Chandler v. Warden

Filing 21

OPINION AND ORDER: The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED. The clerk is DIRECTED to close this case. Signed by Judge Jon E DeGuilio on 10/2/18. (Copy mailed to pro se party)(ksp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
KEVIN CHANDLER,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN,
Respondent.

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CAUSE NO. 3:17-CV-862-JD-MGG

OPINION AND ORDER
Kevin Chandler, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed an amended habeas corpus
petition challenging a disciplinary hearing (ISP 17-09-107) where a Disciplinary Hearing
Officer (DHO) found him guilty of sexual contact against staff without consent in
violation of Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC) Policy B-204 on September 20,
2017. ECF 8 at 1, ECF 14-7 at 1. As a result, he was sanctioned with the loss of 90 days
earned credit time and demoted one credit class. Id. The Warden has filed the
administrative record and Chandler filed a traverse. Thus this case is fully briefed.
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees prisoners certain procedural due
process rights in prison disciplinary hearings: (1) advance written notice of the charges;
(2) an opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision-maker; (3) an opportunity to
call witnesses and present documentary evidence in defense, when consistent with
institutional safety and correctional goals; and (4) a written statement by the fact-finder
of evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418

U.S. 539 (1974). To satisfy due process, there must also be “some evidence” in the
record to support the guilty finding. Superintendent, Mass Corr Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445,
455 (1985). In his amended petition, Chandler presents a number of grounds he claims
entitle him to habeas corpus relief.
As a threshold matter, the DHO had sufficient evidence to find Chandler guilty
of sexual contact against staff without consent. In the context of a prison disciplinary
hearing, “the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could
support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472
U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985). “In reviewing a decision for some evidence, courts are not
required to conduct an examination of the entire record, independently assess witness
credibility, or weigh the evidence, but only determine whether the prison disciplinary
board’s decision to revoke good time credits has some factual basis.” McPherson v.
McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted).
[T]he findings of a prison disciplinary board [need only] have the support
of some evidence in the record. This is a lenient standard, requiring no
more than a modicum of evidence. Even meager proof will suffice, so
long as the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the
disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary. Although
some evidence is not much, it still must point to the accused’s guilt. It is
not our province to assess the comparative weight of the evidence
underlying the disciplinary board’s decision.
Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks, citations,
parenthesis, and ellipsis omitted).

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Here, Chandler was found guilty of violating IDOC offense B-204 which
prohibits inmates from “[c]ontact of a sexual nature with a staff person, including
contractual staff and volunteers, which includes intentional touching, either directly or
through the clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any
staff person. (Does not include kicking, punching, or grabbing the genitals when the
intent is to harm or debilitate rather than to sexually exploit.).” Indiana Department of
Correction, Adult Disciplinary Process: Appendix I. http://www.in.gov/idoc/files/
02-04-101_APPENDIX_I-OFFENSES_6-1-2015(1).pdf.
The Conduct Report charged Chandler as follows:
On Sep. 7, 2017, as I ofc. Rei was doing a security walk at 9:11 pm on the
100W range, I ofc. Rei stopped to talk to a[n] offender on the rec. pad
which happened to be in front of 106W cell. As I ofc. Rei was standing in
front of his cell offender Chandler D.O.C. 138734 grabbed my buttocks. I
ofc. Rei then proceed[ed] to ask offender Chandler “why did you touch
me”? Offender Chandle[r] laughed after I asked him the question. I ofc.
[Rei] proceed[ed] to finish the security walk and followed proper chain of
command.
ECF 14-1 at 1.
The video evidence of the September 7, 2017, incident was reviewed by the DHO
and showed the following:
On the above date [9-7-2017] and approximate time of 9:13 PM Officer B.
Rei is walking the 100 West side range in DCH. There is an offender in the
rec area that she stops and talks to. While she is talking to the offender in
the re[c] area, offender Chandler in D 106 reaches out of his cell and
touched her buttocks. She quickly turns around to face him and then
proceeds down the range.
ECF 14-6 at 1.
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In assessing the evidence, the DHO determined there was sufficient evidence in
the record to find Chandler guilty of violating offense B-204. A conduct report alone
can be enough to support a finding of guilt. McPherson, 188 F.3d at 786. Such is the case
here. In this case, Officer Rei, the reporting officer, documented the fact that Chandler
grabbed her buttocks when she was performing a security walk on the 100W range of
the prison after 9:00 p.m. on September 7, 2017. ECF 14-1 at 1. Here, Officer Rei
explained that, when she stopped to talk with another offender in the recreational area
across from Chandler’s cell, he reached out of his cell and grabbed her buttocks. Id. In
light of Officer Rei’s first hand account or personal knowledge of Chandler’s conduct,
there was more than “some evidence” for the DHO to find Chandler guilty of sexual
conduct against staff without consent. Therefore, because the DHO’s finding was
neither arbitrary or unreasonable in light of the facts presented in this case, the DHO
had sufficient evidence to find Chandler guilty of offense B-204.
Nevertheless, in one ground of his amended petition, Chandler argues his due
process rights were violated because he was improperly denied a witness statement
from Officer Peggy. ECF 8 at 2. Prison officials have discretion to “keep the hearing
within reasonable limits.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566. Thus, a hearing officer may deny
witness or evidence requests that threaten institutional goals or are irrelevant,
repetitive, or unnecessary. Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003). That is
what happened here. The DHO denied Chandler’s request for a statement from Officer
Peggy because it was “irrelevant.” ECF 14-7 at 1. Here, Chandler requested Officer
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Peggy’s testimony or a statement to show that Officer Rei was “very unprofessional
towards [him].” ECF 14-3 at 1. However, Officer Rei’s alleged demeanor does not
provide any defense to Chandler for his grabbing of Officer Rei’s buttocks. And, as
discussed, the conduct report in this case provides ample evidence to support the
DHO’s conclusion that Chandler was guilty of offense B-204.
Furthermore, a hearing officer’s improper exclusion of evidence will be deemed
harmless unless there is some indication from the record that the evidence “might have
aided [the prisoner’s] defense.” Piggie, 342 F.3d at 666. But here Chandler has not
identified anything from Officer Peggy that would prove to be exculpatory or might
have aided his defense. Thus, even if the DHO had improperly excluded Officer
Peggy’s testimony, it would have been a harmless error. Therefore, this ground does
not state a basis for habeas corpus relief.
In his amended petition, Chandler argues his due process rights were violated
because the DHO failed to follow IDOC policy when she denied his request to continue
his hearing. ECF 8 at 2. Here, Chandler claims he should have been granted one
continuance as permitted by IDOC policy. Id. However, habeas corpus relief can only
be granted for “violation[s] of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Failure to follow policy is not a constitutional violation. Estelle v.
McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991) (“state-law violations provide no basis for federal habeas
relief”) and Keller v. Donahue, 271 F. App’x 531, 532 (7th Cir. 2008) (inmate’s claim that
prison did not follow internal policies had “no bearing on his right to due process”).
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Therefore, Chandler’s claim regarding violations of IDOC policy can not be remedied in
a habeas corpus petition.
In another ground of his amended petition, Chandler seems to argue that his due
process rights were violated because he was denied a fair hearing. ECF 8 at 3. He
claims the DHO treated him unfairly by “getting up an[d] walking out of [the] hearing
befor[e] it was done.” Id. In the prison disciplinary context, adjudicators are “entitled
to a presumption of honesty and integrity,” and “the constitutional standard for
improper bias is high.” Piggie, 342 F.3d at 666. Due process prohibits a prison official
who was personally and substantially involved in the underlying incident from acting
as a decision-maker in the case. Id. However, due process is not violated simply
because the hearing officer knew the inmate, presided over a prior disciplinary case, or
had some limited involvement in the event underlying the charge. Id.
The court’s review of the record indicates there is no competent evidence in the
record to support Chandler’s contention that the DHO was biased against him or that
he did not receive a fair hearing. Notably, Chandler has not shown the DHO was
directly or otherwise substantially involved in the factual events underlying the
disciplinary charges, or the investigation of the incident. Piggie, 342 F.3d at 667.
Furthermore, the DHO thoroughly considered the record evidence and found there was
sufficient evidence to find Chandler guilty. Therefore, Chandler has not identified a
basis for granting habeas corpus relief.

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Furthermore, in his amended petition, Chandler argues his due process rights
were violated because he was improperly denied prison surveillance video evidence.
ECF 8 at 2, ECF 14-3 at 1. In support of his position, Chandler states he requested video
evidence from September 6, 2017, the day before the incident occurred, to show Officer
Rei acted unprofessionally toward him. Id. But here the DHO denied Chandler’s
request for the September 6, 2017, video evidence as “irrelevant.” ECF 14-7 at 1. See
Piggie, 342 F.3d at 666 (a hearing officer may deny witness or evidence requests that
threaten institutional goals or are irrelevant, repetitive, or unnecessary). As discussed,
Officer Rei’s alleged demeanor does not provide any defense for Chandler’s improper
behavior toward Officer Rei. Therefore, video evidence of prior interactions between
Officer Rei and Chandler are irrelevant to Chandler’s defense of the September 7, 2017
incident.
To the extent, Chandler asserts he was denied video evidence of the September 7,
2017 incident, that request was properly denied. ECF 8 at 2, ECF 14-3 at 1. While
Chandler had a right to request evidence in his defense, see Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566, he did
not necessarily have a right to personally review the evidence. See White v. Ind. Parole
Bd., 266 F.3d 759, 767 (7th Cir. 2001) (“prison disciplinary boards are entitled to receive,
and act on, information that is withheld from the prisoner and the public . . . “).
Chandler did not have a right to review the video evidence because the release of that
information would have given Chandler and other inmates insight into the surveillance
and investigative techniques employed by prison officials. The court has reviewed the
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video evidence and finds that the release of this information would have posed a
security threat if it had been released.
Chandler also did not have a right to review the video evidence because it does
not contain exculpatory evidence. Miller v. Duckworth, 963 F.3d 1002, 1005 (7th Cir.
1992) (“[i]nmates have a right to present relevant, exculpatory evidence in their
defense”). Exculpatory in this context means evidence which “directly undermines the
reliability of the evidence in the record pointing to [the prisoner’s] guilt.” Meeks v.
McBride, 81 F.3d 717, 720 (7th Cir. 1996). While Chandler had a right to present
relevant, exculpatory evidence in his defense, the video recording is made up of
incriminating evidence, which supports the conduct report. Miller, 963 F.3d at 1005. As
stated, the court has reviewed the video evidence and notes that it does not contain any
exculpatory evidence. Because the DHO, who presided over Chandler’s hearing,
considered all of the relevant evidence in this case, including the video evidence, staff
reports, and witness statements, there was no violation of Chandler’s due process
rights. White, 266 F.3d at 767. Therefore, Chandler has not identify a basis for granting
habeas corpus relief.
If Chandler wants to appeal this order, he does not need a certificate of
appealability because he is challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding. See Evans v.
Circuit Court, 569 F.3d 665, 666 (7th Cir. 2009). However, he may not proceed in forma
pauperis on appeal because pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) an appeal in this case
could not be taken in good faith.
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For these reasons, Kevin Chandler’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is
DENIED. The clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.
SO ORDERED on October 2, 2018

/s/ JON E. DEGUILIO
JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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