Smith et al v. Nexus RVs, LLC et al

Filing 28

OPINION AND ORDER The Court GRANTS IN PART Defendants' 18 motion to compel as to the RV inspection. The Court ORDERS Plaintiffs to make the RV available for an inspection by Defendants expert at a date mutually acceptable to all parties and u nder the terms set forth in Defendants' DE[21-9] Amended Notice. Additionally, the Court ORDERS Defendants to create a video recording of the entire inspection and to serve it on Plaintiffs along with the experts report.The Court also DENIES IN PART Defendants' motion to compel as to an award of reasonable expenses under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael G Gotsch, Sr on 5/14/19. (kjp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
LINDA SMITH, and
KEN SMITH,

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Plaintiffs,
v.
NEXUS RVS, LLC., and
ALLY FINANCIAL, INC.,
Defendants.

CASE NO. 3:17-CV-00815-PPS-MGG

OPINION AND ORDER
On October 19, 2018, Defendants filed a Motion to Compel Private Expert
Inspection Under FRCP 34(a)(2). On November 2, 2018, Plaintiffs timely filed their
response in opposition. Defendants’ motion became ripe on November 9, 2018, when
they filed their reply brief. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants
Defendants’ motion to compel.
I.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND
This case arises from numerous defects in a recreational vehicle purchased by

Plaintiffs and manufactured by Defendant, Nexus RVs, LLC. As part of discovery,
Plaintiffs’ expert witness inspected the RV on September 6, 2018. The written report
from that inspection was provided to Defendants on October 5, 2018. However,
Defendants neither received notice of, or other express invitation to, this initial
inspection nor did they request to be present at Plaintiffs’ expert’s inspection. Now,
Defendants want their expert witness to conduct a private inspection of the RV.

Plaintiffs do not object to allowing Defendants’ expert to inspect the RV, but do object to
a private inspection and would like their counsel to attend.
In support, Plaintiffs’ counsel explains that inspections outside the presence of
counsel in some of his past cases have resulted in destructive testing of the RV at issue.
Additionally, Plaintiffs’ counsel alleges that the parties’ law firms have established and
observed an agreed inspection protocol for nearly four years. Plaintiffs’ counsel argues
that the protocol allows for plaintiffs to conduct a private inspection of the RV followed
by a discussion among counsel to find a mutually agreeable date for defendants’
inspection. Plaintiffs’ counsel also suggests that the protocol could accommodate
opposing counsel’s attendance at either inspection upon request.
In early October 2018, the parties’ attorneys engaged in email exchanges,
telephone calls, and in-person conversations attempting to schedule the RV inspection
at issue. In one of these communications, Plaintiffs’ counsel dismissed a proposed
inspection date because he would not available to attend. Defendants’ counsel then
informed Plaintiffs’ counsel that he was “not invited to the inspection.” [DE 21-13 at 4].
Shortly thereafter on October 12, 2018, Defendants served their Notice for
inspection of the RV on October 25, 2018 1. The Notice said nothing about who could or
could not attend the inspection. During a subsequent telephonic conference to finalize
the inspection details, counsel still disagreed as to whether Plaintiffs’ counsel would be
attending the inspection. On October 16, 2018, the day after this telephonic conference,
This date would presumably have left Defendants sufficient time to serve their expert witness report on
Plaintiffs on or before the Court’s original expert witness deadline of November 5, 2018. [See DE 15 at 4].
1

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Defendants served an Amended Notice of Inspection on Plaintiffs, in which they
explicitly noticed an inspection of the RV to occur on October 25, 2018, “outside the
presence of Plaintiffs and their representatives.” [DE 21-9 at 1].
Upon receipt of the Amended Notice, Plaintiffs’ counsel persisted in his position
that the Defendants’ inspection would not be private, but still agreed that the RV would
be available for inspection on October 25, 2018. Several emails were exchanged in which
the parties unsuccessfully attempted to resolve the question of a private inspection.
Plaintiffs’ counsel remained steadfast in his view that Defendants have no right to a
private inspection, while Defendants’ counsel insisted that they have a right to a private
inspection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3)–(4), and 34(a)(2).
Plaintiffs served Defendants with a Written Objection to Defendants’ Amended
Notice of Inspection on October 19, 2019. After further communications that failed to
resolve the matter, Defendants filed the instant motion to compel pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 34(a)(2). 2 The parties agree that Rule 34 permits Defendants to inspect the RV.
However, the parties still disagree about whether Defendants are entitled to perform an
inspection of the RV outside the presence of Plaintiffs’ counsel.
II.

ANALYSIS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 allows a party to request, “entry onto

designated land or other property possessed or controlled by the responding party, so

The Court acknowledges that the parties apparently did at one time agree to allow Plaintiffs, but not
Plaintiffs’ counsel, to attend Defendants’ expert’s inspection. Defendants appear to have withdrawn their
agreement to this compromise when they filed their motion to compel. Therefore, the Court need not
consider that option in resolving the instant motion to compel.
2

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that the requesting party may inspect, measure, survey, photograph, test, or sample the
property or any designated object or operation on it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(2). Should a
party “fail[] to respond that inspection will be permitted—or fail[] to permit
inspection—as requested under Rule 34,” the aggrieved party may “move for an order
compelling disclosure or discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1); (a)(3)(B)(iv).
When addressing motions to compel, the court has broad discretion and may
deny discovery to protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
undue burden or expense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); see also Sattar v. Motorola, Inc., 138 F.3d
1164, 1171 (7th Cir. 1998); Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 495-96 (7th Cir. 1996).
“[A] district court should independently determine the proper course of discovery
based upon the arguments of the parties.” Gile, 95 F.3d at 496. The burden “rests upon
the objecting party to show why a particular discovery request is improper.” Kodish v.
Oakbrook Terrace Fire Prot. Dist., 235 F.R.D. 447, 449–50 (N.D. Ill. 2006). The objecting
party must show with specificity that the request is improper. Graham v. Casey's Gen.
Stores, 206 F.R.D. 251, 254 (S.D. Ind. 2002). Thus, Plaintiffs bear the burden here to show
with specificity why Defendants’ request for a private inspection of the RV is improper.
Defendants’ operative Amended Notice of Inspection states:
Defendants, by counsel, and pursuant to Trial Rule 34 requests [sic] the
private inspection of Plaintiffs’ 2018 Nexus Phantom on October 25, 2018
beginning at approximetly [sic] 2:00 pm. at the home of Plaintiffs at 600
Maple Crest Lane Watertown, WI 53094.
Defendant’s Expert, Paul Pierce, will be required to test drive the unit off
premise and drive the unit to a nearby weigh station, along with a full
inspection of the vehicle. The test drive will take palce [sic] under normal
driving conditionas [sic] and Plaintiffs will be reimbursed for mileage
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using stndard [sic] reimbursement rates, upon submission to counsel for
Defendant. Since the inspection will be non-destructive, Defednant [sic]
will conduct the inspection outside the presence of Plaintiffs and their
representatives.
[DE 19-7 at 3]. Arguing that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 establishes a right for a
private inspection, Defendants filed the instant motion asking the Court to enter an
Order compelling a private expert inspection as specified in the operative Notice.
Defendants also ask the Court to award their reasonable expenses, including attorney
fees, associated with the instant motion citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A).
A.

Right to Private Inspection

“Trial preparation materials are protected from disclosure by Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(3) and Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).” Shoemaker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 154
F.R.D. 235, 236 (W.D. Mo. 1994).
Rule 26(b)(3)(A) disallows discovery of documents and tangible things
“prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its
representative (including the other party’s attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor,
insurer, or agent).” The Rule only allows the discovery of such information “if they are
otherwise discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1) 3; and the party shows that it has substantial
need for the materials to prepare its case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain
their substantial equivalent by other means.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(i)–(ii). Even if

3 Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that
is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to
relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and
whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”

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discovery of documents and tangible things prepared in anticipation of litigation is
allowed under these exceptions, the court “must protect against disclosure of mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party’s attorney or other
representative concerning the litigation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(B). In other words,
Rule 26(b)(3)(A) and (B) distinguish discoverable non-privileged facts underlying a
party’s documents and tangible things created in anticipation of litigation from the
mental processes, impressions, conclusions, opinions, legal theories of an attorney or
representative such as a retained expert, which are never discoverable. See Valley Forge
Ins. Co., 2017 WL 1361308, at *9 (citing Vardon Golf Co. v. Karsten Mfg. Corp., 213 F.R.D.
528, 534 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (citing Hickman, 329 U.S. at 513C)).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B) then defines the work product protections established
in Rules 26(b)(3)(A) and (B) further by explicitly noting the “protect[ion of] drafts of any
report or disclosure required under Rule 26(a)(2) 4, regardless of the form in which the
draft is recorded.”
Plaintiffs argue that Rule 26(b)(4) only applies to documents and tangible things
prepared in anticipation of litigation. [See DE 21 at 18 (citing Rackemann v. LISNR, Inc.,
No. 117CV00624MJDTWP, 2018 WL 3328140, at *3 (S.D. Ind. July 6, 2018); Valley Forge
Ins. Co. v. Hartford Iron & Metal, Inc., No. 114CV00006RLMSLC, 2017 WL 1361308, at *9
(N.D. Ind. Apr. 14, 2017)]. Applying this principle, Plaintiffs contend such protection
does not extend to the mere observation of an expert’s inspection of a tangible thing

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Rule 26(a)(2) establishes procedures for disclosure of expert testimony.

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because the inspection is not a draft of the expert’s report. Defendants, on the other
hand, rely upon Cottrell v. Dewalt Indus. Tool Co., No. 09 cv 5306, 2009 WL 5213876, at
*2–*3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 29, 2009) in support of their argument that a right to private
inspection exists under Rule 26(b)(4)(B) to protect the mental impressions of the
attorney and expert until after the expert’s report is produced.
In their briefing, the parties cite cases on both sides of the question of whether a
right to private inspection exists. As outlined above, however, the applicable rules of
civil procedure do not explicitly provide a right of private inspection. Instead, the rules
create a framework from which it can be determined whether a particular inspection in
a specific case may be conducted outside the presence of opposing counsel. The rules
simply allow for an inspection of tangible things like RVs (Rule 34) and then provide for
the protection of the mental impressions and such of attorneys and their representative,
including experts, (Rule 26(b)(3)) while ensuring that all of the inspecting expert’s
thoughts and efforts in preparing a report “regardless of the form.” (Rule 26(b)(4)(B)).
Without more explicit direction from the Rules, the Court is left to analyze the unique
circumstances of this case to make the discretionary decision about a private inspection
for Defendants. This case-by-case, particularized approach is supported by cases cited
by the parties.
For instance, the court in Diepenhorst v. City of Battle Creek, No. 1:05CV00734, 2006
WL 1851243, at *1 (W.D. Mich. June 30, 2006) articulated well its particularized analysis
in ascertaining that a private forensic inspection of original documents was warranted.
In support, the court advocated the general proposition that “each party should be free
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to engage in its own trial preparation unhampered by the intrusive supervision of the
opposing party.” Id. The court also relied on other courts in cases “where purely
nondestructive testing [was] proposed” that typically “allow[ed] the examiner to
perform his or her work without being scrutinized by the opposing expert.” Id. Notably,
however, the Diepenhorst court recognized that “the particular circumstances of a case
may dictate a different result.” Id. Said another way, Diepenhorst explained that the
existence of a right to a private inspection does not automatically arise in every case;
rather, the question of whether a right to private inspection exists requires analysis of
the unique circumstances involved in each case.
In a different case, the court decided that opposing counsel should be allowed to
be present at multiple site inspections needed in the litigation of a large class action by
inmates regarding conditions at California prisons. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, NO. CIV
S-90-0520 LKK JFM P; NO. C01-1351 THE, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99928, at *23–*25 (E.D.
Cal. Oct. 30, 2007). The court found that open inspections were needed in that case to
“promote efficiency and fairness.” Id. at *24. The court reasoned that
the presence of all counsel on all expert inspections will create the
“common factual baseline” . . . concerning the events of inspection,
thereby reducing the number of preliminary questions that must be
explored in depositions and/or at the trial of this matter. In addition,
given the likelihood that [the] experts will want to talk to members of the
plaintiff class . . ., the presence of counsel minimizes potential conflicts
arising from these communications.
Id. at *24–*25. Thus, the Coleman court was influenced by several facts unique to that
class action—(1) the complex nature of the litigation, (2) the cost savings resulting from
eliminating at least some preliminary questions at expert depositions or at trial, and (3)
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the experts’ interest in talking to class members—when deciding to allow, or even
encourage, counsel’s attendance at each site inspection.
Consistent with the discretion afforded by Rules 26(b)(3) and (4) and the
particularized approach exemplified in both Diepenhorst and Coleman, this Court will
inventory the unique concerns and circumstances of this case in deciding whether
Plaintiffs’ counsel should be allowed to attend Defendants’ expert’s inspection.
1.

Fear of Destructive Testing

Plaintiffs want to observe Defendants’ expert’s inspection of the RV out of fear
that destructive testing, even if inadvertent, will occur. Plaintiffs’ fear is based upon the
experience of their attorney in similar product liability cases. Yet the courts in both
Diepenhorst and Cottrell allowed private inspections of tangible items when the
inspecting party explicitly stated that it would only conduct nondestructive testing.
Cottrell, 2017 WL 5213876, at *2–*3; Diepenhorst, 2006 WL 1851243, at *1. In Cottrell, the
court was also influenced by the inspecting party’s intention to document the tangible
item’s condition both before and after the inspection. 2017 WL 5213876, at *2.
Here, Defendants explicitly seek to perform nondestructive testing on Plaintiffs’
RV. Taking Defendants and their counsel at their word, any damage during the
inspection would be inadvertent with no guarantee that the presence of Plaintiffs or
their counsel could prevent such unintentional and unanticipated damage. Moreover,
the Court could ensure preservation of any evidence related to the conduct of the
inspection by other means such as ordering Defendants to create a video recording of
the entire inspection. Furthermore, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure protect
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Plaintiffs by providing for sanctions in the event an attorney is found to have made a
misrepresentation to this Court or in the event of spoliation of evidence. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 11, 37.
2.

Protection of Trial Preparation Materials and Activities

Plaintiffs have also argued that they want to attend the inspection, in part, “to
establish a common factual baseline of what took place during the inspection” [DE 21 at
7] and because they “are far better able to prepare for trial if they (or their counsel) have
been able to personally observe the manner in which the inspection is conducted.” [DE
21-12 at 5]. Plaintiffs’ language is consistent with the court’s rationale in Coleman. 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99928, at *24. And indeed, the conduct of the inspection likely
constitutes discoverable underlying facts relevant to the interpretation of Defendants’
expert’s ultimate opinion and report. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A)–(B); Valley Forge Ins.
Co., 2017 WL 1361309, at *9. However, the unique circumstances of Coleman—its status
as a large class action, the large number of site inspections, and the relevance of plaintiff
testimony to the experts involved in the inspections—made attendance by opposing
counsel to avoid wasting the parties’ resources much more valuable. Moreover, the
court decided that all inspections, whether conducted by the plaintiffs or the
defendants, should be open to opposing counsel.
Plaintiffs’ case here is not as large or complex as the class action in Coleman. And
most critically, Plaintiffs’ expert has already conducted a private inspection of the RV.
Thus, Defendants’ costs for deposing Plaintiffs’ inspection expert and other discovery
targeting the facts underlying Plaintiffs’ expert’s report were not minimized.
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Defendants would also be prejudiced by an open inspection because Plaintiffs would
have an unfair advantage in preparing for trial having attended Defendants’ expert’s
inspection when Plaintiffs prevented Defendants from deciding for themselves whether
to attend the inspection conducted by Plaintiffs’ expert.
Similarly, Plaintiffs’ heavy reliance on Eirhart v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 93 F.R.D.
370 (N.D. Ill. 1981) to support their argument for an open inspection is misplaced due to
the unique circumstances of that case. In Eirhart, the court allowed the plaintiff’s
counsel to observe a special production line created by the defendant manufacturer to
study the issues raised in the plaintiff’s complaint. Id. at 371. The court reasoned that
the plaintiff was not attempting to glean any test results or opinions through its
observation of the defendant’s production line study. Id. at 372. Additionally, the court
found that it would be impossible for the plaintiff to replicate the results of the
defendant’s study. Id. As such, the inspection would not interfere with the preparation
of trial materials or strategies protected through Rule 26(b)(3) and (4) and would have
satisfied the work product exceptions set out in Rule 26(b)(3).
Again relevant is the fact that Plaintiffs here have already conducted their own
private inspection. In so doing, Plaintiffs have essentially already replicated
Defendants’ anticipated expert inspection leaving Plaintiffs without any substantial
need for the information gleaned from the inspection results. Furthermore, Plaintiffs
stated that attending the inspection would allow them to better prepare for trial,
implying an interest in more than the discoverable underlying facts of the inspection.

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Regardless of their intentions, however, Plaintiffs would necessarily be privy to
both the expert’s and Defendants’ counsel’s trial preparations if allowed to observe
Defendants’ expert’s nondestructive inspection of the RV. The scope of the expert’s
inspection would be obvious to any observer and will have been directly influenced by
the hiring counsel’s mental impressions and theories of the case that will undoubtedly
dictate the plan for the inspection. Similarly, any observer would be able to discern at
least part of the evolution of the expert’s thinking during the inspection based upon his
conduct. Indeed, the expert’s thinking could affect the sequence and scope of his
inspection even if no words are spoken.
In other words, Plaintiffs would be improperly intruding upon Defendants’
development of their case. See Cottrell, 2009 WL 5213876, at *2 (citing Shoemaker, 154
F.R.D. at 236). And despite Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary, Rule 26(b)(3) and (4)
protect these aspects of the inspection. Both rules work hand in hand such that the
mental impressions of an expert are protected until they are incorporated into his expert
report. Id. Moreover, the balance of competing interests related to a private inspection
favors “allowing the examiner to work in peace” unless destructive testing is proposed
or the parties disagree on the nature of any testing. Diepenhorst, 2006 WL 1851243, at *1.
Plaintiffs have presented no circumstances unique to this case that outweigh
Defendants’ justified interest in protecting the impressions of both their counsel and
their expert when conducting the proposed nondestructive testing of Plaintiffs’ RV. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)–(4); Cottrell, 2009 WL 5213876, at *2 (citing Shoemaker, 154 F.R.D.
at 236).
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3.

Prejudice

Defendants’ right to a private inspection of Plaintiffs’ RV in this particular case
does not preclude Plaintiffs from using ordinary discovery methods after the expert’s
report is disclosed to secure disclosure of any non-privileged facts underlying
Defendants’ expert’s inspection. See Vardon Golf Co. v. Karsten Mfg. Corp., 213 F.R.D. 528,
534 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 513 (1947)); Eagle Compressors,
Inc. v. HEC Liquidating Corp., 206 F.R.D. 474, 479 (N.D. Ill. 2002). Therefore, Plaintiffs
will not be unduly prejudiced if they cannot attend Defendants’ expert’s inspection.
Admittedly, at least some of the costs associated with expert depositions might
have been avoided if the parties could have agreed to attend each other’s expert
inspections. However, Plaintiffs’ inspection of the RV without notice to Defendants
tipped the scales enough that Defendants’ trial preparations would be compromised if
their expert cannot conduct their own private inspection. The prejudice Defendants will
likely suffer if Plaintiffs’ counsel attends their expert’s inspection will arise just by the
process of the inspection regardless of any precautions the expert may take and
outweighs any of Plaintiffs’ reported concerns about a private inspection when
Defendants were not afforded the same opportunity.
B.

The Parties’ Inspection Protocol

Plaintiffs’ other central argument against a private inspection is the alleged
inspection protocol between counsel’s law firms who have worked together in recent
years on similar RV cases. The Court does not want to minimize the importance and
validity of such discovery-related agreements. Indeed, this Court regularly relies upon
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parties’ agreement in establishing case management plans. The Court also prefers to
empower parties to follow their own litigation plans as much as possible rather than
engage in excessive or intensive oversight.
Here, however, Plaintiffs have not provided the Court with enough information
about the alleged protocol to support using it to deny Defendants the trial preparation
protections afforded by Rule 26(b)(3) and (4). In fact, the record lacks any evidence from
which the Court can determine whether the alleged protocol constitutes a valid
agreement among the parties, especially now that Defendants’ counsel disputes the
protocol’s existence. Additionally, the time to present such a protocol to the Court
passed. The Court would have welcomed the opportunity to incorporate a written
version of an inspection protocol into its Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order. As such, the
parties should have presented any agreed protocol in their Rule 26(f) Report of Parties’
Planning. They did not. Therefore, the Court cannot enforce the alleged protocol.
Without a protocol formally in place, what’s good for the goose is good for the
gander. Plaintiffs ensured that they were able to conduct a private inspection by failing
to provide Defendants with notice that the inspection was happening thereby erasing
any opportunity Defendants might have had to attend. Now Defendants shall have the
same opportunity. And in the future, counsel should take more care to protect their
clients’ interests and resources by developing an agreed protocol and presenting it to
the Court in the Rule 26(f) Report of Parties’ Planning so the Court can incorporate it
into the Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order and enforce it, as necessary.

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C.

Rule 37 Attorney Fees

When a motion to compel is resolved, the court is left to determine whether
either party’s reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney’s
fees, should be awarded. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)–(B). Both parties’ explicitly request
such an award assuming that the Court will have favored them in resolving
Defendants’ instant motion to compel. As discussed above, the Court has favored
Defendants. Therefore, the Court must now, after giving Plaintiffs an opportunity to be
heard, require them to pay Defendants’ reasonable expenses incurred in making the
motion, including attorney’s fees. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). “[T]he court must not
order this payment if . . . [Plaintiffs’] objection was substantially justified; or other
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Id.
Here, Plaintiffs presented arguments and supporting legal authority in their
response brief that exposed a challenging procedural issue requiring careful
consideration of the unique circumstances of this case. As such, Plaintiffs’ objection to
the private inspection was substantially justified making an award of expenses under
Rule 37(a)(5)(A) unjust. Therefore, the parties shall cover their own expenses in
litigating this motion.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS IN PART Defendants’ motion

to compel as to the RV inspection. [DE 18]. The Court ORDERS Plaintiffs to make the
RV available for an inspection by Defendants’ expert at a date mutually acceptable to all
parties and under the terms set forth in Defendants’ Amended Notice. [DE 21-9].
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Additionally, the Court ORDERS Defendants to create a video recording of the entire
inspection and to serve it on Plaintiffs along with the expert’s report.
The Court also DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion to compel as to an award
of reasonable expenses under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A).
SO ORDERED this 14th day of May 2019.
s/Michael G. Gotsch, Sr.
Michael G. Gotsch, Sr.
United States Magistrate Judge

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