2017. Before this case,
Mr. Kuykendoll had filed applications for disability insurance benefits and

supplemental security income in 2003, 2010, 2012, and 2013. These
applications were denied and Mr. Kuykendoll didn’t appeal those decisions.
At the 2017 hearing on these applications, the ALJ concluded that Mr.
Kuykendoll had numerous severe and non-severe impairments. The severe
impairments were degenerative disk disease; left shoulder/rotator cuff status
post-arthroscopic surgery and rotator cuff repair; anxiety; and depression. The
non-severe impairments were mild sleep apnea; Hepatitis C; benign prostatic
hypertrophy (“BPH/enlarged prostate”); chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
(“COPD”), asthma, and bronchitis; carpal tunnel-like syndrome; left hip pain; a
mild heart murmur; and podiatry issues. The ALJ concluded that Mr.
Kuykendoll’s impairments weren’t severe enough, either singularly or in
combination, to meet or medically equal any of the impairments listed in 20
C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1. The ALJ considered listings 1.02A (major
dysfunction of a joint), 1.04 (disorders of the spine), and 12.06 (anxiety-related
disorders) in his decision.
The ALJ determined that Mr. Kuykendoll was mildly restricted in his daily
living. He could perform fine and gross shoulder movements and had a normal
gait and station, but couldn’t engage in sustained lifting, reaching, pushing,
kneeling, or crouching. The ALJ also determined that Mr. Kuykendoll was mildly
restricted in his social functioning and that his impairments created moderate
difficulties with concentration, persistence, and pace. Mr. Kuykendoll lived with
his mother. He attended church occasionally and saw friends irregularly. He
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struggled with group interaction but appeared to fare well in one-on-one
scenarios. He could cooperate with others, follow directions, and foster romantic
relationships. He handled his own medical care and that of his mother, although
he sometimes struggled to recall detailed medical history. Mental health
providers at Oaklawn Psychiatric Center determined that his attention and
concentration were within the normal limits.
The ALJ found that Mr. Kuykendoll had the residual functional capacity
to perform unskilled, light exertional work with a number of limitations. These
included limitations on lifting, carrying, pushing, reaching, climbing, and
kneeling. The ALJ further found that Mr. Kuykendoll was capable of work
involving interaction with superiors and the general public and that he could
also perform other work that existed in significant numbers in the national
economy.
The ALJ concluded that Mr. Kuykendoll wasn’t disabled within the
meaning of the Social Security Act and so wasn’t entitled to disability benefits.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue before the court isn’t whether Mr. Kuykendoll is disabled, but
whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision that he wasn’t
disabled. Scott v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 2011); Nelms v. Astrue,
553 F.3d 1093, 1097 (7th Cir. 2009). Substantial evidence means “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
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conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Jones v. Astrue,
623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 2010). In reviewing the ALJ’s decision, the court
can’t reweigh the evidence, make independent findings of fact, decide credibility,
or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner, Simila v. Astrue,
573 F.3d 503, 513 (7th Cir. 2009); Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 434–435 (7th
Cir. 2000), but instead must conduct “a critical review of the evidence,
considering both the evidence that supports, as well as the evidence that detracts
from, the Commissioner’s decision.” Briscoe v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th
Cir. 2005). While the ALJ isn’t required “to address every piece of evidence or
testimony presented, he must provide a ‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and
the conclusions so that [the court] can assess the validity of the agency’s ultimate
findings and afford the claimant meaningful judicial review.” Jones v. Astrue,
623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 2010). ALJs must “sufficiently articulate their
assessment of the evidence to assure [the court] that they considered the
important evidence and to enable [the court] to trace the path of their reasoning.”
Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations
omitted).

III. DISCUSSION
Mr. Kuykendoll believes the ALJ made several errors requiring remand: 1)
that the ALJ erred in not including all relevant limitations in his Residual
Functional Capacity determination; 2) that the ALJ erred in not giving a treating
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physician’s opinion controlling weight; and 3) that the ALJ’s erred in improperly
overemphasizing Mr. Kuykendoll’s ability to complete daily activities. Mr.
Kuykendoll asks the court to either reverse the Commissioner’s decision and
award benefits or remand the case for further proceedings.

A. The Inclusion of All Relevant Limitations
Mr. Kuykendoll says the ALJ didn’t properly include all his relevant
limitations in the determination of his residual functional capacity.

The ALJ

must include all relevant evidence in the residual functional capacity
determination. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). The Commissioner responds that the
limitations were properly considered.
Mr. Kuykendoll argues that the ALJ didn’t consider his pulmonary
ailments and his tendonitis. An ALJ must consider all medical evidence on the
record, even non-severe evidence. Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809 (7th Cir. 2015).
The ALJ considered both limitations. The ALJ didn’t directly mention Mr.
Kuykendoll’s pulmonary ailments, the ALJ did cite his proper use of his C-pap
machine (used for COPD and sleep apnea) and ability for home exercise. The ALJ
didn’t specifically mention Mr. Kuykendoll’s use of a walking cane, but
determined that he could exercise, complete household tasks, shop at stores,
and that he had a normal gait. The ALJ directly considered those conditions in
deciding that Mr. Kuykendoll could engage in unskilled work.
Mr. Kuykendoll also says the ALJ ignored certain concentration,
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persistence, and pace limitations. An ALJ must consider such limitations. Craft
v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 676 (7th Cir. 2008); SSR 96-8p (the ALJ “must consider
limitations and restrictions imposed by all of an individual’s impairments, even
those that are not ‘severe.’”). Much of Mr. Kuykendoll’s argument essentially
attempts to relitigate the ALJ findings, characterizing the various limitations as
more severe than the ALJ determined. This court isn’t in a position to reweigh
such evidence. Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 513 (7th Cir. 2009); Powers v.
Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 434–35 (7th Cir. 2000). The ALJ considered Mr.
Kuykendoll’s concentration, persistence, and pace limitations in detail. The ALJ
considered psychiatric assessments as well as an extensive review of Mr.
Kuykendoll’s ability to complete daily activities.
Mr. Kuykendoll argues that these findings don’t support a proper
concentration, persistence, and pace determination under the standard set forth
in Yurt v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 850 (7th Cir. 2014); see also DeCamp v. Berryhill,
2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 5587 (7th Cir. 2019); Paul v. Berryhill, 2019 U.S. App.
LEXIS 4608, __ Fed. Appx. __, 2019 WL 643261 (7th Cir. 2019); Winsted v.
Berryhill, 915 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 2019). Yurt and its progeny involved a lack of
discussion on a plaintiffs’ concentration, persistence, and pace. In these cases,
the ALJs disregarded specific testimony and documentary evidence on the
plaintiffs’ concentration, persistence, and pace limitations. These cases also
centered on a discussion of the inadequacy of various hypotheticals the ALJs
used in their RFC determinations because the hypotheticals lacked a proper
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logical connection to the plaintiffs’ concentration, persistence, and pace.
The ALJ discussed Mr. Kuykendoll’s concentration, persistence, and pace
thoroughly and there is no indication that the ALJ engaged in inadequate
hypotheticals. The vocational expert determined that Mr. Kuykendoll could
complete unskilled work that required “little or no judgment.” 20 C.F.R.
404.1568(a); 416.968(a). The record shows that the ALJ’s conclusion was absent
of attenuated hypotheticals and grounded in the thorough analysis of plaintiff’s
concentration, persistence, and pace.
It was further asserted during oral argument that Yurt stood for the
proposition that a finding of a severe impairment must mean that a plaintiff was
severely limited in concentration, persistence, and pace. The court understands
the standard differently. An impairment’s severity acts as a requirement for
further analysis – any impairment found not be slight or “not severe” results in
a claim denial. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If an impairment is deemed
severe, it is first evaluated to determine whether, on medical evidence alone, the
impairment precludes any work function. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1.
If not, the impairment is evaluated based on the limitation it sets on plaintiff’s
ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). This determination considers
a wide variety of factors including age, education, work history, and social
interaction. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). The ALJ’s determination that
Mr. Kuykendoll had a number of severe impairments does not necessarily mean
that he must also find that Mr. Kuykendoll had severe limitations.
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B. Dr. Platt’s Medical Opinion
Mr. Kuykendoll alleges that the ALJ didn’t give appropriate weight to the
medical opinion of his treating physician, Dr. Platt. If a treating physician’s
opinion is “well-supported” and “not inconsistent” with other evidence on the
record it should be afforded controlling weight. Puzio v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 704,
710 (7th Cir. 2011). If a treating physician’s opinion is to be discounted, the ALJ
must describe the reasons for the discount. Martinez v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 693,
698 (7th Cir. 2011).
The ALJ considered Dr. Platt’s medical opinion as it pertained to Mr.
Kuykendoll, devoting three full paragraphs to Dr. Platt’s diagnoses of depression
and anxiety. This analysis also included a consideration of Mr. Kuykendoll’s
improvement in those conditions. Other physicians in the record reported the
improved conditions. The ALJ thought much of Dr. Platt’s opinion on Mr.
Kuykendoll’s ability to perform work was speculative. The ALJ discussed this
and concluded such speculated conclusions were worth little weight, finding that
Dr. Platt’s determinations of depression and anxiety weren’t supported by
evidence in the record while the determination that Mr. Kuykendoll’s ability to
follow simple tasks was supported by evidence An ALJ is “not required to rely
entirely on a particular physician’s opinion” if the opinion is inconsistent with
the evidence in the record. Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 845 (7th Cir. 2007);
Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 306 at n.6 (7th Cir. 1995).
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C. Overemphasizing Mr. Kuykendoll’s Abilities
Mr. Kuykendoll alleges that the ALJ improperly overemphasized his ability
to complete daily tasks in its analysis of his residual functional capacity. As
stated before, this court is limited in what it can review. Skarbek v. Barnhart,
390 F.3d 500, 505 (7th Cir. 2004) (determinations made by the ALJ cannot be
overturned unless “patently wrong.”). For Mr. Kuykendoll’s claim to be correct,
the ALJ must have given his daily activity abilities so much weight as to render
his residual functional capacity “patently wrong” in light of the evidence. Skarbek
v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d at 505.
Looking towards “daily activity” ability to the exclusion of other factors is
improper. Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 674 (7th Cir. 2012); Beardsley v.
Colvin, 758 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 2014). Had the ALJ looked exclusively at Mr.
Kuykendoll’s daily activity ability when determining his residual functional
capacity, remand would be required. But the ALJ focused on a number of factors
in its RFC determination: Mr. Kuykendoll’s mental and physical impairments,
medications that help with the impairments, surgeries, daily activities, and
ability to perform work functions. The ALJ came to the RFC determination by
considering all of these factors and didn’t overemphasize one to the exclusion of
others.

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IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the court AFFIRMS the Commissioner's decision. The
Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED:

March 28, 2019

/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr.
Judge, United States District Court

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