Stanfill v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 17

OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING the final decision of the Commissioner of SocialSecurity denying plaintiff Sandra S. Stanfills application for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits. ***Civil Case Terminated. Signed by Judge Philip P Simon on 3/13/19. (mlc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
SANDRA S. STANFILL,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant.

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CASE NO. 3:17-cv-856-PPS

OPINION AND ORDER
An ALJ denied Sandra Stanfill’s application for Social Security disability benefits,
and Stanfill now seeks review of that decision. Stanfill claims the ALJ made two main
errors in denying her application. She argues that the ALJ insufficiently weighed two of
her alleged impairments and that this error resulted in the ALJ finding that Stanfill had
greater abilities than she actually possesses. Second, she says that the ALJ made a clear
error in assessing her credibility concerning the effect of those impairments. Based upon
a review of the parties’ briefs, the ALJ’s written decision, the hearing transcript and
underlying record, I disagree with Stanfill and will affirm the ALJ’s decision.
Background
Stanfill first applied for benefits on July 9, 2014. [A.R. 12.1] In her application,
Stanfill alleged a series of impairments and medical conditions which she said rendered
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The Administrative Record (A.R.) in this case is found at Docket Entry # 7. Citations
are to the page number in the lower left-hand corner of the A.R.
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her disabled. Of these, the ALJ found that the underlying medical records supported a
finding that Stanfill had the following severe impairments: neuropathy, fibromyalgia,
status post cervical fusion, chronic pain syndrome, and obesity. [A.R. 14.] The ALJ
addressed in detail how additional conditions that Stanfill testified about were not
supported by the underlying medical records. Stanfill does not challenge these
determinations on the basis that any of them should have been found to be severe
impairments, but because they serve to support the ALJ’s credibility determination, a
review of them is in order.
Stanfill alleged hypoglycemia resulting in lightheadedness and dizziness, but
according to the ALJ, “a diagnosis of hyperglycemia has not been recorded” and “no
complaints of blood sugar drops have been noted during any visit with primary care
physician D. Ebersole, M.D. through the most recent visit on June 20, 2016.” [A.R. 14.]
Similarly, while Stanfill had reported to an optometrist that she was borderline diabetic,
the ALJ found that “the medical evidence is inconsistent with diabetes, borderline or
otherwise.” [Id. at 15.]
The ALJ next addressed Stanfill’s testimony concerning irritable bowel syndrome
(“IBS”) which Stanfill said caused her daily symptoms of diarrhea which would impact
her daily work activities. The ALJ noted, however, that Stanfill’s medical records
contained only one reference to IBS, a diagnosis by a Dr. Ebersole from December 1,
2015 which noted that Stanfill had IBS “without diarrhea” and that no treatment was
prescribed. [A.R. 15.] Stanfill also testified that her eyesight “can be messed up” and
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this affects her ability to read. [Id.] In a lengthy discussion of Stanfill’s eyesight and
corresponding treatment, the ALJ found no basis for a severe visual impairment, as
Stanfill’s eye pain was resolved via a prescription of Restasis for dry eyes, and Stanfill
had not followed up with a prescription for bifocals. [Id. at 17.]
In addition, the ALJ reviewed Stanfill’s alleged impairments stemming from
allergies, elbow pain, hypertension, hypothyroidism, headaches, mild neurocognitive
disorder, and anxiety, to find that Stanfill’s testimony and the underlying medical
records did not support a finding that such impairments were severe. [A.R. 17-18.]2
Thus, as discussed later in the written decision, the crux of the ALJ’s decision was that
while Stanfill had multiple severe impairments which were supported by objective
medical evidence, there were numerous instances of apparent exaggerations and
contradictions between what Stanfill testified to at the hearing and what was found in
her underlying medical records. This applied to both severe and non-severe
impairments. The ALJ found that “claimant’s allegations are not supported by the
objective medical evidence. In addition, she has alleged and reported unsubstantiated
diagnoses, and it appears that she has not fully complied with recommendations that

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While they do not appear to have been claimed as severe impairments and so were not
discussed in depth, elsewhere in the written decision, the ALJ noted several other
instances in which Stanfill had made claims to medical providers which were
uncorroborated. For example, during a consultative physical examination in October
2014 and during a visit with her optometrist in November 2015, she reported
osteoarthritis “but there is no imaging in evidence to support this report, and a
diagnosis in this regard has not been made.” [A.R. 24.] Likewise, during his visit with
her optometrist she reported suffering from lupus, but “no testing is in evidence to
confirm lupus and no treatment in this regard is reflected.” [Id.]
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may decrease her reported pain symptoms, such as cognitive behavioral therapy and
exercise. Despite the claimant’s allegations of near complete debilitation at the time of
the hearing, she advised Dr. Ebersole that she was using a personal trainer just six
months prior. Overall, the evidence is inconsistent with the claimant’s allegations[.]”
[A.R. 25.] The contradiction between Stanfill’s claims of “near complete debilitation”
and inability to work or function independently in her daily life on the one hand, and
what was contained within her underlying medical records, on the other, led the ALJ to
discount Stanfill’s credibility.
This credibility assessment informed the ALJ’s calculation of Stanfill’s Residual
Function Capacity (“RFC”). In formulating the RFC, the ALJ determined that Stanfill
has the capacity “to perform light work . . . except that the claimant can occasionally
climb ramps and stairs, she can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, she can
occasionally balance, stoop, kneel crouch, and crawl, and she should avoid concentrated
exposure to wet, slippery, or uneven surfaces and hazards, such as unprotected heights
and dangerous moving machinery.” [A.R. 20.] In doing so, the ALJ looked askance at
Stanfill’s testimony and reiterated her findings concerning the impairments discussed
above, finding that overall “[t]he claimant’s testimony suggested an extreme loss of
functioning that is not supported by the objective medical evidence.” [Id. at 22.] In
particular, the ALJ found that claims of an inability to stand or any feeling in her hands
were contradicted by claims of “tennis elbow” which she reported to her physician was
the result of doing “a lot of sanding” and painting, as well as her reporting working out,
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including use of a personal trainer six months prior to the hearing before the ALJ. [Id.]
As for Stanfill’s small fiber neuropathy and fibromyalgia, the ALJ recounted
several of Stanfill’s physician trips but noted that “the only reference related to ‘fiber’
neuropathy was during a February 27, 2009”visit which was seven years prior to the
hearing before the ALJ. [A.R. 22.] And even that reference to fiber neuropathy was
merely “suggestive” of small fiber neuropathy. [Id.] Indeed, an EMG performed two
weeks later was normal and without evidence of neuropathy. [Id. at 23.]
The ALJ also discussed Stanfill’s October 2014 consultative examination with Dr.
Villareol in depth. Dr. Villareol’s notes stated Stanfill was “in no ‘painful distress,’ she
was alert and oriented, and recent and remote memory was preserved.” Her posture
was “straight” and she was able to walk toe to heel and able to move on and off the
examination table, albeit “with difficulty.” [A.R. 24.] Her knee strength and range of
motion in her extremities were normal. And while range of motion in the cervical spine
was decreased, Stanfill had full range of motion in her thoracic and lumbar spine. [Id.]
The State Agency, upon its review, determined that Stanfill retained the capacity for a
restricted range of light work activity, which was effectively what the ALJ determined.
Given this RFC determination, the ALJ considered whether Stanfill could
perform her prior work experience. Stanfill previous worked as a school bus driver. The
ALJ consulted the testimony of a Vocational Expert (“VE”) who participated in Stanfill’s
hearing. The VE testified that while a school bus driver is defined as a “medium
exertion” job in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”), Stanfill performed this
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job at a light exertion level. [A.R. 25-26.] The VE was then posed a series of
hypotheticals to determine whether someone with Stanfill’s RFC could find sufficient
employment. The VE determined that sufficient jobs existed in the national economy
which Stanfill could perform. Specifically, the VE testified that Stanfill could be
employed as a cashier, officer helper, or pricer. [Id. at 27.] Given these findings, the ALJ
determined that Stanfill was not disabled and denied her application for benefits.
Discussion
Before diving into the specifics of Stanfill’s argument, let’s start with some basics
on what my role is in this process. It is not to determine from scratch whether Stanfill is
disabled or whether she should receive benefits. Instead, my review of the ALJ’s
findings is deferential, to determine whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards
and whether the decision’s factual determinations are supported by substantial
evidence. Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 310 (7th Cir. 2012). If substantial evidence
supports the Commissioner’s factual findings, they are conclusive. Id.; 42 U.S.C. §405(g).
Substantial evidence is a low bar. Long ago, the Supreme Court told us that
“substantial evidence” means more than a “scintilla” of evidence, but less than a
preponderance of the evidence. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). “Evidence
is substantial if a reasonable person would accept it as adequate to support the
conclusion.” Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004). Given this modest
standard, the review is a light one. But, of course, it is not meaningless review; I cannot

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“simply rubber-stamp the Commissioner’s decision without a critical review of the
evidence.” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000).
With this basic primer on the standards governing my decision-making out of
the way, it’s time to address Stanfill’s specific arguments. Although she makes the
argument second, I will first address Stanfill’s claim that the ALJ improperly assessed
her credibility concerning her subjective complaints. As a starting point, it should be
noted that “[a]n ALJ is in the best position to determine a witness’s truthfulness and
forthrightness” and as such, a reviewing court will not overturn a credibility
determination unless it is “patently wrong.” Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 504 (7th
Cir. 2004). “This court will affirm a credibility determination as long as the ALJ gives
specific reasons that are supported by the record for his finding.” Id. In making such
determinations, an ALJ first looks to see if there are medically determinable
impairments that could reasonably be expected to produce symptoms, and then
evaluate to what extent the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms
limit a claimant’s functioning. Here, the ALJ did just that, as recounted in the above
RFC determination. [A.R. 20.] The ALJ determined that Stanfill’s level of exertion,
including “a lot of sanding,” painting, and weight loss from working with a personal
trainer, inconsistent with her claims of being unable to stand for any length of time
without pain. [Id. at 22-23.] But beyond that inconsistency, the ALJ further noted how
Stanfill’s characterizations were inconsistent with the objective medical evidence
provided by her doctors and testing. [See id. at 22-25.]
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Stanfill argues that Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2004) prohibits an
ALJ from rejecting or limiting the weight given to a claimant’s testimony concerning her
impairments solely because that testimony is not fully supported by the claimant’s
underlying medical records. In essence, Stanfill argues that Carradine requires an ALJ to
presumptively believe any statement made by a disability claimant unless they are
definitively contradicted by objective medical records. This is an incorrect statement
and an overreading of the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Carradine. That case focused on
subjective complaints of pain and how pain can be both psychological and physical in
nature, and it is improper for an ALJ to reject complaints of pain only because they are
unsupported by objective physical evidence. As the court explained, “[p]ain is always
subjective in the sense of being experienced in the brain. The question whether the
experience is more acute because of a psychiatric condition is different from the
question whether the applicant is pretending to experience pain, or more pain than she
actually feels. The pain is genuine in the first, the psychiatric case, though fabricated in
the second.” Carradine, 360 F.3d at 754–55. Here, the ALJ did not impermissibly
discount Stanfill’s claimed pain levels; instead the ALJ found numerous conditions and
impairments alleged by Stanfill to be unsupported by her medical records and directly
contradicted by her reported activities. [See A.R. 20-25.] That is a very different thing.
In sum, the ALJ did not error in discounting Stanfill’s testimony concerning her
“near complete debilitation” at the time of the hearing because of contradictions from
her recent medical records. And to the extent Stanfill’s argument focuses only on pain
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and not the wider RFC determination, she makes no argument that her pain is “more
acute because of a psychiatric condition” like the claimant in Carrdine.
Having analyzed the ALJ’s credibility determination concerning Stanfill’s
testimony (which undergirds much of the analysis relating to RFC), I will turn now to
her other argument. Stanfill’s brief is not a model of clarity on this point, but her
argument focuses on the ALJ’s RFC determination in general and the corresponding
findings concerning jobs based on that RFC. [DE 12 at 12-19.] First, Stanfill argues that
the ALJ’s finding that she could return to her work as a bus driver was not supported
by substantial evidence. Second, and more broadly, Stanfill tells me that the ALJ’s
improper evaluation of her fiber neuropathy and fibromyalgia led to an improper RFC
determination. Because the RFC determination itself comes first in the sequence of an
ALJ’s decision, I will address it before the job-specific argument.
Stanfill attacks the ALJ’s RFC determination through a variety of means. One of
them is to say that the ALJ impermissibly “played doctor” and that despite the fact
Stanfill had been diagnosed with small fiber neuropathy, the ALJ simply did not believe
that Stanfill actually had this affliction. [DE 12 at 13-14 (“The ALJ seemed to have
determined Ms. Stanfill did not have small fiber neuropathy[.]”).] Stanfill says that the
ALJ made the same mistake when evaluating the effects of her fibromyalgia. [DE 12 at
17 (“The ALJ seems to determine that Ms. Stanfill does not have fibromyalgia[.]”)] But
Stanfill’s assertions are directly at odds with the fact that the ALJ did specifically find
(thus agreeing with Stanfill) that she suffered from both fibromyalgia and neuropathy
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and that these impairments were severe. [A.R. 14.] So, to be clear, the ALJ did not refuse
to accept the diagnoses or believe that Stanfill was faking these impairments. Instead,
she accepted the diagnoses, but found that Stanfill’s claims as to their effects on her
daily living and ability to sustain gainful employment were not supported by the
underlying medical evidence.
So what Stanfill is really challenging is that, in her view, the ALJ should have
found that her impairments from these two diseases were worse than what the ALJ
determined. This is because, according to Stanfill, fibromyalgia and small fiber could
reasonably cause the symptoms she alleged. The problem is that Stanfill does not point
out any uncontroverted evidence at odds with the ALJ’s decision, any key piece of
evidence or medical opinion which the ALJ ignored, or other impermissible action.
Instead, Stanfill wants me to second-guess the ALJ and re-weigh the evidence in a
manner that would result in a more limited RFC determination. But that is not
something a reviewing court is permitted to do. Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1001
(7th Cir. 2004) (holding that a reviewing court may not “reweigh evidence, resolve
conflicts in the record, decide questions of credibility, or, in general substitute our own
judgment for that of the Commissioner”) (citation omitted); Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d
836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007) (“When reviewing for substantial evidence, we do not displace
the ALJ’s judgment by reconsidering facts or evidence or making credibility
determinations.”).

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Skinner is instructive. There, the Seventh Circuit noted that while the claimant’s
“symptoms are reasonably related to her diagnoses of diabetes and hypertension . . . the
existence of these diagnoses and symptoms does not mean that the ALJ was required to
find that [the claimant] suffer disabling impairments. Contrary to any claim of severity,
the ALJ concluded that at best [the claimant] had demonstrated nondisabling
symptoms, and the record medical evidence established that those symptoms are
largely controlled with proper medication and treatment.” Skinner, 478 F.3d at 844-45.
So too here. The ALJ reviewed Stanfill’s symptoms resulting from her fibromyalgia,
neuropathy and other impairments based on what was supported by the objective
evidence and crafted an RFC which restricted Stanfill’s activities to be consistent with
those symptoms. [A.R. 24-25.] And because that determination was supported by
substantial evidence, it was not done in error.
Finally, I will address Stanfill’s claim that the ALJ erred in finding that she could
return to work as a school bus driver because while that job is listed in the DOT has
being of “medium exertion,” Stanfill performed it at a light exertion level. This is
Stanfill’s strongest argument, but in the end it does not make a difference to the
disposition of her case. That is because, even if the ALJ’s finding that she could return to
work as a school bus driver was in error, the ALJ further found, based upon the RFC
and corresponding testimony of the VE, that Stanfill could perform three other jobs:
cashier, officer helper and pricer. [A.R. 27.] Thus, a finding that she could perform her
job as a school bus driver was at most harmless error. And harmless error is not a basis
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to reverse an ALJ. Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 924 (7th Cir. 2010). Stanfill does not
challenge the determination regarding the other three jobs, except in that she challenges
the entire RFC determination. And as recounted above, that RFC determination was
made based upon substantial evidence and thus there is no basis to overturn it.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security denying plaintiff Sandra S. Stanfill’s application for Social Security Disability
Insurance Benefits is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED on March 13, 2019.

/s/ Philip P. Simon______
PHILIP P. SIMON, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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